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Abstract  
The purpose of this thesis is to offer a defence for the goodness of the God of the 
Judeo/Christian Scriptures—in the light of [the Triune] God’s use of an 
evolutionary process; a process that has predation, pain and death as an essential 
core of its potential, id est, to give rise to the ‘end purposes (telɒs) of God’.  
The methodological approach taken in this thesis is one in which the shape of 
the account is determined by Christian doctrine—the scientific contribution 
being critically appropriated to that doctrinally shaped account. 
 
Under the heading of ‘Changes to the traditional/Biblical view of the attributes of 
God’ we consider the implications/alternatives espoused by some philosophical 
theologians. This section of the thesis explores the alternative views of the 
‘nature’ and ‘attributes’ of God, id est, the transposition of the God of Scripture 
with another in the light of the problem of natural evil—that of a creative ‘ground 
of being’ that is deemed more acceptable to both science and modern 
philosophical theology. Further to its research objectives the thesis investigates 
recent evolutionary defences/theodicies offered by several proponents of both 
scientific enquiry and theological research and reflection.  
 
The final part of the thesis offers an eight-step argument for the goodness and 
justice of God in the light of evolution—an argument that has developed out of 
the author’s  work regarding God, evolution and the  [evidential] problem of evil. 
A major part of the argument centres on the pre-cosmological existence of angels 
and the rebellion of those considered ‘fallen’.  
 GOD, evolution and the problem of evil: 
Towards A Solution 
Derek J. White 
 
 
3 
The argument offered in this thesis is that such creatures have been at the root of 
the universal problem of evil (natural and supernatural) since before the 
‘birthing’ of the universe and that the problem of evil was dealt a fatal blow 
through the incarnational work of Christ. 
 
A crucial part of the argument in this thesis is the significance of the evolutionary 
process—as being the only possible means for the development of biological life-
forms—a pathway for the incarnation and a means by which God, in Christ, 
would bring about redemption for the creation and ransom for mankind. 
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Part One 
1. Introduction to Thesis 
The interest for the subject of this thesis emanates from the conviction that the 
God of the Judeo/Christian Scriptures (The creator of all things ex nihilo) is both 
Omnipotent and Benevolent; and this in the light of an evolutionary process that 
is, seemingly, the root cause of suffering—a process that may be described as that 
through which, “…thousands of animals are being eaten alive; others are running 
for their lives, whimpering with fear; others are being slowly devoured from 
within by rasping parasites…” [etc..] (Dawkins 1996, 132)  
 
The word benevolence is, as McCabe (2010, 56) reports Aquinas as saying, “…used 
‘secundum analogiam’ (according to analogy)…The inferences in the case of God 
fail because ‘good’ is a contextually dependant word.”  Though it is the case that 
Aquinas thought that evil was, most often, the absence (privation) of positive 
outcomes; it can be argued, as we do, that to say that God’s benevolence always 
has to be interpreted as God’s having to bring about ‘good outcomes for 
whosoever—whether justified outcomes or not is mistaken; this is not to deny 
God’s right to forgive but God’s right to bring about a just state of affairs. 
 
Clearly a theistic view of the creation must attribute some intentionality within 
the process of natural selection—a process that may be described as ‘purpose-
driven’. Evolution in this thesis is taken to be the process through which [God], 
rather than entirely unguided materialistic processes, has brought about the best 
possible conditions for the development of life and consciousness—the process 
through which God will bring about His ultimate goal—at the eschatological 
climax of God’s creation.  
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Dennis Lamoureux (2013) offers an evolutionary theological perspective that he 
refers to as ‘Evolutionary Creationism’: “Evolutionary creation asserts that the 
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit created the universe and life, including humans, 
through an ordained, sustained and intelligent design-reflecting evolutionary 
process.” (42,43) It is from the perspective of a ‘purpose-driven natural process’ 
that the argument in this thesis is developed. 
 
Since the advent of Darwinism—and because of the increasing challenge of 
Naturalistic Materialism—there is an increasingly urgent need for a fresh 
approach to the subject of theodicy. As a result of a developing (hostile) narrative 
the existence of the God of the Bible is in question or simply classified along with 
‘fairy story’ narratives—as being blatantly false. The second reason for the 
undertaking of this research is because of a personal dissatisfaction with 
theodicies/defences of:    
 
i) a traditional genre i.e. ‘Fall’ defences that offer the actions of the man 
and woman in the ‘Garden of Eden’ as the sole reason for the 
predation, parasitism and plague experienced by all carbon-based life-
forms since the beginning of time—or in this case since the 
disobedience of the first humans. 
ii) defences that offer naturalistic explanations, philosophical speculation 
or dialectical reasoning—without major consideration for what 
Scripture may teach regarding past and future events. 
 
This thesis is concerned with the problem of suffering among sentient creatures 
of all varieties in the light of evolutionary processes that have been a part of life’s 
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progression from its genesis. This is not to say that there were would not have 
been significant ‘effects’ initiated by God after the Fall of mankind as Scripture 
indicates; neither is it to say that fallen angels have not, do not and will not bring 
about states of affairs that have increased, do increase and will increase the 
potential of suffering for sentient life-forms. On the contrary, Scripture makes 
clear that such causes and effects proceeded from both the fall of angels and of 
mankind. Moreover, it is the case that mankind itself is responsible for an 
unfathomable amount of suffering—whether through his moral ineptitude or 
through his abuse/misuse of God given natural resources. 
 
The thesis considers the extent to which this suffering acts as a charge against 
either the power or the goodness of God. The thesis addresses the problem from 
a position of belief and commitment to a view of God’s character and attributes—
as offered by the Scriptures rather from any modern/post-modern notion of the 
‘person’/character of God. The argument in this thesis offers what may be 
considered a fresh approach to the problem—an approach which is consistent 
with the Scriptures or with theistic evolutionary views of God’s ‘eternal’ 
perspectives—his ‘plans and purposes’ for the created order. 
 
The approach to this work is of a theological/scientific nature rather than a 
purely scientific, philosophical approach. The reasons for taking the 
theological/scientific approach are due, in particular, to the nature of the ‘charge’ 
against God—not any ‘god’ but, specifically, the God of the Bible—that biological 
evolutionary processes cannot be harmonized with any notion of divine 
benevolence.  
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1.1 Methodological Considerations 
The approach to the subject of Evolution, Suffering and the God of the Bible is 
situated in relation to the taxonomy offered by Neil Messer (2007). Messer 
considers five possible options.  
o Option 1: Only science contributes to the account, and the contribution of 
Christian doctrine is dismissed.  
This option has no bearing on this work as it is, primarily, a theological 
work that discusses a scientific given—that of Evolutionary Theory. 
o Option 2: Both science and Christian doctrine contribute to the account; 
its shape is determined by the scientific contribution, and the input from 
Christian doctrine must be adjusted to fit the outlines determined by the 
scientific contribution.  
This approach cannot be the one taken here. It is Christian doctrine that is 
the determining factor—for it is with Christian doctrine that the challenge 
presently lies.  
Option 3: Both science and Christian doctrine contribute, and neither has 
sole control over the shape of the account.  
This option is partly acceptable. However, as conservative Christian beliefs 
are based on Scripture and tradition—that which has been affirmed by the 
conciliar creeds, as a reliable and, indeed, plausible account of the history of 
God’s interaction with mankind—Scripture rather than scientific 
interpretation should have the final word. This is not to suggest that the 
evolutionary paradigm may be deficient but rather that it is a matter of 
doctrine over science; this is of particular importance as it is likely that, as 
scientific paradigms develop, the more ‘accurate or more reliable model’ will 
be accepted as being superior to the prevailing paradigm. Ideas change and 
paradigms may change along with those ideas.  
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Faith on the other hand does not depend on scientific verification but on 
adherence to the doctrine revealed in Scriptures and attested by the great 
councils of the Church.  
Option 4: Both science and Christian doctrine contribute; the shape of the 
account is determined by Christian doctrine, and the scientific 
contribution is critically appropriated to that doctrinally shaped account.  
This is crucial for this thesis—this particular type of encounter’—in which 
both science and Christian doctrine contribute to the account, its shape 
being determined by Christian doctrine, and the scientific contribution being 
critically appropriated to that doctrinally shaped account…’ (60) 1 
o Option 5: Only the contribution of Christian doctrine is admitted, the 
scientific contribution being denied or dismissed.  
This option is not relevant to this research project, since, in broad terms, the 
scientific relevance of an evolutionary narrative is not in question. 
 
The author’s Christian persuasion is summed up by the following:  
 That Scripture (The Bible) is the final authority in all matters of faith and 
doctrine (sola Scriptura). It is not, however, advocated that the Scriptures 
are the product of ‘divine dictation’—to quote Alister McGrath: “Just as 
Christ’s divinity does not abrogate Christ’s human nature, so the divine 
authorship of Scripture does not abolish its human authorship.” (1993, 55)  
 It is appreciated that ‘no one proposition’ may express all the truth but the 
notion that there is, therefore, no likelihood of any such truths is not 
denied. The author advocates belief in the propositional nature of 
                                                          
1
 For Messer this doctrinally shaped account can be found in the theology of Karl Barth. 
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Scripture e.g. ‘Jesus Christ is Lord’; ‘Humans are Sinful’; ’Jesus’ death 
atones for human sin’; ‘There is Judgement’. (Groothius 2000, 117) 
. “…the Christian gospel tells how for the world’s redemption God entered 
into history,…‘the eternal came into time, the kingdom of heaven invaded 
the realm of earth, in the great events of the incarnation, crucifixion, and 
resurrection of Jesus the Christ.” (Bruce 1960, 7-8) 
 The truth of Christian doctrine does not depend solely on personal belief 
or on the beliefs of the community of faith; it is true whether or not 
anyone adheres to its propositions. 
 The importance of personal encounter/experience of God is a given 
though it is not advocated that experience is the sole witness of the work 
of God, or that it should have pre-eminence as the principal means of 
witness of the individual believer or of the community of faith.   
 
Fundamental to this approach to the subject of evolutionary theodicy is the belief 
that the Testaments of the Bible are trustworthy in all things essential for faith. 
Gordon Wenham says (1987), regarding the problem of the received wisdom of 
the distant past and of the (post) modern present, that:  
 
If it is correct to view Genesis 1-11 as an inspired retelling of ancient oriental 
traditions about the origins of the world—with a view to presenting the 
nature of the true God as one, omnipotent, omniscient, and good as opposed 
to the fallible, capricious, weak deities who populated the rest of the ancient 
world; if further it is concerned to show that humanity is central in the 
divine plan, not an afterthought; if finally it wants to show that man’s plight 
is the product of his own disobedience and indeed is bound to worsen 
without divine intervention, Genesis 1-11 is setting a picture of the world that 
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is at odds both with the polytheistic optimism of ancient Mesopotamia and 
the humanistic secularisation of the (post) modern world. (Wenham 1987, 
.iii)                                                                                                                                                                                
 
In the introduction to his book ‘The Lost World of Genesis One’ (2009) John, H. 
Walton says of the Old Testament, that “…it is God’s revelation of himself to 
Israel and secondarily through Israel to everyone else.” (7)  Walton affirms the 
distinctiveness of the biblical literature when compared to other contemporary 
writings. Indeed Walton suggests that to compare the Old Testament to the 
literature of the ancient world is not, “…to assume that we expect to find 
similarity at every point.” (Walton, 10). The Bible is, as Walton states, distinctive 
—in that it does reveal the nature and character of God. Moreover, Scripture is, 
as the apostle Paul makes clear in his letter to Timothy“…breathed out by God 
and profitable for teaching…”(2 Timothy 3:16). We advocate that it is the case that 
though the Bible uses various literary devices (metaphors, similes etcetera) this 
does not imply that it conveys indecisive language or that it does not include 
historical narrative2.  It is also the case that although the Bible is not a textbook 
of science it informs us of the relation of God to the cosmos and to human 
beings. This does not mean that the Bible is offering some kind of ‘scientific 
treatise’ from which we can deduce equations. It means that Scripture reveals 
                                                          
2
 ‘We know that the earth does not rest on literal foundations or pillars made of stone, concrete, 
or steel. We can therefore see that the words ‘foundations’ and ‘pillars’ are used in the 
metaphorical sense. However, it needs to be emphasised once more that the metaphors stand for 
realities. God the creator has built certain very real stabilities into the planetary system that will 
guarantee its existence so long as is necessary to fulfil his purposes. Science has been able to show 
us that the earth is stable in its orbit over long periods of time, thanks in part to the obedience of 
gravity to an inverse square law, to the presence of the moon, which stabilises the tilt of the 
earth’s axis…’ (Lennox 2011, 33) 
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certain truths but not others. Examples of such truths would be the essential 
[high] calling of humankind in God’s creative purposes, and the redeeming work 
of Christ—and of God’s immanent, cruciform relationship with his creation 
throughout the history of the cosmos.3 
 
In addition to the above, the following commitments are an essential part of the 
argument given here in this thesis: 
i. That God is sovereign over the universe and all that functions within it: 
That this sovereign God is not to be confused with lesser gods—demiurges 
etc. Moreover, that the sovereign God has allowed evil to exist on earth so 
that evil is ultimately defeated.  
ii. That the emergence of creatures with the ‘will to choose within the 
created order was a major part of God’s goal for the creation.  
The notion/possibility of the absence of Free-Will in advanced, sentient 
beings such as mankind would be in contradistinction to the character of 
the God who is the ultimate expression of personality and unity. 
iii. That the Goodness of God is coterminous with the justice of God. And the 
Justice of God entails God’s desire to ‘deliver from evil’ rather than to exert 
a ‘compensatory’ form of justice—though God’s ultimate justice must 
prevail in whatever form God so chooses.  
                                                          
3
 In addition to these there is the personal experience of the life changing power of Jesus Christ—
through the Spirit of the Triune God. It is acknowledged however that experience may or may 
not, in real terms, verify the benevolence of God outside of that personal testimony .Indeed, it 
may be the case that personal testimonies offer varied definitions of ‘realised’ benevolence’. 
Nevertheless the personal experience of coming to Christ, in the author’s case from atheism, most 
certainly had ‘real’ consequences: causes and effects. 
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iv. Furthermore the argument in this thesis is that the laws of physics (as 
presently understood) are fundamental to God’s creation of the cosmos 
and of the ensuing evolution of biological life forms—that it was God’s 
preordained purpose that an evolutionary process should be the means 
through which God would bring about his eternal purposes [ultimately] at 
the eschaton. 
 
1.2 Good & Evil 
Psalm 19:1 says, “The heavens declare the glory of God, and the sky above 
proclaims his handiwork.” Psalm 50:6, “The heavens declare his righteousness, for 
God himself is judge!” The universe is a glorious display of God’s infinite power 
and of God’s intricate handiwork. From an aesthetic perspective it could be said 
that biological evolution per se is wonderfully creative. Biological evolution is 
both a beautiful and a seemingly merciless system. Evolution could be described 
as the product of mindless ‘opportunity’ or of a merciless cosmic sadist. Whatever 
adjective or adjectival phrase one might use when describing the ‘vista’, process 
and effects of evolution, the argument here is that evolution is the only possible 
means through which God could have brought the genesis and telos of His 
creation. The view of both Robin Attfield (2006) and Christopher Southgate 
(2008)—is, indeed, that the values of such a process do outweigh the disvalues—
that God’s goodness is not an illusion but an actuality. However, differentiating 
between that which can be, justifiably, regarded as ‘good’ and that which 
constitutes ‘evil’ is an essential exercise for theodicy; this we do in the following 
section. 
  
1.2.1 Good 
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Karl Bridges (1997) states that God’s goodness is a bedrock truth of Scripture and 
that, “…although we might discuss God's goodness in some abstract philosophical 
sense, in Scripture his goodness appears most clearly in his dealings with people. 
He is not only good in general, but he is good to us.” 4 (Bridges 1997)  Goodness 
in its very essence, is ‘God’. God is ‘Good’. Jesus’ command to ‘love God with all 
our heart, soul, mind’ (Matthew 22:37) is due to the fact that the God of the 
Judeo/Christian Scriptures is goodness personified—is indeed nothing other than 
love itself (1.John 4 ). Indeed, would it be possible to offer genuine love and 
worship to a deity that was a contradiction in terms? McCabe (2010) suggests 
that we cannot say merely that God is good but that God is goodness or that 
goodness is God: “In the end, what is common to good things is not that they 
share a characteristic but that they share a creator.” (3)  
1.2.2 Evil 
The effects of ‘evil’ in this document are defined as the manifestation of ‘harms’ 
that are deemed to be contrary to the nature of goodness. McCabe states that, 
according to Aquinas, evil is a lack of good—a certain kind of absence (60).  “The 
word ‘evil’  signifies what St Thomas calls ‘a sort of absence of good’….(quaedam 
absentia boni), because to say that goodness is absent is not always to say that 
something is lacking in the properties that make it good…” (McCabe, 60)  
Aquinas cites the example of ‘a room lacking the goodness of a tree’; which 
simply means that there is no tree in the room. One might, of course, prefer that 
there were a tree in the room but its presence is not an essential part of the room. 
                                                          
4
 Bridges’ view though seems to suggest a kind of subjective outcome that indicates an ‘all is well’ 
in a kind of: ‘God is obliged to give every human (First World—at least) the most fulfilled, 
enjoyable/happy, existence/experience possible’. These things can, of course, define ‘good 
outcomes’ for those benefitting from such a subjective view of goodness but cannot be allowed to 
hijack the definition of God’s absolute goodness. Moreover, it does not take into consideration 
suffering among other species and may, therefore, be considered too anthropocentric.   
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However, if the goodness of a tree were lacking in a tree then this absence may 
indicate deprivation or negation. Ergo, to lack something that is essential to the 
normal functionality of any living creature would be considered the opposite to a 
good outcome.  
 
Norman Geisler (1974) suggests, along with Augustine et el, that evil is not a 
substance—it has no positive nature; but the loss of ‘the good’ is to be considered 
‘evil’. Geisler goes on to say that if evil were a substance, it would be good—since 
evil does not possess a nature of its own. “Evil does not subsist in itself; it lives 
only in another. It is an ‘ontological parasite’…If one asks what is the cause of evil 
willing, Augustine replies, ‘ What cause of willing can there be which is prior to 
willing…? Either ‘will’ is itself the first cause of sin, or the first cause [a free 
creature] is without sin.5’” (338-339) We absolutely concur with this view. Angels 
and men are both are created by God, though Angels, being incorporeal and 
extra-terrestrial, need not be considered ‘products’ of any evolutionary ‘pathway’. 
Both were created with Free-Will, i.e. the will to make choices. It is these [wrong] 
choices that produce the potential for the absence of good outcomes—the 
occurrence of harmful outcomes. We refer here to the outcomes of free-will 
choices rather than to harmful outcomes proceeding from natural consequences, 
such as predation etc. Of course natural causes bring about Aquinas’ privation as 
an exceedingly regular occurrence.  
 
Tina Beattie says that Thomas Aquinas's view of morality makes humans 
responsible for their actions and that, “… there is no other excuse, in terms of an 
evil force manipulating our wills…unless we are suffering from some lack or 
                                                          
5
 Augustine, Two Souls: Against the Manichaeans, X; On Free Will I,I,1: III, xvii,49. 
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defect of our natural rational faculties that diminishes our responsibility, we are 
accountable for what we intentionally do or fail to do.” (Beattie 2012)  
She adds that Aquinas's view of moral responsibility—for conscious agents with 
the will to do—(our italics) confronts us with the question that was asked 
by Rabbi Eliezer Berkovits: “not where was God in Auschwitz, but where was 
man?” (2012) This may apply to both men and angels. This we want to 
distinguish from what Christopher Southgate refers to when he talks of harms 
that arise, not because of the decisions of men or angels but as a natural part of 
the cycle of life—‘evolutionary evil’ (2008, 41), that branch of natural evil that 
involves harms to creatures that has no human or angelic cause but rather seem 
to form part of the ‘natural’ processes of evolution. Southgate is correct 
regarding—what is generally perceived to be the major hurdle regarding the 
goodness and omnipotence of God—evolutionary evil. Indeed, this is the major 
‘Problem of Evil’ but it is not the only source of harms—as if there were no other 
contenders that may be allowed to ‘shoulder the blame’, as shall be argued in 
Part Two of this thesis. 
2. Creation & Goodness  
2.1 Goodness in the Hebrew Scriptures 
In this section the use of the word ‘good’ in Scripture is considered in reasonable 
detail ,in particular with regards to its use in the Genesis  narrative[s]—how this 
word is ascribed to the God of the Bible and to his creation. In looking at the 
Genesis creation narrative  (Genesis 1:1-2:3) C. J. Collins notes that the author of 
Genesis refers to God looking back at what he had created and stating that 
“behold, it was very good” (1:31). Collins, referring to Thomas Aquinas (2001, 82) 
writes that he [God] brought things into being—and that his goodness might be 
communicated to his creatures, and be represented by them. Yamauchi (2003) 
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outlines five areas of ‘good’ (tōv) practical, abstract, quality, moral, and technical 
(2003). Melvin Tinker (2010) refers to the use of the word ‘good’ (tōv) and the 
conditioning of the word in context—suggesting that: 
 
…while the word has many shades of meaning, ranging from ‘useful to 
‘beautiful’ to ‘valuable’, the meaning of the word in any particular case will 
be conditioned, to a large extent, by its immediate context. It can certainly 
mean ‘aesthetically good’ and need not mean ‘perfection’…in the context 
of Genesis 1 the meaning is best taken as ‘efficient’…This interpretation 
leaves room for the idea of a creation which is perfectly in line with what 
the creator intended but which is less than absolutely perfect,…” 
(Tinker, 49). 
 
Ronald E. Osborn (2014) suggests that, as unsettling as it may be for some readers 
to discover, nowhere in Genesis is the creation described as ‘perfect’, “God 
declares his work to be good or tob at each stage and finally very good tob me 
’od at its end. Elsewhere in The Hebrew Bible tob me ’od describes qualities of 
beauty, worthiness or fitness for a purpose but never absolute moral or 
ontological perfection.” (29) In his comments on Genesis 1:31 Umberto Cassuto 
states that: 
 
…we have here, at the conclusion of the story of creation, a more 
elaborate and imposing statement that points to the general harmony 
prevailing in the world of the Almighty. On the previous days the words 
that it was good were applied to a specific detail; now God saw everything 
that He had made, the creation in its totality, and He perceived that not 
only were the details, taken separately, good, very good, but that each one 
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harmonized with the rest; hence the whole was not just good, but very 
good.(Cassuto, 59-60)  
 
It would seem, prima facie,  most incongruous if the state of affairs Cassuto 
describes could be that of the ‘genesis’ of the evolutionary process but that would 
be to miss the point—for the Genesis narrative (1:31) states that, on the sixth day, 
“God saw everything he had made, and behold, it was very good.” The question is: 
Would it have really been a time for rejoicing for an [omnipotent & omniscient] 
creator with any semblance of morality in his character?  
 
It is clear from the Genesis text that God concluded, on the sixth day, that the 
creation was, indeed, ‘very good’. The question arises as to how this ‘very 
goodness’ can apply to evolutionary creation? The key, we suggest, is in the 
literary function of the, “And God said” phrases—sometimes referred to as ‘divine 
fiats’—occurring, as they do, at least nine times in chapter one of Genesis.  
Alan Hayward (1985) suggests that though the text doesn’t tell us, there is a 
suggestion in the Job narrative that the audience of God’s creative declarations 
may have been angels (Job 38:4-7). Hayward’s point is that God does not see 
things the way man sees them and that, to God, “…the fiats are real; once the 
word is spoken, the deed is certain to follow. He commanded, and at once he 
saw—in his mind’s eye, so to speak…from the perspective of Heaven it seems that 
foreordaining something is tantamount to creating it.” (Hayward 1985, 174-175)  
It is in this sense that God can conclude—and that the author of Genesis can 
record—that the creation was, is and will be, ‘Very Good’.  
 
Making reference to the laws of physics, in particular the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics, Hayward comments that the Second Law does not denote a 
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universe where things have gone wrong but that, “It characterizes a universe 
where energy transfers can occur, and consequently where things can happen—in 
other words, a ‘very good’ universe.” (Hayward 1985, 184) A world where the 
Second law did not operate would be, in Hayward’s opinion, stagnant. Southgate 
(2008, 1) refers to the beautiful rhythms of the first chapter of the Hebrew Bible 
that culminate in the assertion that what God had made was ‘very good’. 
Southgate (2008) however points out that humans have always known that the 
creation contained ‘violence and pain’ and accepts that there is a real problem in 
affirming with Genesis 1:31 that this creation is “very good” (14). He nevertheless 
holds that creation is good: “—in its propensity to give rise to great values of 
beauty, diversity, complexity, and ingenuity of evolutionary strategy.” (15) 
Southgate makes clear nevertheless that these kinds of values do not of 
themselves act as justification for creation by means of evolution [by natural 
selection]. We agree with Southgate—that creation’s propensity to give rise to 
‘great values’ is a ‘good’. The view here though is that God’s ‘very good’ refers not 
to the beginnings of the creation [process], but to the whole of God’s planned 
intentions for the creation—the ‘alpha and omega’. In other words, God sees, in 
his mind’s eye, the whole picture and it is this that is ‘very good’. For God, surely, 
sees the beginning from the end and rejoices in the fact that ‘Creation’ is, de 
facto, very good. And this de facto good is not because ‘the ends justify the 
means’ but rather that ‘the means’ (the evolutionary process) is the only possible 
way for God to bring about an end that not only justifies the creator but that 
brings, at the eschaton, the best of possible outcome for all creatures—even 
Southgate’s ‘Pelican Heaven (2008, 85)’ 
 
Richard Swinburne argues that a perfectly good God would seek to do many good 
actions and no bad actions, and that, “good actions often derive their goodness 
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from bringing about states of affairs which are intrinsically good, that is good 
because of what they are and not because of how they were brought about or 
what they cause.” (Swinburne 1998, 50). Understanding what is meant by 
goodness is crucial for the question of theodicy. Swinburne’s comments are 
especially relevant regarding evolutionary theodicy and bear on the question of 
what the Bible means by ‘good’.Jϋrgen Moltmann states that:  
 
The verdict on creation—that it was ‘very good’ does not mean that it was 
in the Greek sense perfect and without any future; the Hebrew means that 
it was fitting, appropriate, corresponding to the Creator’s will. The 
accounts of the creation-in-the-beginning do not as yet talk about a 
creation in the glory of God. Only the Sabbath of creation is more than 
‘very good’. It is hallowed, sanctified and therefore points to creation’s 
future glory. The Sabbath is, as it were, the promise of future 
consummation built into the initial creation.” (1996, 264)  
 
Moltmann’s comments are insightful in that he offers, here, a rationale for past 
events and future ‘glories’  but without committing himself to a true definition of 
‘goodness’—apart from it (creation) being, at its inception, ‘hallowed’ and 
‘sanctified’. Moltmann’s definition, if we have understood him correctly, will not 
totally suffice as he does not appear to align himself with any clear definition of 
‘the good’ of creation. The question arises: Was it good or not? Our answer to 
that is that it was ‘very good’.  Herbert McCabe (2010, 59), working from the 
thought of Thomas Aquinas, argues that, “God whose essence is not potential 
with respect to existence, and which therefore does not constitute a limiting 
context for transcendental words (i.e.goodness), we can say not merely that God 
is good but that God is goodness or that goodness is God. ” For Aquinas, to have a 
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concept of goodness in the sense in which we have a concept would be to 
comprehend God. We take this to mean that God, in God’s self, is the ultimate 
expression of goodness. 
  
2.2  ‘Good’ as opposed to ‘Bad’  
God’s purposes for His creation, it is reasonable to assume, are ‘good’—good, that 
is, as opposed to: evil, wicked, corrupt, ruthless and unscrupulous—in the ethical 
sense ‘good and not bad’. John Swinton (2007) refers to Martin Buber who held 
that good was the product of striving for truth and beauty: “ ‘Such goodness’, 
Buber believed, does not occur accidentally, rather; ‘it emerges from intentional 
practices of caring about and paying attention to particular noble goals.’” 
(Swinton, 180-181) It is indeed these ‘noble’ goals of God that we seek to 
comprehend. Collins (2006, 69) suggests that the goodness of creation implies 
that the result of God’s creative endeavours were pleasing to God; God thought 
that the results were good. Collins concludes: “To affirm that the creation is ‘good’ 
then, is to affirm that God takes delight in it and that man at his best will do so as 
well.” (70) Ernest Lucas states that the meaning of the goodness in the Creation 
Narrative is clear from the context: “…it pleased God. It pleased him because it 
reflected something of himself…The fact that it pleased God also means that it 
was free of evil, which becomes the major cause of the absence of shalom after the 
[Genesis] fall.” (Lucas, 172). If, therefore the creation outcome pleased God, 
because of the efficient (tov) nature of the creation, we can conclude that the 
outcome is good even though this ‘good’ may not, presently, be fully 
comprehended by lesser beings.  Terence Penelhum notes (1990) that in calling 
God ‘good’, one is not merely applying to God some ‘general epithet of 
commendation’, with no ancillary commitment on what he might be expected to 
do. Penelhum suggests that, “it would be vacuous to apply the concept of 
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goodness without a fairly detailed idea of what these standards are—the 
standards which the speaker must regard as applying to himself.” (Penelhum, 
75).6  
 
2.3  Goodness and its implications for an Evolutionary Theodicy  
Gregory Boyd (2001) refers to the work of Howard Bloom, who describes the 
creation in terms of it being ‘The Lucifer Principle’, that is: nature abhorring evil 
and yet seemingly embracing it, “For Bloom, the Lucifer principle is simply part 
of the way things are. But no one who accepts that the cosmos was created by an 
all-good and all-powerful God can accept this.” (2001, 245) Boyd affirms that 
creation displays, “…remarkable purposes and design, enough to proclaim the 
wisdom of a grand designer (Romans 1:20).” (245) Boyd though qualifies this by 
stating that the world also displays the antithesis of unified purpose and design. 
Boyd’s points are relevant to a perspective that cannot accept that an omnipotent 
God could have allowed the prevailing state of affairs to pertain. However, what is 
advocated in this thesis is that the creation, with all the values and disvalues, is 
indeed the world God intended from eternity and is, until the eschaton, an 
unfinished creation.  
 
John Polkinghorne (1991, 99) suggests that the goodness referred to by the author 
of Genesis should be understood in terms of what Polkinghorne calls ‘fruitful 
potentiality’ rather than some kind of initial perfection. So, for Polkinghorne, 
                                                          
6
 We may identify with the notion of this ‘goodness’ though we are likely to demand evidence of it 
on the creator’s part. However, we, more often than not, fail miserably to give evidence of it in 
our own lives though our seeking evidence of it in the life of God is not misplaced—for we are the 
Imago Dei. 
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there was no perfect state but only the potential for fruitfulness. This does allow 
for (positive) unknown (fruitful) outcomes—the kind of potential for what God 
may bring about at the ‘eschatological finale’. However, Polkinghorne’s reference 
to potentiality leaves in doubt any outcome that God may, somehow, bring 
about, through the evolutionary ‘creative’ process. Rowan Williams is more 
explicit in his interpretation of the Genesis narrative, allowing for the fruitful 
eventuality of an evolutionary process, and suggests that Creation in the classical 
sense does not involve some uncritical idea of God’s monarchy—rather that, 
“…the absolute freedom ascribed to God in creation means that God cannot make 
a reality that then needs to be actively governed, subdued, bent to the divine 
purpose away from its natural source.” According to Williams, if God creates 
freely, God does not need the power of a sovereign; what is, is from God.  
God’s sovereign purpose is what the world is becoming. (R. Williams 2000, 69) 
Williams’ view allows for the introduction of a lesser ‘deity’—a ‘god’ to suit a view 
that leaves little room for the existence of the God of Scripture. Williams’ view as 
with Polkinghorne’s, seems to leave everything open to the ‘mystically-sovereign-
purposes’ of God. Well, we know a little of what the world was and has been, and 
we are informed by scientific prediction as to what the world might become. 
However, it is the Biblical revelation that offers us a ‘God’s eye view’ of what God 
has in mind for the (biological) by-products of any evolutionary process. The 
tension here is obvious: should the creation have been completed sometime back 
in the distant (or not so distant) past then there would not have been a process 
taking 13.7 billion years (so far) to complete; it would have been a ‘finished’ work 
and there would be no question of God lacking power or needing to relinquish 
power in order to allow for a more intimate connection with the creation process. 
However, the insights of Williams and Polkinghorne are helpful in that they 
point us to a future in which God’s absolute goodness may realise vindication. 
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But, it is not sufficient enough to philosophise about an unknown future—even 
when supporting the notion of the goodness of the God of Scripture. There is, 
surely, something more to offer for those seeking answers. The search for a 
plausible theodicy is, indeed, the raison d'être of this thesis and is addressed in 
the ‘Eight-Step-Argument’ in part two. 
 
2.3.1   Distinctions 
Most, post Darwinian, attempts at a defence or theodicy, avoid any notion of the 
prevailing state of affairs being the result of any major shift in the order of 
creation; few, if any, offer an Adamic Fall as the reason for the existence of 
predation, plague and parasitism though some offer an Angelic Fall as an 
alternative—a fall that brought about and continues to bring about major 
negative effects on the Creation—effects that God is not responsible for, but that 
He allows. The majority of these defences/theodicies adhere to a theistic-
evolutionary perspective—William Dembski’s (2009) effort being an 
exception/variation.  
 
In this chapter we looked, in reasonable detail, at the notion of ‘goodness’ as 
applied to Scripture. We argued that the creation is good in the sense of it being 
the best possible creation that would enable its creator to bring about a best 
possible state of affairs at the eschaton—a pathway to an eschatological ideal. 
Moreover, we argued that the creation should not, in spite of it producing harms, 
be considered anything other than good as Scripture affirms (Genesis 1:31)—a 
Sovereign God’s ‘very good’ over the creation. 
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3. Changes to the traditional/ 
Biblical view of the attributes of God 
 
3.1 What of GOD? 
The God portrayed and ‘defended’ in this thesis is the God of the Judeo/Christian 
Scriptures. A God whose eternity, Peter Sanlon (2014) describes as a qualitatively 
different kind of existence to the one of his creatures (87).”Being outside of time 
does not mean that God cannot know what happens inside of time, nor that he 
cannot interact with a temporal order. Quite the opposite! It does, of course, 
shape the way he does these things.” (88) As Sanlon makes clear in the same 
passage, “It would perhaps be odd for him to create something he could not 
interact with. Similarly God created time. It is part of the created order. And 
though God is not himself temporal, he can interact with, and know all that 
occurs in, the times he has made. Indeed, precisely because God is not temporal 
he has perfect knowledge of all events in time.” (88) This God is not to be 
confused with any other ideas/notions/theologies or philosophies of God—either 
pre-modern, modern or post-modern—as shall be made clear throughout the 
development of the argument.  
 
In this section we, briefly, address, what may be considered the ‘straw men’ 
(demeaning caricatures) of modern and post-modern attempts at lessening the 
culpability of the classical ‘image’ of God in the light of evolutionary theory—and 
also in the light of contemporary religious and philosophical notions of the 
reality of God. The views offered here are considered incontrovertibly necessary 
to the defence of the God of the Bible against other notions and ideas that may be 
seen to better fit the evolutionary paradigm but that only serve to remove the 
problem by the substitution of the God of Scripture with a lesser ‘deity’. 
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3.1.1 Constraints on God  
Should God be limited in his ability to produce or concoct the best possible plans 
for fulfilling his creative objectives, God would not be omnipotent. Christopher 
Southgate (2008, 29)  argues that the sort of universe we have, in which 
complexity emerges in a process governed by thermodynamic necessity and 
Darwinian natural selection, is the only sort of universe that could give rise to all 
that the earth has produced. To affirm evolutionary process as being ‘the only 
way’ through which God could achieve his objectives one has to assume that God 
was unable (lacked the ability) to bring about his creative objectives without this 
astronomical/biological framework or that God’s use of such a process was the 
best possible means through which God could bring about the best of possible 
outcomes. This is, a similar point to the one noted in Alexander, that sees biology 
as a ‘package deal’ (2008, 279). If biology should be a ‘stand-alone-package-deal’  
that has no significance other than it being the product of creative genius, it is 
reasonable to suppose that the creator’s benevolent characteristics be called into 
question—unless there is more to the story other than God’s desire to create.  
This is, of course, assuming that there has been an intentional pathway within 
the evolutionary process—otherwise there would be no reason to suppose that 
any such future outcomes could be considered anything other than random 
outcomes within the naturally selective process of evolution.  Jeff Astley (2009) 
asks whether or not God could have ordered nature differently and then answers 
his own question by saying, ‘perhaps not’. Astley goes on to say however that 
materiality inevitably involves imperfection—a tendency to disorder, decay, 
fragility, and mortality (167). Astley’s point is significant as it is the case that the 
accusation against the ‘designer God’ is often that of incompetence—that the 
design is simply under par or faulty. Ergo, God is either impotent or fails to meet 
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the necessary criteria or the presuppositions of the complainant. This assertion is 
false as we shall argue in part two of this thesis; indeed Keith Ward (1990) is 
correct when he refers to ‘natural’ evil as an inevitable consequence of this kind 
of world, which we shall argue in part two, is a necessary kind of world.   
 
3.1.2  ‘A Question of Ontological Veracity’ 
In this section we briefly address the notion of ‘God’ as the ground of being 
rather than as a determinate entity. 
 
Should the term ‘God’ refer only to a ‘ground of being’ first cause—a first cause 
that defies description or a ‘first cause’ that may be loosely described as 
‘nature’—then there would be no case to answer as there would be no personal 
creative-agent against whom a charge may be brought. For should the term ‘God’ 
refer only to a ‘ground of being’ first cause—a first cause that defies description 
or that may be loosely described as ‘nature’—then there is no case to answer—
for there is, indeed, no personal agent that may be found guilty of failure of any 
sort. The notion of a ‘Ground of Being’, presumably, thought by its advocates, to 
deal with the problem of natural evil,  does nothing of the sort apart from 
demeaning the God of the Bible. However, it is such a view that is commonly 
espoused by philosophical theologians such as Wesley Wildman. 
 
Wesley Wildman says (2007, 167) that any notion of ‘ultimate reality’ is bizarre 
but adds that ‘most theologians and a few philosophers are captivated by such 
(ultimate reality) speech’ and that they even choose it while understanding its 
‘final futility’. In his section on ‘Determinate-Entity Theism’ Wildman, regarding 
this alleged futility, asks (170) what kind of entity the divine reality really is?  
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His conclusion is that the God of the Bible seems to be made in the image of its 
authors. In short, God’s determinate nature is known in our longings. Everything 
else we say theologically must serve this overridingly important version of 
ultimate reality, and this becomes the crucial criterion of determinate-entity 
theism. Wildman’s views seem to have little to do with any perceived notion of 
the goodness of the Triune God of Scripture, as Wildman’s picture of God bears 
no resemblance whatsoever to this God. He writes: 
  
Speaking of God as the ground of being removes the possibility of 
proposing a divine character that is profoundly different from the 
character of the world. This is its chief theological difference from its 
competitors. Determinate-entity theism requires a divine goodness that 
our best scientific vision of the cosmos does not easily support and so 
positively requires some ontological distance between God and the world 
and a layer of theological explanation for why the world is the way it 
appears to be despite the purported impeccability of God’s moral 
character…Ground-of-being theism needs neither to explain a discrepancy 
nor to distinguish among events to articulate the divine nature.  
(W. Wildman 2007, 281) 
 
Wildman’s views are clearly expressed. Indeed, it would seem that the notion of 
God as a ‘determinate entity’ creates enormous philosophical questions—
especially with regard to the problem of [natural] evil. It is, of course, possible 
that the God revealed in the Bible is a figment of the imaginative wishful thinking 
of latter day Homo Sapiens—particularly the authors of the Old Testament. 
Wildman states (282) that the ‘divine goodness’ described in the Scriptures is a 
difficult fit with the apparent evidence. However, it is striking that many 
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distinguished theologians and philosophers are content to hold to a more 
classical approach. Keith Ward (2008) comments that to call God good is to say 
that God actualises within himself the best of all possible perfections—moreover, 
Ward suggests that, “If such a God produces a universe like this, then God 
remains good, whatever the universe is like. A supremely good God might, then, 
necessarily create this universe, or some universe with similar characteristics.” 
(Ward, 92)  By ‘necessarily’ we take it (though Ward doesn’t state this) that the 
sovereign God chose to create this universe in order to bring about the best of 
possible circumstances, i.e., the ‘best possible world’. This does not imply lesser 
capabilities on God’s part but rather that this world is, de facto, the best possible 
world—the world in which God’s ultimate ‘Good’ purposes can be achieved. 
 
As far as Biblical Theism is concerned, there should be no willingness to dilute 
God’s attributes; however should there be any attempts at ‘dilution’ the most 
likely candidates would be those of omnipotence or benevolence. Should God be 
declared ‘less than powerful’ or ‘not quite as powerful’ as previously thought, the 
question of God’s benevolence becomes less crucial. Omnipotence, however, 
remains crucial to any evolutionary theodicy that takes seriously the legitimacy of 
the biblical narratives. The ‘God is not benevolent’ view seeks to remove the 
notion of both evil and benevolence from the ‘stage’ but, nevertheless offers a 
reason for the existence of ‘harms’. For proponents of this position, the argument 
is likely to be that God does not have the necessary characteristics that enable 
him to behave with consistent benevolence. Wildman gives an outline of the 
possibilities: Firstly, he makes clear his view that (a) a personal, benevolent, 
attentive, and active deity cannot create through evolution and (b) that therefore 
God the creator is not a personal, benevolent, attentive, and active deity. He 
states that we can preserve those affirmations symbolically (for whatever reason), 
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but goes on to say that, “… they no longer refer to a divine being with intentions 
and awareness, with feelings and intelligence, with plans and powers to act. 
Rather, they refer to the ground of being itself, to the creative and fecund power 
source in the depths of nature, to the value structures and potentialities that the 
world manifests. They refer to the God beyond God, which is to say the truly 
ultimate reality that hovers behind and beneath and beyond the symbolic gods 
we create and deploy to satisfy our personal needs, to make sense of our world, 
and to legitimate the exercise of social control.” (W. Wildman 2011)   
 
There is neither time or space to discuss Wildman’s assertion that the God of the 
Bible could not have created through an evolutionary process, though we 
disagree entirely with his conclusions. We however accept that this does offer, to 
some extent, a challenge regarding providence within the evolutionary process. 
Wildman’s ‘god’ though lacks ‘substance’ lacks any notion of benevolence— 
indeed lacks anything in real terms. Naturally, this ‘god’ cannot manifest personal 
concern for the products of any likely creative processes because this ‘god’ has no 
personality from which to proceed. Nevertheless, Wildman’s alternative is 
somehow able to ‘allow for’ the transformation of the material in the cosmos that 
allowed for the evolution of the biosphere etc.  
 
Wildman’s apparent disillusionment with the classical notion of God has 
provoked him to strong language ; Clayton and Knapp (2007) make the following 
reference to Wildman’s disdain, quoting him thus: “Frankly, and I say this with 
the utmost reverence, the personal God does not pass the test of parental moral 
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responsibility. If God really is personal in this way, then we must conclude that 
God has a morally abysmal record of inaction or action.”7 (179-180)   
 
Sigmund Freud’s view (Nicholi 2002), that the very idea of ‘an idealized 
Superman’ in the sky is so patently infantile and so foreign to reality seems, most 
likely, to stem from a total miscomprehension—even caricature of the God of the 
Bible. It is no doubt the case that some may naively interpret the biblical notion 
of God in the way Freud expresses, but some  (an increasing number even ) may, 
due to this kind of reasoning or lack of a plausible notion of the God of the Bible, 
wish to find an alternative ‘god’—this, we suggest, is totally the wrong direction 
to take as it leads to another path—a path void of any notion of ‘God’ whatsoever 
to anything other than an unworthy caricature of the God that Scripture reveals.  
 
Wesley Wildman is of the opinion that ground-of-being theologies are important 
because of their denial that ultimate reality can ‘possibly’ be a determinate entity 
at all—and that this establishes a valuable theological contrast with determinate 
entity theisms. The ‘ground-of-being’ view of the ‘personhood’ of God as well as 
God’s possible interaction with the world may, as Wildman suggests, produce a 
hopeful intellectual response to these pervasive evils. But, at the same time, this 
view favours philosophical logic over and above the revelation of Scripture.  
Wildman, we believe, is mistaken in his deliberations—his alternative ‘deity’ 
being unacceptable. It is unacceptable for two reasons. Firstly, as a result of his 
dissatisfaction/disappointment with the ‘performance’ of the God of the Bible 
Wildman offers an extra-biblical, pantheistic alternative. Secondly, the 
                                                          
7
 Wildman says, regarding the use of the word ‘evil’, that ‘suffering is a more useful category than 
evil because suffering is more neutrally descriptive and does not prejudge the moral character 
of...[?] regarding  natural disasters, predation and the like’. Here, Wildman may well be correct. 
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substituted, ‘ground of being’, alternative, apart from being unbiblical, fails to 
convince us that ‘it’ has any substance whatsoever. Regarding, the ‘narrative to 
Scripture’, Peter Sanlon says that, “…for the drama to be of any significance 
whatsoever there must be real actors in the play. If the metaphor of a drama has 
to be developed further, then it must be insisted that the scriptwriter is also real. 
The God who creates, speaks, directs, interacts and participates must be a real 
person before he can do any of these things. In the technical terminology, 
ontology is prior to revelation and salvation. Systematic theology recognises this, 
and asks the entirely appropriate questions ‘What kind of being is he?’ and, What 
may we know of him from his words and actions?’” (Sanlon 2014, 72)  
 
God is the Triune ‘determinate entity’ who has created all things and who 
sustains all things for His ‘good’ purposes. Ergo, God is the ultimate ontological 
reality.  
 
3.1.3   Process thought and Omnipotence 
In this section we will briefly consider process theology as it applies to 
‘omnipotence’. Cobb & Griffin (1976, 69) state the dominant position of process 
theologians clearly enough when they pose the question of why evil exists when 
there is in existence, according to classical and biblical theology, a God with 
‘controlling power’—suggesting that, “… a major reason that Christian theism has 
clung on so long to the notions of God as a Controlling Power is that thereby it 
can assure believers that God’s will, despite appearances, is victorious—for the 
sake of this assurance it has risked seeing God as the author of needless suffering 
and even moral evil. It has risked the implicit denial of human freedom and the 
rebellion of humanistic atheism.” (Process Theology, 118)  
 
 GOD, evolution and the problem of evil: 
Towards A Solution 
Derek J. White 
 
 
35 
There is a something to be said for this critique. However, the above depiction is 
an extreme caricature and it is not the picture of sovereignty that is anywhere 
near to that adhered to by the author of this thesis—or to that even of Open 
Theism which offers freedom without, mostly, denying the overall sovereignty of 
God (Pinnock 2000)8. Indeed, the Process view offers a rather simplistic view of 
sovereign reality as it does not allow any means with which to comprehend any 
notion of ontological veracity for this alleged ‘ground of being’ other than as 
some kind of nebulous force akin to that of pantheism. Indeed, it does not offer 
anywhere near sufficient reason to replace the God of Scripture with any ‘straw 
man’ scenario in the form of dialectical hypothesis. Wildman (2006, 274) 
acknowledges the difficulty in that whatever God is, on the process account, it is 
exceedingly resistant to anthropomorphic modelling, “and certainly nothing like 
the personal God of so many sacred texts and religious pieties”. Wildman ‘s 
summary accurately describes the problem from both perspectives. 
 
The God of process theology is considered to be a God that does not abuse, or 
‘coerce’ but persuades—throughout nature and in living beings. The God of 
process theology cannot override free will; it is not that he will not but rather that 
he cannot (cannot as in does not have the potency to so do). According to Griffin 
(Lubarsky & Griffin 1996), the redefining of the omnipotence of God may be the 
solution that dissolves the problem of evil as there is no likelihood of culpability 
on the part of this particular notion of God. 
                                                          
8
 According to Clark Pinnock, “God as the creator of the world  (italics ours) can make the kind of 
world he likes—in this case a world with free creatures in it…God exercises power in ways 
appropriate to the creation project…He gives creatures the room decides things and binds himself 
to the promises he makes. Thus God exercises sovereignty by sharing power not by 
dominion…God uses omnipotence to ‘free’ and not enslave…It takes omnipotence to create and 
manage freedom...” (Pinnock 2000, 93,94,95) 
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Any possibility of continued adherence to the biblical view of omnipotence is 
ruled out as is made clear from the following quotation from Griffin:  
 
Because our universe was created out of chaos rather than out of absolute 
nothingness, so that creative power is inherent in the world (as well as in 
God), the creatures’ twofold creative power of self-determination and 
efficient causation cannot be cancelled, overridden, or completely 
controlled by God. On this basis process philosophy denies the second 
premise in the argument…saying instead that although God is all-powerful 
—not only in the sense of being the supreme power of the universe but 
also in the sense of being perfect in power, having all the power one being 
could possibly have—God cannot unilaterally prevent all evil. If being ‘all-
powerful’ is taken to mean being omnipotent in the sense of essentially 
having all the power, however, then process philosophy simply denies the 
first premise’s assertion that a being worthy of the name God is all-
powerful by definition. (Griffin 2001, 223-224)  
 
Both the logic and implications of this kind of thinking are clear. There is, 
according to this view, in the world of matter—matter that pre-existed the 
emergence of God, an inherent creative capability out of which appears the 
process of evolution—a process that ‘God’ could not interfere with but only 
persuade. So it is from within the alleged ‘inherent creative capability’ of matter 
itself that the force of evolution manifests itself (ex nihilo, nihil fit)—and not out 
of the MIND of the God of Scripture—ex nihilo. Griffin states that God, though 
having all the power possible, does not possess ‘ALL POWER’ and therefore is 
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not capable of preventing evil or of much else regarding the biological 
evolutionary process.9 10 
 
The idea that any such imagined requiredness could exist as a de facto state of 
affairs—‘conjured up’ as a more convenient replacement for the God of Biblical 
Theology—is hardly convincing. Moreover, the notion that ethical principles (or 
any other come to that) are likely to emanate from anything other than the actual 
character [Mind] of The God, who is by His very nature ‘the ultimate good’ is 
equally unconvincing. We are in agreement with Gregory Boyd (2001) who states 
that, “…unless God’s essential nature is necessary and actual—apart from his 
interaction with the world, neither the enduring nature of God nor the 
contingent nature of the world can be rendered intelligible. God must be self-
sufficient within himself, creating and relating to the world out of love instead of 
metaphysical necessity.” (276) In the light of the problem of creaturely suffering 
the process ‘alternative’ may seem an attractive proposition—one that may fit in 
with some current understandings of reality, but it cannot be taken as the final 
word regarding the God of the Bible as it fails miserably to do justice to the 
character of that God. This view of God, helpfully, dissolves the problem of evil. A 
                                                          
9
 Madden & Hare (1987) conclude that the process God is, “...unable to move toward an aesthetic 
end and without an enormous cost in pain (his own and others); he is apparently so weak that he 
cannot guarantee his own welfare. If he is that weak, obviously he is not able as a theistic God 
should be, to ensure the ultimate triumph of an end of his choice.”(29) 
10
 In contra distinction to the views espoused by Griffin, Wildman et el, John Leslie (1989) 
suggests that, “Neoplatonism is [today] often expressed in such a formulae as that God is not a 
being but the Power of Being. On my interpretation, what dark sayings say that God is the 
world’s ethical requiredness or, equivalently, that God is the creatively effective ethical need that 
there should exist a (good) world.” (167)  
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God with restricted or limited ability can hardly be held responsible for failing to 
address the problem of suffering in any significant way. Indeed, this ‘god’, it could 
be said, cannot entertain any kind of ‘planned intention’—vis a vis the creation of 
anything much—most certainly not creation ex nihilo. This God though could 
not be mistaken for the God of the Judeo/Christian Scriptures  as this view of God 
is a step into the unknown and ‘unknowable’, and is not a God we could visualise 
and, most certainly is nothing like the Triune God of the Bible.  
 
Paul Copan and William Lane Craig offer a helpful summary regarding the 
difference between ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’ objects:  
 
We have seen that God, though immaterial and not spatio-temporal, 
would be classed by everyone as a concrete object in view of his being a 
personal causal agent. Perhaps that provides a clue to the distinction 
between concrete and abstract entities. It is virtually universally agreed 
that abstract objects, if they exist, are causally impotent; they do not 
stand in causal relations. Numbers, for example, do not effect anything. 
(Copan 2004, 168) 
 
The following chapter offers a discussion of several relatively recent attempts at 
an evolutionary theodicy. Each of the views mentioned have wrestled with and 
have contributed to the work of seeking a plausible defence/theodicy in the post-
Darwin world of science, philosophy and theology. These ‘offerings’ are insightful 
and helpful and have allowed for the development of the Eight-Step-Argument 
offered in this thesis.  
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4. Ideas that further the case for the omnipotence and 
benevolence of God—in the light of an evolutionary 
consensus: 
 
In this section we consider the published works of  William Dembski, John 
Haught, Michael Murray & Christopher Southgate (2007-2010) and  that of 
Michael Lloyd (1998) that deal, particularly, with evolution and the problem of 
evil. 
 
4.1 Evolution: God’s response to rebellion 
William Dembski (2009, 20) makes much of the attributes of God and rails 
against any attempts to restrict God’s activity to the metaphysical, the biophysical 
or ‘the present tense’. Dembski (50) asks why it is that, in the economy of the 
world whose creator is ‘omnipotent, omniscient, and trans-temporal’, should 
causes always precede effects? ‘Clearly, such a Creator could act to anticipate 
events that have yet to happen. Moreover, those events could be the occasion (or 
‘cause’) of God’s prior anticipatory action.’  
 
Dembski takes the Adamic Fall as a major event in the history of the world and 
offers a defence based on Genesis chapter three11. However, Dembski states that 
in arguing that the fall of mankind marks the entry of all evil into the world (both 
personal and natural evil) he makes no assumptions about the age of the Earth, 
the extent of evolution, or the prevalence of design. He does though state that 
                                                          
11
 Dembski (p146) refers to Adam and Eve as the initial pair of humans—as the progenitors of the 
whole human race; he furthermore suggests that they were specially created by God, and thus 
that they were not the result of an evolutionary process from primate or hominid ancestors. 
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the theodicy he develops, “…looks not to science but to the metaphysics of divine 
action and purpose.” (10) In other words his concern is to offer a defence without 
particular deference to scientific opinion.12 
 
Dembski states that the theodicy he is proposing gladly acknowledges that 
important similarities exist between humans and primates but he, nevertheless 
insists that far-reaching differences also exist, “…especially differences in 
cognitive and moral capacities, and that these represent a difference in kind and 
not, as Darwin and many contemporary evolutionists hold, merely a difference in 
degree.” (161) Dembski’s approach is one that maintains the uniqueness of the 
Imago Dei—that there is indeed something uniquely significant about the 
‘arrival’ of early humans13. Here, we are in full agreement with Dembski. 
Dembski, though, addresses the problem of evil with a novel alternative to the 
traditional offerings. His major thrust is to do with what he terms ‘retroactivity’.  
 
In contrast to theodicies that attempt to justify God’s goodness by limiting 
God, I’m going to argue that full divine foreknowledge of future 
contingent propositions in fact helps to reconcile God’s goodness with the 
existence of evil. By taking a retroactive approach to the Fall, which traces 
                                                          
12
  This is an opinion with which we are mostly in agreement with. However, though we take 
seriously the evolutionary perspective we do not allow it to dictate terms—as the problem of evil 
within the theistic-evolutionary-paradigm is not with the science but with the God of the 
Judeo/Christian Scriptures. It would matter little if there were no such God and no such 
Scriptures. 
13
 Stephen Webb refers to Richard Middleton’s (2005) position which, according to Webb has 
“…severed the anthropological implications of the imago from the cosmological…Instead, it 
should lead us to contemplate the cosmological significance of Jesus Christ, who is “the exact 
imprint of God’s very being.” (Hebrews 1:3). The cosmological provides the foundation for the 
anthropological… (2010, 287) 
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all evil in the world back to human sin (even the natural evil that predates 
human sin), the theodicy I develop preserves the traditional view that 
natural evil is a consequence of the Fall. (129-130)14 
 
In essence, what Dembski proposes is that God, having foreseen the rebellion of 
humanity in the space-time continuum, brought into being the evolutionary 
programme of ‘life, predation, parasitism, disease and death’ as punishment for 
the ‘future’ disobedience of Adam and Eve. It was a kind of pre-emptive strike 
against the ‘future’ free-will behaviour of the two. Dembski consistently upholds 
the conservative evangelical argument regarding both the ‘punishment’ and the 
‘acquittal’ and the consequential effects on God’s ‘good’ creation—at least when it 
comes to the events prior to God’s ‘retro-proactivity’. 
 
Thus, just as the death and resurrection of Christ is responsible for the 
salvation of repentant people15 throughout all time, so the Fall of humanity 
in the Garden of Eden is responsible for every natural evil throughout all 
time (Future, present, past, and distant past preceding the Fall). (110)  
 
We agree with Dembski with regards to the salvific power of the cross of Christ. 
However, with regards his view that the Adamic fall brought about such an ‘earth 
shattering’ change in the creation, we disagree. Would God really have brought 
about such a drastic state of affairs—over the disobedience of the pair in the 
garden? Dembski, we feel, has introduced an unnecessary element into the 
                                                          
14
Dembski points out (2009, 110) that a retroactive view of the fall was one of several (Christian) 
options proposed in the nineteenth century to explain pre-human suffering and death; Dembski 
refers as such to J. Dana (writing in 1853—prior to the Darwinian revolution).  
15
 Dembski offers no explicit justification for the plight of animals—or indeed the ‘created order’ 
other than human beings.  
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argument—not so much the ‘Fall’ (though our view differs from his)—but the 
retroactive retribution that he introduces.  
 
In offering this innovative approach Dembski does allow for God to be God, and 
does allow ‘space’ for biological evolution—its cycle of life, predation and death 
—without having to deal with the notion of there being no physical death before 
the disobedience of advanced hominids whenever the incident may have 
occurred in the space/time continuum.  
 
Dembski’s approach—though innovative and intriguing—offers a picture of God 
as being so taken up with anger and disappointment that he brings about a 
retroactive state of affairs that would have been totally unnecessary16; a state of 
affairs that punishes creatures for a sin that had not even occurred. Dembski’s 
thesis seems to offer a God who punishes innocent creatures because of 
something that would happen long after their death. 
 
4.2  ‘Making Sense of Evolution’  
John Haught (2010) holds that the continuous evolution of life, from the initial 
protoplasm to the end of evolution (presumably the eschaton), continues to wind 
its autonomous way without any tangible sign of the divine agent—most 
certainly not that of a cosmic engineer ‘tinkering’ with project creation17 18. 
                                                          
16
 Does not the Genesis text (3:22-24) state that the pair were expelled from the garden and 
prohibited from partaking of the fruit of the tree of life? Moreover, did not God plant a ‘garden in 
Eden’ (2:8) in which he put (2:18) the man Adam?  Is it not likely that outside of the confines of 
the garden—the biosphere continued to allow for the ‘life-death cycle’ of the evolutionary 
process? Moreover, Dembski’s thesis seems to offer a God who punishes innocent creatures 
because of something that would happen long after their death 
17
 Haught refers to such a possible scenario as being ‘dead on delivery’. (2010, 63) 
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Haught, indeed, refers to the impressiveness of a divine maker of a ‘self-creative’ 
world and suggests that ‘the divine maker of such a self-creative world is arguably 
much more ‘impressive—hence worthier of human reverence and gratitude— 
than a ‘designer’ who moulds and micro-manages everything directly. (42) 
Haught makes reference to the work of Paul Tillich. Tillich held the view that 
nature had an inexhaustible dimension—and that this dimension allows theology 
to avoid what Haught refers to as ‘the traps that occur whenever we wonder how 
God could possibly act or intervene in nature’. In answer to the question, ‘What 
is really going on in nature?’  Haught says that, “…if nature has an inexhaustible 
depth, we can respond to this question by differentiating reading levels, such as 
those of science and theology, without having to resort to fruitless speculation 
about how divine  influence somehow ‘hooks itself’ into natural processes.” (97) 
Haught’s point here seems to be that there are different levels of ‘interpretation’ 
and that, to avoid wasting time with speculative reasoning—such as attempting  
to locate evidence for God’s craftsmanship at the molecular level—theologians 
should  leave science to the scientist—concentrating more on matters of 
theology. For Haught the important question is not how God acts in nature but 
how deep we are willing to look in our quest to understand  ‘what’s really going 
on in the drama of life and the cosmos’. He refers to evolution as a ‘still-unfinished 
drama rather than a factory of designs’ (57) and argues that accidents, natural 
selection and time are instances of the elements necessary to any dramatic story, 
and that focussing on evolution as a still-unfinished drama rather than a factory 
of designs is crucial. The question is: Where is this seemingly directionless, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
18
 Haught holds to a form of Process Theology and thus states: "…to those who object that process 
theology is hereby illegitimately redefining the idea of God's power in order to contrive a fit with neo-
Darwinian theory, the reply is simply that no other conceptions of power is more consistent with the 
quite orthodox religious belief that God is infinite love."   (Haught, God After Darwin: A Theology 
of Evolution 2001, 42) 
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openly indefinable journey heading? Moreover, how is it possible for God to be 
responsible for the direction of the evolutionary process (in control of it in some 
tangible way), and therefore culpable?   
 
Haught is aware that ‘most readers’ of Darwin’s Origin of Species would consider 
that a ‘do-nothing God’ differs little from no God at all (43) but nevertheless 
describes God as, “…the inexhaustible dimension of depth beneath the surface of 
our lives and of nature.” (91) He goes on to suggest that this God may seem 
absent or even non-existent since we have no evidence of depth in the scientific 
sense: “Darwin, in other words, has portrayed the life-story as a true adventure. 
Evolution is a risk-taking and extravagantly inventive drama. Alongside its lush 
creativity, there always exists the possibility of tragic outcomes, including 
abundant suffering and perpetual perishing. Haught suggests that, to Christians, 
there is something ‘cruciform’ about the whole drama of life. (63) There is 
‘something cruciform going on’. Indeed, the evolutionary process can be viewed 
as being ‘a risk-taking and extravagantly inventive drama’. Some interpreters may 
wish to leave it there—‘content’ in their ignorance—disallowing the likelihood of 
God having any ultimate ‘design’ objective for His creation. Haught is correct of 
course when he claims that a ‘theology of evolution’ (83) is not interested in 
defending the idea of a ‘designer God’ per se, “…as this would only make us 
wonder why the  ‘designer’ does not immediately eliminate the disorder of 
suffering in the drama of life.” In other words: why would the designer make no 
effort to ‘immediately’ eliminate the effects of the bad design—should there have 
been a ‘bad design’ in the first place. We, along with Southgate and others do not 
hold the view that there ever was a ‘bad design’ or a malfunction within the 
universal law of physics—contrary to Adrian Hough’s (2010) interesting idea of a 
‘flaw in the universe’.  
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Regarding evolutionary theory, Haught asks whether or not ‘a theology of 
evolution’ can, indeed, make sense of ‘life’s suffering’. His conclusion is that it 
cannot, yet, do so and he states that, if there ever was a question resistant to 
receiving a presently satisfying response, it is that of why the drama of life 
involves so much agony and loss. “To make ourselves receptive to any answer at 
all, however, we must be prepared to wait. Such is the requirement of faith.” (83-
84) Haught is, of course, correct—we can only speculate as we do not have all the 
answers; waiting is a requirement of faith (Hebrews Chapter 11). However, the 
Christian faith is based on both future revelation (what Scripture points to) and 
past (not too insignificant) events such as the incarnation and resurrection (what 
Scripture attests). Of course there are questions, scientific or otherwise, that 
humans, in spite of their persistent endeavours, will have no closure on. 
However, Haught, we maintain, is incorrect in his bleak analysis—as if Scripture 
gives no clue to the purposes of the God of creation. Indeed it does, as shall be 
obvious from the main argument of this thesis. 
 
The language Haught uses is contemporary and it fits in well with current 
theistic-evolutionary views of craftsmanship rather than design. God’s desire to 
produce the ‘Greatest Show on Earth’ (Dawkins 2009) may well be ‘reason 
enough’ for the existence of pain and suffering but this reasoning will not suffice 
to defend the benevolence of God. Whatever one makes of this kind of reasoning  
it is not sufficient enough to ‘get God of the hook’—at least not the God whose 
benevolent character would, according to some, not have allowed such 
compromise. Haught’s God, though, seems not to be in danger of needing any 
kind of defence. 
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4.3 ‘Nature Red in Tooth & Claw’  
Michael Murray (2008) offers what he terms as a reasonable defence rather than 
actual evidence for the existence of gratuitous evils: ‘a thin defence’ rather than a 
‘thick defence’ (Tracy 2007, 157-160). Murray’s defences are composite — 
combinations of what Murray refers to as forms of causa dei (CD) :  arguments in 
defence of God, the hope/intention being that the combination of defences 
offered will be enough to persuade the objector as well as encouraging the 
believer. It is the case that the success of any defence of the problem of evil is 
dependent on an individual’s ‘warranted acceptances’ or presuppositions. 
However, in a combination of defences there might be, at least, one ‘on offer’ that 
is acceptable to the protagonist. Chapter 7 of Murray’s book is actually entitled 
‘Combining CDs’. It follows that Murray isn’t convinced that any (one) 
explanation for God’s allowance of the existence of gratuitous evils is sufficient 
but that, taken together, some might suffice.  
 
Murray takes an interesting excursion into the principle of Nomic Regularity  i.e. 
the notion of ‘chaos to order’ through which God was able to bring forth a 
positive end product; the idea being that, at least partly, this Nomic Regularity 
(NR), is a sufficient reason for the ‘developmental’ necessity for animal suffering. 
In other words NR  (in the universe) allowed for the actual evolution of biological 
life-forms and that this ‘lengthy’ process (with all the implications for suffering 
and death of numerous creatures) brought about the ‘greater good’ of creatures 
such as Homo Sapien Sapiens. Murray’s NR is an essential feature of theistic 
evolution as it offers a ‘signpost’ for the existence of God.  However, with regards 
to animal pain and suffering Murray states that, “…if justifiable at all, [it] is 
justified as a necessary condition for outweighing goods which either are enjoyed 
by creatures other than those that suffer or serve to enhance the goodness of the 
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universe at the global level.” (130) Murray’s question (146) as to whether or not 
there could have been a better world introduces a comment from the  
eccentrically brilliant Woody Allen, who suggested that the worst that could be 
said on God’s behalf is that ‘he’s an under achiever’. Murray himself (151-152) 
states that a complete causa dei of this (NR) sort faces two ‘insurmountable 
hurdles’. The first hurdle is that such an account does not seem to have the 
resources to explain why exactly there has to be so much pre-human animal pain 
and suffering, and secondly, that it is hard to see how the ‘good’ of free and 
effective choice by creatures like ourselves requires the existence of animals pre-
existent to humans that have [to have] ‘second-order mental states of the sort 
that make animal pain and suffering morally salient’.  Murray’s ‘hurdle’ is indeed 
difficult to assail unless the evolutionary path should have had no other means of 
bringing about the unswerving plans of the God who is there, and who cares 
deeply for all that he has made. However, the issue raised here is that of morality 
—God’s morality—the perceived issue of ‘natural evil’.  Murray concludes (164) 
that the theist has good reason to believe that Nomic Regularity is ‘a highly 
desirable feature of creation’ and that it does explain a variety of types of natural 
evil, but that the theist would not have sufficient reason to think that animal 
suffering would be among them. Of course, apart from this nomic regularity 
there may never have arisen any prospect of the emergence (however temporal) 
of the abundant life that has appeared, over time, on this planet.  NR aside— 
because ‘higher-order-thought’ creatures share the same vulnerability there 
might be sufficient reasons for this state of affairs—as Southgate (2008, 16) 
points out when he says that this world is the only possible type of world for such 
creatures to arise. We return to this notion in the final section of this thesis.  
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Murray (141) refers to George Frederick Wright who argued that intellectual 
goods were as significant as moral goods and that NR served the aims of both. 
Murray: “Indeed, for Wright, these intellectual pleasures were sufficiently good 
that they offset the natural evils that might occur as by-products of the nomic 
regularity of nature.” (142) Of course, just because the world tends to follow rules 
or principles that produce an orderly system, it does not follow that the 
predictability of the ordered system (our world) is the kind of system an 
omniscient, omnipotent and benevolent mind would have engineered. It may, of 
course, indicate the existence of an intelligent cause but that may be all it does. 
To argue that the existence of suffering is the result of the activity of a system 
that functions in a regular way is fine but it tells us nothing whatsoever of the 
‘deity’ behind such symmetry. The use of the NR may open the closed mind to 
the existence of God but, most likely, not to the goodness of God—in the face of 
the ‘ills of evolution’. Murray though ‘spreads the net’—hoping that his (or 
another’s) CD is able to add weight to the general work of theodicy. Murray is 
aware of the extent of the problem in constructing such a defence. He writes: 
“Indeed, it seems quite implausible to think that an evil as widespread as the evil 
in question here, animal pain and suffering, could or would be explained only by 
appeal to one narrow range of goods that God aims to bring about through 
creation, and that certain types of permitted evil take such explanations 
seriatim.” (195)  
 
4.4 ‘The Groaning of Creation’ 
In the introduction of his book ‘The Groaning of Creation’ : God, Evolution and 
the Problem of Evil 2008’, Christopher Southgate states (2) that species as we 
know them are as they are because of the pressure of natural selection and 
predator-prey cycles—and that, ‘we can now see why pain and violence are 
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endemic in nature.’ Southgate refers to the environmental philosopher and 
theologian Holmes Rolston III. Rolston, who having listed the more positive 
aspects of the evolutionary process, stated that, “… It is also, orderly, prolific, 
efficient, selecting for adaptive fit, exuberant, complex, diverse, regenerating life 
generation after generation.” (3)  
 
Southgate makes it clear (28 -40) that, in the light of biological evolution, the 
Adamic Fall account (as the sole reason for the existence of physical death in 
nature) is untenable on chronological grounds. Southgate’s view of the tenability 
of the Adamic Fall, in the light of biological evolution, is important. However, 
even if the Adamic fall has no relevance for an evolutionary defence, it does not, 
necessarily, mean that the Adamic Fall is not of theological/actual significance.  
If, as Southgate suggests (8), death is actually a ‘thermodynamic necessity’, it is, 
indeed,  difficult to imagine the biological process/system without death. We 
may well be dealing with a God who had but the one ‘option’ for his creation 
purposes. Southgate states (30) that even though we can never be sure that the 
evolutionary process was God’s only way to give rise to creatures such as stem 
from the 3.8 or so billion-year-long evolution of the Earth’s biosphere, we can 
only say that, given what we know about creatures—especially what is known 
about the role of the evolutionary process in refining biological characteristics, 
and the sheer length of time the process has required to give rise to sophisticated 
sentience—it is eminently plausible and coherent to suppose that this was the 
only way open to God19.  
                                                          
19
 Southgate’s is a good argument as the point is that it is God’s use of evolution that is in question 
and it is the evolutionary process that is broadly accepted. The only thing here though is that it 
may be seen to diminish God’s omnipotence—but does it? Not if we are referring to the ‘received 
wisdom’ that supports entirely the evolutionary package—with some ‘emergent’ qualification. 
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The ‘Only Way’ option is a view also held by, among others, R.J.Russell. Russell 
(2007, 109-151) gives detailed reasons for holding a view that is committed to 
biological evolution being the only way God could have produced the present day 
results. Should God have had only the ‘one option’ through which to create a 
world, one could, rightfully suppose that we are not dealing with an omnipotent 
God. Southgate, however, is not suggesting that the Triune God is anything other 
than omnipotent; however, it does follow that this aspect of God’s ‘being’ might 
well be in question should it be that, somehow, the God of Christian belief could 
not have produced a better process for the achievement of the objectives of an 
omnipotent and omniscient God. 
 
Southgate (pages 57-59) explores the notion of kenosis and its relevance for 
evolutionary theodicy and refers to the term ‘deep intratrinitarian kenosis’—that 
the ‘self-abandoning love of the Father in begetting the Son establishes an 
otherness that enables God’s creatures to be (what Southgate terms) ‘selves’. It is, 
therefore, ‘selving’—the self-development of biological (sentient) ‘selves’—the 
‘selving’ goal of the evolutionary process that is seen by theists as a major goal of 
evolution. Should there have been no such thing as evolutionary process, there 
would, of course, have been no possibility for any such selving to occur. 
Southgate proposes that the evolutionary struggle of creation, ‘can be read as 
being the “travail” to which God subjected creation in hope that the values of 
complex life, and ultimately freely choosing creatures such as ourselves, would 
emerge.’ (95) It is, of course, a possibility that unguided [Darwinian] processes 
would produce less than the ‘hoped-for’ outcomes.  
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Southgate reminds his readers that he is not advancing the view that the 
evolutionary process has been damaged by ‘Adamic’ fallenness. Indeed, 
Southgate, as with most Christian evolutionists, realises the evident 
contradictions between a creation that is ‘frustrated’ and that ‘groans (Romans 
8:20-22) and a ‘creation’ that is the craftsmanship of a loving, caring, benevolent 
God. Indeed, this earthly state of affairs may be seen as a system that is in need of 
healing. Southgate maintains that we shall fulfil our co-redeeming role by 
becoming partners with God in the healing of our little corner of the cosmos, 
when we reveal our true Christ-likeness by having our minds set on servanthood. 
Moreover, we shall transcend ourselves not by the consummation of all our 
desires but through re-educating them with wisdom, so as to liberate the 
nonhuman creation from this particular mark of its travail. It is Southgate’s 
contention that this renewing of the mind’ (Romans 12:2) produces the necessary 
‘self-giving’—a self-giving (love) that emanates from the relationship within the 
Trinity.  However, it is the human animal, rather than any other species, that 
fares best out of the evolutionary environment. Southgate, indeed, highlights the 
fact that the human animal has access to an extent of freedom and self-
transcendence that goes vastly beyond what is present to other animals. 
However, we would suggest that ‘potentiality’ is not an absolute—mankind has 
the potential for both good and evil. Indeed, mankind may be, through the 
evolutionary process, [becoming] something ‘ignoble’ rather than something 
‘noble’; bearing the Imago Dei does not guarantee righteous choices, as both the 
Scriptures and the evidence of history confirm. Of course, for those in Christ the 
potential to bring about change is, indeed, enormous; but this is, for the present 
and future, a potentiality to be realised. 
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Whatever it is that God intends for humanity or other creatures at some point in 
the future, the facts are that the death of all creatures fuels evolutionary 
processes leading to the demise of the weak and the survival of the better 
equipped predator. Yet in spite of predation—before the appearance of modern-
man—there would have existed a prolific, ‘self-sustaining’, abundant, diverse, 
creation. Death though can be seen as the final victor unless, somehow, God 
redeems the ‘unfairness’ and brings about whatever can be believed to be ‘greater 
goods’ for the recipients of the unjust treatment meted out by the evolutionary 
process. Indeed, Southgate (81) argues that a scientifically informed eschatology 
‘must’ try and give some sort of account of what might be continuities and 
discontinuities between this creation and the new one. Any such future hope 
though does not depend on our present understanding of just how this universe 
(any parallel universes) or how any new planetary systems function, but on what 
God has promised in Scripture. 
 
Vital to this present project is my conviction that scientifically informed 
eschatology must also try and relate the great final transforming act of 
God, of which the resurrection of Christ is usually regarded as the 
beginning, not just to continuities and discontinuities in human life but 
also to our understanding of God’s relation to living creatures other than 
human beings. (Southgate, 81-82) 
 
Southgate, along with Murray, offers an amalgam of defences—the core of which 
(listed a-f) are as follows: 
 
That the goodness of creation gives rise of all sorts of values: 
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a. That pain, suffering, death, and extinction are intrinsic to a creation 
evolving according to Darwinian principles. 
b. That an evolving creation was the only way God could produce all 
the ‘beauty, diversity, sentience, and sophistication that the 
biosphere exhibits.  
c. That God co-suffers with every sentient being in creation. 
d. That the Cross of Christ is ‘the epitome’ of divine compassion, 
God's assuming of ultimate responsibility for the pain of creation— 
the Cross inaugurating the transformation of creation (the ending 
of the groaning Paul refers to in Romans 8:22) 
e. The importance of giving an account of how a loving God of loving 
relationship must provide an eschatological fulfillment for 
creatures that have no flourishing in this life—that such a God 
could never regard such a creature as ‘a mere evolutionary 
expedient’.  
f. If divine fellowship with creatures such as us is in any sense a goal 
of evolutionary creation—that this may lead to the possibility that 
humans have a crucial and positive role, cooperating with their God 
in the healing of the evolutionary process—the ‘co-redeemer’ 
argument. (16)20 
That creation engenders many sorts of values is, without doubt, the case. 
Moreover, that an evolving creation was necessary for God’s purposes is accepted 
as a ‘given’ in the majority of theistic evolutionary circles—a  de facto, even 
                                                          
20
 Evolution though is, from the position of the argument in this thesis, not something that is 
broken—rather it is this way for a reason—and God has subjected the creation to this system so 
that God, in Christ, could redeem and transform it. Indeed, this is the only means through which 
God could resolve the problem of moral evil and to release the creation from its bondage    
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necessary, state of affairs.  Southgate’s argument that God co-suffers with every 
sentient being is plausible, as this would be a necessary expression of the 
compassion of the God of the Bible. However, we suggest that God as ‘co-sufferer’ 
does not indicate a culpability on God’s part but rather speaks of an empathetic 
solidarity of God with his creatures. 
 
It is agreed that some kind of ‘eschatological fulfillment’ for creatures that have 
‘no flourishing in this life’ shall (somehow) pertain—though we have no idea how 
this would pertain. It is so hard for us to imagine a world without entropic 
consequences.  Southgate’s , view—that humans have a positive, cooperative role 
with God in the healing of the evolutionary process, is interesting. However, 
considering the late arrival of ‘the’ species with both the means (technologically 
& politically) and the will (morally & ethically) to address the prevailing state of 
affairs, Southgate’s suggestion cannot be of major significance. However, it could 
be argued that this was God’s intention regarding the people of Israel (C. Wright 
2006) and that it continues to be God’s intention regarding those professing to 
follow Christ in the ‘latter days’.  
 
4.5  A Barthian theodicy of nature 
Evolutionary theory has exacerbated the problem of natural evil for the believer 
—leaving the existence of benevolence within the character of the Godhead 
questionable. Darwinian Natural Selection has, without doubt, greatly 
diminished the likelihood of there being a satisfactory outcome in the work of 
theodicy. Neil Messer, however, offers a possible way ahead.  
 
At the beginning of his chapter in the edited book Theology after Darwin, Messer 
(2009, 139) outlines his intended course—stating that a more satisfactory 
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approach to the problem of evolutionary evil is to be taken from the perspective 
of Christian tradition rather than from any scientific interpretation or overview. 
Messer also refers to his own approach and that it is developed in dialogue with 
the twentieth century Swiss theologian Karl Barth. Messer refers to ‘Mapping the 
Problem of Evolutionary Evil’—making reference to two strands: the stronger 
strand advocating that the evolutionary process is the means that God used to 
‘create’ all biological life. The weaker claim is that which applies to…the 
conviction that the world which God made and pronounced ‘very good’ (Genesis 
1:31) is a world that has a process of evolution by natural selection built into it’. 
(140) Messer suggests that one obstacle that modern biology ‘seems’ to place in 
the way of both the weak and strong claims is that the evolutionary process 
inevitably entails ‘ills’ or ‘evils’ i.e. the pain and death of all creatures. It is this 
‘inevitability’ factor that poses the problem—markedly within the world of 
evolutionary theodicy.  
 
Messer offers an alternative approach to the problem and refers to two aspects of 
approaches to the problem of evil. Firstly he refers to the apparent contradiction 
between the world disclosed to us by evolutionary biology and the creation that 
God (Genesis 1:31) pronounces ‘very good’. Secondly, he refers to the more 
familiar question of whether an omnipotent God could have avoided some of the 
evil that we find in the world. Regarding the latter Messer states that there is a 
danger that if Christians pursue this line of thought too far, ‘they will find 
themselves defending an idol of their own making rather than the God of 
Christian revelation.’ (147). This is taken to mean that taking such a route often 
leads to dead-ends or an adventure in metaphysical gymnastics rather than an 
adequate theodicy. Messer’s point, as viewed here, is that any ‘enquiry’ of this 
sort needs to start with the Christian community’s confession of faith in response 
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to the biblical witness. Messer is fully aware of the problems and lists the major 
difficulties:  
 
a. That the Scriptures witness to a God who created all that is, and 
who pronounced the creation ‘very good’ (Genesis 1:31). 
b. That the Genesis creation narratives and other biblical texts flesh 
out what we are to understand by ‘very good’,‘ a world of peace and 
plenty.’  Messer states that if, in any sense, the Christian doctrine of 
creation and Darwinian evolutionary biology are referring to the 
same world, then we seem to be faced with a contradiction. (148) 
 
The ‘contradiction’ Messer refers to in ‘b’ is that the God of the Bible would not 
have devised such a system as the one in question and then declared it ‘very 
good’. Here we disagree with Messer and uphold that, in spite of what Messer 
feels to be a contradiction, it is possible to affirm—along with Scripture: that 
creation was ‘very good’, in the sense of being fit for purpose21. Southgate’s 
response (2011) to this is that Messer is, “…simply unwilling to concede that the 
disvalues we see in evolution could be part of God’s creation.” (14). Southgate 
suggests that it seems that in order to retain belief in ‘the unequivocal goodness 
of God’s creation’, Messer wants to draw instead on Barth’s ‘Church Dogmatics’ in 
which Barth reflects on this concept of ‘nothingness’.  
 
                                                          
21
 Or as Polkinghorne (1991) suggests: it was good because it had ‘fruitful potentiality’. The view 
held here, though, is that any notion of ‘potentiality’ must take into consideration God’s sovereign 
purposes—the purposes of a God who has the wherewithal to bring about an ultimate telos—this 
being  in stark contrast to a God who has no means of bringing about His plans and purposes. 
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Regarding ‘beginnings’, Messer follows Barth, Southgate (2008, 5) and others 
when he states that there never was a ‘golden age’—never an idyllic period on 
earth when there was no predation, parasitism or plague. ‘The first man was 
immediately the first sinner’[Barth,1956]. According to Messer, Barth is saying 
that history begins with the Fall—that the history of the world has always been a 
‘fallen history’ (149). However, this does not mean that the story of creation can 
be contradicted by the [so] different history supplied by evolutionary biology. 
Messer points out that Barth is not attempting an explanation of the origins of 
evil but that Barth is more interested in what God has done about the problem. 
This is all very well but it seems to rather ‘muddy the waters’ . ‘Barth’, Messer 
states, identifies evil as ‘nothingness’ (das Nichtige). As such ‘nothingness’ has a 
strange, paradoxical, negative kind of existence: it is the chaos, disorder and 
annihilation that threatens God’s creation—a threat to which God is opposed. Sin 
is one form that ‘nothingness’ takes, but it also takes the forms of suffering and 
death. Furthermore, it is clear that not only humanity, but the whole of God’s 
creation is threatened and opposed by this ‘nothingness’: “Whatever in the 
evolutionary process is opposed to God’s creative purpose is to be identified with 
‘nothingness’: it is an aspect of the chaos and disorder threatening the creation.” 
(149) 22 23 
                                                          
22
 Barth’s use of the term ‘nothingness’ seems to be less than satisfactory—especially if this 
‘nothingness’ is to be defeated by ‘something’. Whether or not it avoids the problem of dualism is 
debatable. 
23
 Walter Brueggemann (2009) refers to the hymnic tradition of Israel being, “…surely aware of the 
old and pervasive mythos of primordial combat, exuberantly announces that YHWH has defeated 
and dispelled the forces of evil…that YHYH is indeed the Creator of all the ‘hosts’, the powers of 
heaven and their work at YHWH’s command…” (Brueggemann 2009, 147). That there was ‘a 
personified’ opposition to God’s creative purposes rather than any abstract nothingness, is an 
essential part of the argument in this thesis as shall become apparent in the latter sections. 
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Messer affirms that the Biblical witness requires us to say of the world: that it is 
both created and fallen, that creation is the work of God, that it was pronounced 
‘very good’, and that it is badly astray from what God means it to be24.  
In contradistinction to Messer’s view, the view held here is that creation, in terms 
of God’s planned intentions is (though it is impossible to qualify because of the 
unverifiable effects of the behaviour of fallen angels) as God intended—that 
creation has an evolutionary ‘blueprint’ because of the planned intentions of the 
God who is both benevolent and sovereign25. Messer (150) aligns himself with an 
evolutionary perspective and states that it is the evolutionary process that has 
made us the way we are. However, he follows Barth in identifying the violence 
and scarcity of the struggle for existence with what he considers ‘the fallenness of 
the world’. The argument in this thesis though is that there is, indeed, a 
fallenness but that the cause of that fallenness need not remain unexamined—an 
‘unknown cause’ or an ‘abstract form’—a  das Nichtige that leaves aside the need 
for an answer to the problem of evil—but rather that the fallenness, of angels and 
of men—though not instigated by God was, somehow, known by God before the 
creation of the universe. For this world is the best possible world in which the 
Triune God brings about the best of possible outcomes.  
 
Messer is concerned not to blur the edges—‘making God’s good creative purpose 
and the flawed evolutionary process into two co-eternal powers vying for the 
                                                          
24
 It’s interesting to note that Messer (2009, 150) thinks that there could be closer links than we 
sometimes think between the violence of the struggle for existence and—at least some aspects of 
human sin. We agree with this—it is so much more than we see or even perceive.  
25
 This is not to say that created agents have not brought about states of affairs that may be 
considered a contradiction , regarding  God’s attributes of benevolence and sovereignty, but that 
are nothing of the sort. 
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upper hand in shaping us.’ Neither is Messer wishing to re-invent a form of 
Manichaeism, in which light battles darkness or any form of Gnosticism26— 
where the material world is irretrievably flawed and salvation lies in escaping 
from it. The reason we don’t have to do either of these things, Messer suggests, is 
because God has, in Christ, addressed our predicament.  According to Messer, 
Barth held that in the incarnation God exposed Himself to nothingness—doing 
so in order to repel and defeat it. Messer adds to this by referring to Paul’s words 
in 1 Corinthians 15:3-4 where the apostle states that, “Christ died for our sins in 
accordance with the scriptures, and that he was buried, and that he was raised 
from the dead on the third day in accordance with the scriptures.” 
 
Messer affirms that, “Because this is the heart of the [Christian] good news, 
Gnosticism is not an option: the Christian gospel promises not an escape from 
the material but its healing and transformation…The Christian tradition 
understands the resurrection of Christ as the in-breaking of God’s promised new 
age into history, the first fruits of what God promises to do to ‘make all things 
new’. Revelation 21:5 “ (151) It is, as Messer suggests, the ‘transformation’ that is 
the good news. However, should there be any need of ‘healing’ the inference 
would be that the creation is out of sorts with its creator or that another 
party/parties had ruined the ideal. Messer admits that the kind of world to 
which—“ …a wolf hath sojourned with a lamb, And a leopard with a kid doth lie 
down, And calf, and young lion, and fatling are together, And a little youth is 
leader over them.” (Isaiah 11:6-927) is beyond our [present] comprehension 
especially in the light of evolutionary biological outcomes.  
                                                          
26
 Neither is this the view in the argument in this thesis—in which neither Dualism (Gnostic or 
otherwise) or any other proposed opposition to the sovereign will of God could obtain. 
27
 Young’s Literal Translation 
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However, because of his high view of biblical revelation and his insistence that 
theological interpretation take precedence over any scientifically derived a 
priori—this is Messer’s position. Messer is correct in this—for it is the 
‘theological’ that is in question and not, at present, the ‘scientific’. Messer affirms 
what is the Christian hope: that God’s peace, not the struggle for existence, will 
have the last word—and because God’s ‘good future’ has broken into our 
[present] with the resurrection of Christ, we are able to see the past and the 
beginning in a true light as well. 
 
In the final part of his discourse (154)  Messer admits that his ‘picture’ does not 
offer much by way of explanation—of how the struggle for existence came to be 
such a pervasive feature of our present reality. He does suggest, however, that the 
important question to report is what God has actually done to address our 
predicament and our response to God’s solution. Messer’s is a familiar voice. 
Reaching into the eschaton for consolation may well be preferable to wallowing 
in the [muddy] waters of the ‘dim’ past but this in and of itself does not match up 
to an adequate defence, let alone a theodicy. However, Messer’s commitment to 
the prioritising of the revelation of God (in Scripture) over the, present, 
conclusions of mankind ‘the latter-day fruit of evolution’ is one readily concurred 
with. Indeed, it is because of the revelation of Scripture—declaring the 
omnipotence and benevolence of God—that the problem arises otherwise there is 
no such problem. 
 
4.6 Against Instrumentalism: animals and the fall 
Michael Lloyd (Are Animals Fallen? 1998), along with Neil Messer, realises that 
the problem of an evolutionary theodicy is acute for the Christian defender as it 
entails dealing with the contradictions of a world in which the ‘love of God’ is 
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[has not been] altogether evident and states that, “It is certainly not the sort of 
world which one would expect the God we meet in Christ to have created.” (Lloyd 
1998, 148) Moreover, Lloyd states that the protest against, what he refers to as, 
‘the predatory character of nature’ is precisely because of the Christological 
conception of God held by Christians. It is though far broader than any 
underdeveloped Christology, for, it is the very idea of the ‘Sovereign God’ (The 
Triune God of Scripture) that is in question. In other words, the life and 
teachings of the incarnate son of God cannot be taken in isolation from the actual 
telos of the Triune God—a telos that has to do with justice as well as 
redemption—with judgement as well as reconciliation. 
 
Regarding the defence offered by instrumentalists (that God will bring good out 
of harms and that the harms are a necessary part of the ‘plot’) Lloyd comments 
that, “…even without pain, predation does not seem unambiguously to declare 
the glory of God, and theodicies which seek to justify predation as part of the 
creational purposes of God tend to adopt anti-Christian attitudes in the attempt.” 
(1998, 149) Lloyd points out that with an instrumentalist view of evolution God is 
“responsible for the suffering involved, but not culpable, because God is using it 
as an instrument in the pursuit of some greater good, be it aesthetic richness or 
human freedom.” (151) Lloyd though says that ‘Eschatology by itself is not 
sufficient however great the happiness, peace and rest on offer they do not justify 
the means, and that the problem must be addressed at the other end as well. 
Lloyd argues (155) that what is needed is an account of evil in which God is not 
only victoriously against it at the end but is also resolutely against it at the 
beginning. In other words, we need a doctrine of the Fall as well as an end times 
solution. We absolutely affirm Lloyd’s view—vis a vis the need for a 
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comprehensive defence that takes into account all the necessary ingredients — 
but come to a different conclusion on the matter. 
 
Lloyd is convinced that the only possible defence for God against the charge of 
making a world riddled with suffering and violence is that God didn’t: “And that 
is what the doctrine of the Fall tells us.” (155) Lloyd’s view sees the Fall as cosmic 
and not local, and that it is not limited to human sin. Lloyd’s view also sees that 
animals are part of a fallen creation and therefore subject to its state of affairs. He 
notes that those who hold to the fallenness of the whole of creation do so not 
primarily to get faith out of an apologetic hole, but for intrinsic theological and 
Christological reasons which they see embedded in the revelation of God in 
Christ and Scripture. Lloyd though states that since the arrival of Darwinism the 
effects of the human fall could no longer be taken as the cause of predation and 
death and states that:  
 
The question must now be faced as to how that which was inimical to the 
creational intention of an omnipotent God could have come to be. 
Granted that the whole of creation is fallen, how did it fall? Granted that 
the divisions of creation are not a design fault of the Creator but the result 
of free decisions by free creatures, what account may we give of the 
volitional process or processes which brought about the Fall?” (156) 28   
 
                                                          
28
 Lloyd refers to the work of the twentieth century theologian N.P.Williams (1998, 157-157) who 
rejected the idea that humans were ‘the ultimate culprits’ for all of the ills within the evolutionary 
scheme of things but, nevertheless, insisted that the Fall must have taken place in time as any 
attempt to lift the ultimate origin of evil out of time would plunge us into the gulf of either 
dualism or of unmoral monism. 
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Lloyd himself prefers to work with a model of the Fall as angelic in origin. He 
suggests that the hypothetical assertion that natural evil is the result of the 
distortion of creation brought about by the angelic fall does not need evidential 
support at this precise point if it can be shown that it is organically related to a 
world-view which is coherent and carries evidential support at other key points29, 
“…the doctrine of the Fall implies that creation is fallen, that it does not reflect 
the self-giving love of God that we meet in Christ, and that the God we do meet 
in Christ is the sort of God who gives creatures that freedom to reject God’s 
purposes without which love is meaningless. If we understand ‘godless’ to mean 
‘having turned away from God’,…”  (160) Indeed, the expressive free will of both 
angels and men are at the root of the problem of moral evil—the effects of which 
are, as yet, not fully comprehended. As Lloyd has stated, and as is agreed with 
here; Free Will is a necessary part of the outworking of God’s creative purposes. If 
this is the case then there must be some cause and effect resulting from free will 
decisions. However, as Southgate points out, “…a position such as Lloyd’s still 
suffers from the problem…that it dissects out the biological world and assigns all 
the disvalue to the free (harmful) choices of angels, and all the values to God’s 
creative work.”  (2011, 235) Southgate is correct in his assessment of Lloyd’s (1998) 
work but this is not the final word on the viability of a Free-Will defence per se—
as will become evident in part two of this thesis. 
 
4.7  Two Theodicies: Irenaeus & Augustine, as interpreted by R.J. 
Russell 
                                                          
29
 Lloyd refers to past theories related to the existence of objects in the universe that were later 
proven to be factual. A current example might be the Higgs Boson. We address the notion of an 
Angelic Fall in part  two of this thesis.  
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Robert J. Russell (2008) has done much to set out a conceptual framework for 
considering the problem of evolutionary theodicy. Russell draws heavily from the 
work of Irenaeus as he develops his defence of the goodness of God in the light of 
evolution.Russell proposes that any ‘robust theodicy’ has to meet at least three 
criteria: 
a) it must ward off Manichean tendencies to “blame God” for creating natural 
evil or to view nature as unambiguously evil, 
b) it must ward off Pelagian tendencies to undercut the universality of moral 
evil, 
c) it must fully take on board [Darwinian] evolution, and in particular the 
constitutive character of natural evil to life. (255) 
Russell notes that Christian theology includes a variety of theodicies (defences) 
that meet these criteria, and refers to John Hick’s analysis of this variety as falling 
into two broad types—the Augustinian and Irenaean; Russell then endeavours to 
reformulate these theodicies so that they meet all three criteria—deploying them 
to the task of evolutionary theodicy. Russell offers some cautionary comments 
and interesting insights regarding Augustine’s ‘Free Will Defence’ and suggests 
that, for Augustine, both natural and moral evils are ‘ultimately’ the result of the 
actions of free rational beings who sin. According to Russell, Augustine’s view 
was that sin began with the cosmic fall of the angels and continued with Adam 
and Eve who, though created ‘very good’ by God, did of their own free will choose 
creaturely goods over God. (255)  
 
1. Extending the Augustinian Theodicy to Physics and Cosmology 
Russell suggests that there are resources in Augustinian theodicy which should 
not be overlooked (257) and refers to the work of Reinhold Niebuhr who 
suggested that the first task required—in order to divest the Augustinian 
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theodicy of its ‘creation/fall’ framework—was to uncover its underlying 
philosophical argument and then to reinterpret this argument in an evolutionary 
perspective:  
 
Niebuhr then rendered the underlying logic of the Augustinian theodicy as 
asserting that sin is unnecessary but inevitable. This phrase captures 
Augustine’s argument without tying it to the Fall30. It expresses in stark 
terms what Niebuhr called the ‘absurd paradox’ of the Christian free-will 
defence. Augustinian theodicy rephrased through Niebuhr’s formation 
now meets our three criteria for an evolutionary theodicy. (257) 
  
Under the heading: ‘Preconditions in physics that underlie the free-will defence’ 
Russell asks, what, in  particular, must physics be like for the reformulated 
Augustinian /Niebuhrian free-will defence to hold. Moreover, what, if anything, 
reflects the Niebuhrian logic of ‘unnecessary but inevitable’ at the level of 
physics? Russell refers to thermodynamics—and the work of what he terms 
‘metaphorical theology’ summarising the views of its exponents thus: 
 
To summarise the idea briefly, we typically find beauty and goodness in 
the patterns of emergent complexity and creative novelty characteristic of 
life, while tragedy and sorrow play themselves out in terms of the 
dissipation and destruction associated with decay, disease and death. 
Curiously, thermodynamics underlies and is entailed by all these 
phenomena. The second law [of thermodynamics] thus plays a dual role: It 
                                                          
30
 This, as shall be argued in part two of this thesis, is a mistake as it does not take into 
consideration the potential for both good and evil that God has allowed within the created 
order—so does not allow for a more comprehensive free-will argument. 
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makes possible the physical and biological consequences of our moral 
action both for good and for ill. (258) 
 
The unavoidable conclusion of Niebuhrian logic seems to be that sin (deviant 
behaviour, disobedience etc.) is the de facto result of the system through which 
God has created life-forms—including sentient beings such as ‘Adam and Eve’. 
The question becomes, as Russell underlines: “Why did God choose to create this 
universe with these laws of physics knowing that they would not only make 
Darwinian evolution unavoidable, and with it the sweep of natural evil in the 
biological realm, but that they would also contribute to natural evil at the level of 
physics….” (Russell, 259) Russell’s conclusion on the matter is that the 
‘Augustinain/Niebuhrian theodicy (ultimately) fails. So, why does it fail? It fails, 
according to Russell, not because it is tied to a ‘mythical fall’,because it is not.  
Neither is its failure due to it mistaking death as a consequence of ‘sin’ and not as 
constitutive of life. It avoids both admirably.  According to Russell, it leads to the 
(unhelpful) recognition that , ‘underlying moral evil is natural evil’ and that this 
recognition (conclusion) characterises the universe as a whole.  
Evil is intrinsic to the processes that generate value.31 Russell, therefore, looks to 
the redemption of the cosmos. 
                                                          
31
 We agree with Russell here—that evil is moral rather than natural. Moreover, it is the case that 
if the laws of physics functioned to different values there might well be no likelihood of the 
entropic effects of the Second Law of Thermodynamics; thus, in such a world, there may not be 
the physical means through which the results of rebellious malevolence could manifest itself. 
Natural evil, paradoxically, exists as a result of moral deviancy but, as we shall argue in the 
conclusion of this thesis—this is the only possible world in which the second person of the Trinity 
could take on flesh, suffer and die—in so doing  rescue, ransom and redeem a creation that 
‘groans’—in the waiting. 
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2. Extending Schleiermacher’s Theodicy to Evolution 
Russell then returns to the work of John Hick—‘retrieving and extending’ his 
ideas. Russell (260) comments on what he refers to as Hick’s helpful comparison 
of both contrasts and agreements between the theodicies of Augustine and 
Schleiermacher (the latter deriving some of its inspiration from Irenaeus). The 
essence of the difference between these theodicies, according to Russell’s 
interpretation of Hick’s views, is as follows: 
 
o The Augustinian theodicy looks at a created paradise in the past and 
focuses crucial importance on the fall of angels and humankind—looking 
to a future of judgement for ‘the damned’. 
o The Irenaean theodicy accepts evil as an inevitable factor in the world— 
suited for moral development. It does not deny the Fall, but rejects the 
ideas of ‘lost righteousness and inherited sinfulness’. It views an eternal 
hell as ‘rendering a Christian theodicy impossible’. (260) 
 
Russell states that the key difference, as he reads Hick, is that the Augustinian 
theodicy attempts to protect God from responsibility for the existence of evil by 
stressing the Fall (Adamic & Angelic), whereas the Irenaean theodicy accepts 
God’s ultimate responsibility for evil while ‘showing’ why a world that includes 
evil can be considered justifiable and inevitable.  
 
For the Augustinian theodicy the world is ‘very good’ as it is now, even 
including the reality of sin and evil. For the Irenaean theodicy the 
perfection of the world lies in the eschatological future where the end, the 
Kingdom of God, will justify the means of its achievement…The 
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Augustinian theodicy admits that bringing good out of evil is better than 
not permitting evil to exist…Irenaean theodicy treats it as central and 
stresses the eschatological context of the ‘greater good’. (261) 
 
Russell’s (2008) conclusion: that ‘the end is a means to the beginnings’—that God 
will bring an ideal end-times solution—that all will be well  so there is no need to 
search for an elusive answer for the state of affairs seems less than satisfactory. 
His explanation for the state of affairs within the created order seems to be 
reasonably plausible but at the same time it does not seem to offer a complete 
account of the extent of evil in the world. Moreover, in order to avoid any ‘fall 
confusion’ it tempts one to engage in an eschatological just-so story—and at the 
same time avoiding contact with the problem of evil per se. 
 
The argument in this thesis sets out to offer a defence that agrees and 
encompasses much of what has been said previously—but that offers a different 
conclusion not previously advanced in the literature. 
 
5. Precursory Chapter to the Proposed Model 
In this chapter we interact particularly with the views of Stephen H. Webb as 
given in his book entitled ‘The Dome of Eden: A New Solution to the Problem of 
Creation and Evolution’. Webb’s views that evolution works under divine 
permission and that the emergence of Humankind has particular significance 
within an evolutionary paradigm have a particular symmetry with the argument 
in this thesis32. 
                                                          
32
 Although Webb’s view, that this world is NOT the best of possible worlds, is at odds with the 
argument given in part two of this thesis, Webb’s views are nonetheless helpful regarding its 
development. 
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Webb notes that evolution leaves a trail in history—marked by blood and 
anguish. What Webb avoids saying here is that it is this very ‘trail of blood and 
anguish’ (made possible by the natural laws) that the Triune God ‘commissioned’ 
and ordained. It is however, as we shall argue in part two, this very state of affairs 
that allows for the victory of God over both sin and death. Indeed, the song the 
faithful will sing and the creation will echo is that of the Victory of God over sin 
and death; it will be a continual song declaring the gracious mercy and goodness 
of the Godhead33. It is this world (a world ordained and created by God) that is 
the only possible world in which the free will of conscious beings can pertain 
with all of the resultant consequences and, most importantly, the redemptive act 
of the crucified Son of God could possibly take place. 
 
We concur with Webb’s views (246-295) on the ‘emergence’ of human kind as 
being a significant ‘event’ in the evolution of carbon based life-form—conscious, 
intelligent, incredibly creative, morally aware and, most importantly, ‘God 
conscious’. Webb’s views coalesce with the argument given in this thesis—that 
God [incarnate], at the eschaton, would dwell with a redeemed creation having 
rescued and redeemed the creation from its bondage to corruption. Humankind, 
Webb argues, is meant to be here—moreover the emergence of humans has been 
a major part34 of God’s ‘creation project’. Webb makes the point that: if God 
                                                          
33
 Donald Macleod (2000), referring to the work of B.B. Warfield says that the revelation of the 
trinity was made not in word but in deed: ”It was made in the incarnation of God the Son, and the 
outpouring of God the Holy Spirit…the revelation of the Trinity was incidental to, and the 
inevitable effect of, the accomplishment of redemption.” (154) 
34
Our argument does not devalue the rest of creation or suppose that God has little more than a 
utilitarian purpose for it. Robert. J. Russell advocates that the suffering of creatures cannot ‘alone ‘ 
be justified by the evolution of Homo sapiens and their destiny with God: “Instead, the suffering 
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chose this world as the stage for the incarnation, and the human species as its 
form, then there must be something unique about both planet Earth and human 
nature. Indeed Webb argues that one of the corollaries of Christ’s primacy is that 
humans have the form (and image) precisely because God intended to give a 
human form to Christ from the beginning. Webb states that the Old Testament 
has not only an anthropomorphic view of God but also a ‘theomorphic’ view of 
humanity, i.e. that humans take the form they do because God has the form he 
has—in Christ the Son. Webb makes it clear that sceptics will view his position as 
anthropomorphism (in the most negative of terms). He understands the reason 
for the critique well enough but points out that they are mistaken to claim that 
Christians think of everything from a human perspective and he suggests that 
God made the world with mankind in mind, to become friends of the Son and to 
accompany him in praise forever. (179) 
  
Webb contends that theologians who argue that this world is the only world that 
God could have created run the risk, in their attempt to justify God’s relationship 
with natural evil, of ‘portraying’ the world as thoroughly and necessarily evil, 
“That is, if there is no possible world that God could have created that would 
have been without evil, then the very existence of matter is thoroughly saturated 
in and inseparable from evil. If evil is built into nature, however, it is God who 
put it there.” (96) Webb’s point—that if evil is built into nature, it is God who put 
it there, clearly rules out the possibility of a third party being responsible for, at 
                                                                                                                                                                          
of creatures is taken up individually by God in the incarnation, suffered by God in the crucifixion, 
and redeemed by God in the Resurrection. This eschatological act of God is to be seen as 
proleptically present to and with each creature at its death.” (2012, 106) Russell may well be 
correct. This view may be considered speculative but it is nevertheless plausible. Indeed, the 
effects of the Cross of Christ need to be viewed in proleptic terms—as it is in Christ’s life, death 
and resurrection that we have sight of the ‘big picture’.  
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least, natural evil. Webb is correct in that God has allowed certain of his 
creatures the gift of choice and that, consequently, this ‘gift’ has allowed for the 
inflicting of an enormous amount of harms. However, this does not mean that 
God is guilty by default, rather that God has allowed for the kind of creation that 
is able to express itself. This, in our opinion, is a good outcome rather than a bad 
outcome. Webb makes a salient point though (97) when he says that evil (in the 
natural world) is real whereas entropy is exactly “what one would expect to find 
at the level of physical processes”. Evil (Webb does not differentiate between 
natural and moral evil) is, from this perspective, a malevolent factor whereas 
entropy is, simply, the consequence of certain physical conditions. Webb 
however points out that even though the temptation to equate evolution with 
evil is understandable; equating nature with evil runs counter to the Christian 
tradition, most notably the claim found in Genesis that nature is good, which for 
Webb seems to mean ‘moral’ rather than ‘utilitarian’. The view held here is that 
creation does not have the moral dimension that Webb may wish to assign to it. 
In this sense nature is amoral. Indeed, Webb reminds us that groups that 
considered nature evil (Manicheans and Cathars in particular) have always been 
considered heretical. He maintains (127) that any adequate theological account of 
evolution has to explain how God (as the source of all that is good in nature) 
bears no responsibility for evil evident within the evolutionary cycle of life. Webb 
here uses the term ‘evil’ but a more appropriate word would be ‘harms’—as  the 
results of [natural] entropy need not be considered ‘evil’ per se. The argument in 
this thesis is that neither God’s universal laws nor the outcomes of these laws are 
‘naturally’ evil, in and of themselves; they are nothing of the sort. That there are 
‘harmful outcomes’  to these laws is a de facto given; that these outcomes are, 
most often, horrendous—even maliciously harmful to life’s outcomes—is 
accepted. But this does not prove that this world is not the best possible world 
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neither does it prove that the natural laws themselves are morally deficient. The 
outcomes of the effects of the natural laws on carbon-based-life may be 
reprehensible (from our perspective) but that is all that they can be35. Webb’s 
view is that entropy is what one would expect to find at the level of physical 
processes (as referred to earlier) whereas ‘evil’ is something other than ‘evil’; this 
obviously demands an explanation. For Webb the answer to the problem of evil 
has to be located outside of the evolutionary paradigm rather than within. This is, 
indeed, a sentiment concurred with in this thesis—particularly with regard to the 
‘labelling of nature as evil’. However, the conclusions in this thesis are somewhat 
different than Webb’s. Webb’s ‘theses’ (139-180) though are relevant to the 
argument in this thesis, as they helpfully open up a vista that offers some clarity 
regarding the rebellion of Satan and the angels: 
 
i) Satan’s Fall is a ‘fall from grace’ and is not to be confused with a ‘fall from 
heaven to earth’. The argument here is that Satan’s ‘fall from grace’ should 
be considered a ‘pre-creation-of-the-physical-universe event’. In other 
words outside of the space/time continuum. Whereas Satan’s being cast 
down to the earth was, obviously, not. Satan was cast down into the world 
we know—an existent world of predation and death.  
ii) Eden was a real place though not real in the sense that we can plot its 
coordinates on the space-time-continuum that we experience today.  
                                                          
35
 It may be acceptable to bring judgement against God with insufficient evidence. This is 
common practice—as C.S. Lewis points out, God is guilty—as ‘proven’. ”He (man) is the judge: 
God is in the dock. He (man) is quite a kindly judge: if God should have a reasonable defence for 
being the God who permits…The trial may even end in God’s acquittal. But the important thing is 
that man is on the Bench and God in the Dock.” (Lewis, 93) 
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If Eden is a real place, and if Satan tries to battle God in nature from some 
point in the space-time-continuum then there has to be some kind of 
‘reality’ that divides Eden from the rest of the world. The effects of moral 
deviancy had to cross into Eden in order to disrupt it and to corrupt it—as 
Scripture indicates. The ‘evil’ that Webb refers to is that which can be 
described as ‘moral’ rather than ‘natural’. This evil comes about as the 
result of the deviant behaviour of advanced created intelligence: extra-
terrestrial and terrestrial alike. The outcomes of this evil, though 
affecting/infecting certain aspects of the created order, do not bring about 
major changes to the laws that God had ordained for his creation 
ordinances—the laws that enable the evolutionary process.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
iii) That the reason for Satan’s fall to come full circle is the same reason for 
creation as a whole, and is the reason why human nature cannot be 
reduced to its biological components: God created the world because God 
the Father had already determined to take the form of God the Son, and 
the form God the Father gave to the son is the same form in which 
mankind was created. 
 
The world and all that is in it is a gift to the Son from the Father. If 
something like the human species, with its intelligence, its eyes and who 
knows what of other parts and features, is inevitable, then biology must 
have been conditioned from the very beginning to unfold the human 
pattern. That is exactly what the Primacy of Christ leads us to expect. 
Indeed the Primacy of Christ can be considered the metaphysical 
precondition made necessary by the phenomenon of evolutionary 
convergences. (Webb 2010, 267) 
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Robert C. Doyle (1999) argues that it is clear from the contents of Genesis 
chapters 1 to 3, as well as the way Scripture uses these chapters, that the basis for 
any understanding of the last things is in the understanding of the first things.  
Doyle’s observation is that the beginning of the Bible—the beginning of time, the 
world, humankind, and humankind’s relationship to God and the world—is 
pregnant with purpose. The purpose, the end(the eschaton) is implicit in the 
beginning (26) Regarding the six days of creation Doyle proposes that these six 
days actually find their significance in the seventh, “…the divine rest on the 
seventh  day indicates the goal of creation.” (26) This, we, along with Doyle 
maintain is a goal which shall be maintained,“…despite any rebellious efforts to 
vitiate it.” (26) The argument in this thesis offers the same reasoning as Doyle’s 
summary, i.e. that God’s plan for the creation is purposeful, that it incorporates 
the alpha and ‘the’ omega with the telos of creation being finally revealed at the 
eschaton. 
 
Throughout this thesis, we have argued that the creation is good—good in terms 
of it being good and not evil. We have maintained that the creation is as it is 
because its evolutionary process has been a necessary state of affairs rather than 
the product of an amorphous deity or of [mere] elemental forces. We have said 
that creation’s evolution coalesces with the purposes (telos) of a God who is 
personal—a determinate entity rather than a force that defies description—
sitting more comfortably with current trends in philosophical theology. We have 
further argued that God (The God of Scripture) is both sovereign and benevolent. 
Moreover we have said that, rather than being the product of a deficient deity or 
a defiant adversary, the creation is as it is because its evolution has been a 
necessary state of affairs and that, though considered less than satisfactory by 
created beings, is indeed a necessary state of affairs, and that (at the eschaton) 
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God will bring deliverance for those longing, as the apostle Paul intimates in his 
letter to the Christians in Rome, “…for the revealing of the sons of God.” (Romans 
8:19) 
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Part Two 
An Eight Step Defence 
 
The ‘eight step’ defence offered here follows the following order: 
 
1. That it is a good for God to create a world containing beauty, diversity and 
complexity of creatures. 
2. That such a world can only arise via an evolutionary process, which also 
necessitates suffering and apparent waste. 
3. That only such a world is capable of being transformed into the ‘new 
creation’, in which there need be no more suffering. 
4. But also, there is evidence that angels exist. 
5. That Angels may have existed before the creation of this universe. 
6. That it is a good that God gave angels freedom.  
7. That angels rebelled and continued to oppose God’s will for humans and 
the rest of creation. 
8. That only such a world as this could make possible the incarnation of the 
divine Son and thereby the defeat of the angels through the power of the 
Cross. 
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Step 1. It is good for God to create a world containing 
beauty, diversity and complexity of creatures: 
It is a most likely state of affairs that—should the God of the Bible desire to 
create a world—it would contain: beauty, diversity and a complexity of creatures. 
This is such a world. 
 
O LORD, how manifold are your works! 
    In wisdom have you made them all; 
    the earth is full of your creatures.  
(Psalm 104:1) 
 
James L.Grenshaw suggests that the author of Psalm 104 looks beyond the tiny 
space occupied by humans, ”His sweeping survey extends to all creatures and, 
more importantly, to their creator. Indeed, his sole point of mentioning a variety 
of animals and their thumb-endowed rival is to laud divine benevolence and 
wisdom.” (2005, 5) Grenshaw adds,“…although the psalmist acknowledges the 
predatory action of lions during the night, the consequence of this behaviour is 
construed as a divine gift.” (5) In this sense it can be said that, whatever the 
purpose of the living organism and whatever the ‘life-experience’ of any such 
creature, its creation is a good thing—even regarding some of the less positive 
life-forms that were in existence ‘a while’ before the arrival of the ‘interpreters’ of 
the evolution of biological life.  
 
Regarding  the  ‘Chance & Necessity’  of the evolutionary process, John 
Polkinghorne (1986, 51) says, “… without chance there would be no change and 
development and without necessity there would be no preservation and  
selection.” In his later work entitled ‘The God of Hope and End of the World 
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(2002) Polkinghorne states  that, “…through the intricate unfolding of physical 
processes initial simplicity has generated immense complexity… Theologically 
one can understand this complexity as the result of creation’s having been 
endowed by its creator with a profound potentiality which has been allowed to 
explore and realise as it makes itself.” (2002, 15) Polkinghorne’s position is one 
that envisages an evolutionary-creation scenario in which God does not ‘control’ 
all of creation (as would a ‘tyrannical puppeteer’) but rather one of a creator 
whose, “…nature of love is patient and subtle, content to achieve the divine 
purposes in an open and developing way, in which the creatures themselves 
collaborate.” (Polkinghorne, 15)   
 
Whatever one may conclude regarding the above view of the actual level of 
God’s interaction with the physical world; it is this world that allows for such 
diversity and complexity. It is, however, good for God to have created such 
potentiality—such complexity, diversity and beauty. David Wilkinson (2009) 
states that we need firstly to take seriously the notion that the heavens declare 
the glory of God (Psalm 19:1)—and that, “God may choose to reveal himself 
through the natural world, the book of his works as well as through the book of 
his word.” (21) In referring to the cosmic picture of Christ, Wilkinson states that, 
“…this cosmic picture of Jesus suggests that God is the sustainer of order in 
creation. Paul in Colossians 1:17 reminds us that Christ is before all things , but 
also that ‘in him all things hold together’36. This is a very different picture from 
the deistic Creator who lights the blue touch paper of the Big Bang and then goes 
                                                          
36
 We take it that in this passage the apostle is referring to the ‘pre-existence’ of Christ  and to the 
‘supremacy’ of Christ—that a straight forward exegesis of the passage does not render any notion 
of panentheism. 
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off to have a cup of tea.  The verb is in the perfect indicating everything held 
together in him and continues to do so.” (Wilkinson 2009, 24)  
The heavens, indeed, declare the glory of God. Scripture enunciates the unseen 
glory that is being revealed in the creation—that God both creates and sustains; 
that there is an overall ‘goodness’ about the Creation—that the absolute 
goodness of the creation will be finally revealed at the eschaton.37  
 
In referring to the progress, complexity and diversity of life, Simon Conway 
Morris (2003)  states that, “…when within the animals we see the emergence of 
larger and more complex brains, sophisticated vocalizations, echolocation, 
electrical perception, advanced social systems including eusociality, viviparity, 
warm-bloodedness, and agriculture—all of which are convergent—then to me 
that sounds like progress.” (307) Conway Morris’ description paints a picture of 
an abundantly creative process that may be described as good. Ergo, it is good 
that God should have so done. Moreover, it is most unlikely that such an 
abundant array of life could have been produced by any other means or by any 
other deity—‘tyrannical puppeteer’ or otherwise.John Haught (2010, 69) says that, 
“…the fact that natural selection produces design, diversity, and what Darwin 
calls the ‘descent of man’ does not exclude the possibility that the evolutionary 
drama carries a hidden meaning and that it is directional in a very profound 
sense because it bears invisibly within it the cooperative influence of a liberating 
and promising God.” It is the ‘liberation and promises’ of God that are germane to 
the argument here for evolution per se cannot offer either promise or liberation; 
                                                          
37
 “And no creature is hidden from his sight, but all are naked and exposed to the eyes of him to 
whom we must give account.” (Hebrews 4:13) It is the imago Dei that is to be called into account 
not the rest of creation that, though groaning, ‘looks’ to its creator for its continued existence. 
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however the God of the Christian Bible can: The creator God whose character is 
such that He cares passionately for all that He has created and promises to 
liberate—the creation from its ‘groaning’—the creation that God Himself has 
brought under  subjugation; this  subjugation though, as we shall argue, should 
not be thought of in a utilitarian way—as if the  ephemeral appearance of the 
millions of creatures over the course of time were simply a means to a 
‘convergent’ end—that [all] of creation has no value to its creator other than that 
of ‘a means to an end’.38 Moreover, the giving of himself in creation underlies 
God’s character—especially his ‘Triunity’. Douglas Meeks (2006) has said that the 
doctrine of the [social] Trinity claims that God’s ‘owning’ is not grounded in self-
possession but rather in self-giving: “It is the character of God to give God’s self to 
us and to give us all things with God’s self (Romans 8:32). God owns by giving…It 
is God’s self-giving which, is the font of human livelihood in community.” 
(Meeks, 18) God creates in order to show both his Glory and His Benevolence—
God sharing His life with carbon based life-forms. Is that not a ‘good thing?’ God 
would have, surely ‘rejoiced’ in the results of the creative process that, profusely, 
established life in all its diversity throughout the earth, seas and skies.  
 
It was this amazing array of life that inhabited this ‘bright-blue-sphere’—eons 
before the arrival of mankind.  Before the shadow of man’s presence on earth 
there existed a creation that would not have been ‘read’ (by any extraterrestrial 
observer) as being ‘red in tooth and claw’ for there existed no carbon-based life-
form that could have set itself up as judge—creation, even then, was good, in all 
                                                          
38
 Regarding the Triune God’s intimate concern for creation Alister McGrath  (2002) states that 
the Trinitarian conception of God affirms that God is to be thought of as both creator of the world 
and a creative presence within it, “…it  (creation) is and remains both God’s possession and the 
place of indwelling of the one who ‘fills all in all’ Ephesians 1:23.” (McGrath 2002, 49) 
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its array. It has, though, been increasingly the case that, should a ‘creator’ of the 
cosmos be allowed, this deity would seem to be culpable—but only in the eyes of 
those with the wherewithal to judge. But this would have been the observation of 
a species without true cognizance of both the nature of creation or its benevolent 
creator . Prior to the advent of modern man there would not have been this 
‘palpable’ sense of moral ‘indignation’ proffered against the author of creation— 
the creation would have been amoral in its character yet it would, nevertheless 
have been a ‘good’ creation as it would have been the creation of a benevolent 
deity. But this [Creation] alone: without either the emergence of the creatures 
that are allowed the freedom of accusation—or the appearance of the accuser 
[Satan] who neither loved God or acknowledged God’s right to rule—could never 
have been a completed work—for it has been the timeless plan and the telos of 
God to create such a species as mankind and for God to ‘put on frail flesh and die’ 
—so that the creation could be released from its bondage to decay and Christ’s 
victory over [moral] evil could be finally won. Ronald Osborn refers to what he 
describes as, “…the ancient patristic understanding of theosis—the view that 
God’s purposes in creating included his desire, from the beginning for the 
divinization of humankind through the hominization of Christ…And the divine 
love has always willed that the journey of creation and pilgrimage of humanity 
should end in our final adoption as coheirs of God’s kingdom and “partakers of 
the divine nature”. (Osborn 2014, 159)  
 
There are several points to be taken from the above: 
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i. Creation through the evolutionary process is, undeniably prolific—its 
diversity, complexity and beauty beyond the realms of coincidence or 
‘coincidental  convergence’.39 
ii. Creation declares the glory of God, and whatever declares the glory of 
God is a ‘good thing’. 
iii. That God’s concern for the creation is personal. The Triune God 
sustains the present creation . 
iv. That, in Christ and for Christ, God continues to prepare a created order 
(new heavens & new earth) so that God’s ultimate good purposes shall 
obtain. 
 
Prior to offering his own compound evolutionary theodicy Christopher Southgate 
(2008, 15) reconsiders the implications of a ‘very good creation’—concluding that 
creation is good in its proclivity to give rise to what Southgate refers to as, 
“…great values of beauty, diversity, complexity, and ingenuity of evolutionary 
strategy…Moreover, “It is also good because it is the Lord’s (Ps.24:1)”  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
39
 It is accepted that there is a chaotic element that may be defined as being without a 
blueprint (Dawkins 2009) or that there may be chaotic interference that might be 
considered the work of other hands (Mathew 13:28). 
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Step 2. Such a world can only arise via an evolutionary 
process, which also necessitates suffering and apparent 
waste: 
 
In a chapter entitled ‘Evolutionary explanation’ Ian Hutchinson (2011) refers to 
the dangers of a hospital environment. Hutchinson comments that one reason 
hospitals are such dangerous places is that, “…the environmental pressures on the 
bacteria there (in hospitals) are such that they rapidly evolve resistance to the 
various anti-bacterial agents that hospitals use.” (96)  Within the evolutionary 
‘framework’ there are a quite remarkable amount of life-forms, some of which 
might be considered unnecessary intruders, or the kinds of creation that God 
would ‘surely not have conjured-up’ because they seem to prove a contradiction 
in terms when one maintains a particular understanding of what a  ‘good’ 
creation would look like. Bacterial life-forms are, as Hutchinson infers, 
endemic—not only in hospitals but in the whole of the biosphere. They are 
essential to the whole of the history of the biosphere. Michael Behe (2007, 63) 
refers to statistics offered by workers at the University of Georgia who estimated 
that about a billion billion trillion (1030) bacterial cells are formed on the earth 
each and every year. Dennis Alexander (2008, 277) refers to the necessary effects 
of biological evolution on its products—advocating that biology is a package deal 
and that the values only come with the disvalues. However, Alexander goes on to 
say that the positive side of this is that we are living in an incredibly dynamic 
world in which there is what he refers to as ‘a huge amount of daily coming and 
going—the dead of all kinds are constantly making room for the living; all of life 
is Interdependent’ (279-280). Alexander holds that the God of all creation is also 
the great naturalist who enjoys all the richness and diversity of the natural world 
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that he has brought into being—including its ‘impressive carnivores’ (281)40.  
Polkinghorne underlines the fact that this current universe is a creation endowed 
with the physical properties that have empowered it to ‘make itself’ over the 
course of its evolutionary history:  
 
A world of this kind by its necessary nature must be a world of transience 
in which death is the cost of new life. In theological  terms, this world is a 
creation that is sustained by its Creator, and which has been endowed 
with a divinely purposed fruitfulness,…” (2002, 114) 
 
God is not, as Polkinghorne affirms elsewhere, the tyrannical puppeteer of the 
universe. This world may be endowed by collaboration and fruitfulness but it is 
also a ‘vale of tears’ in which, metaphorically speaking, ‘all hell breaks loose’. Such 
a world as this most definitely necessitates suffering, but whether or not its 
proclivity to produce the ‘short successes’ of life—the inevitability of pain and 
extinction may be considered wasteful may not be comprehensively addressed 
from mankind’s current perspective. God is, as Polkinghorne suggests, “...the One 
who holds creation in being and interacts in hidden ways with its history.” (114) 
What may be observed ‘today’ is not the whole story. Polkinghorne refers to the, 
“two halves of God’s great creative/redemptive act...” (120)—the second half 
being that through which God shall bring about both vindication and 
justification for the [Created] state of affairs. The ‘present’ half (the old creation) 
may be seen to explore and realise its potentiality at “some metaphysical distance 
                                                          
40
 Alexander’s ‘picture’ of the ‘great naturalist’ enjoying the sight of one section of his handiwork 
tearing apart the other is not one that speaks of benevolence, but rather of a sort of divine 
utilitarianism. The utilitarian view is one that could only be considered in the absence of divine 
benevolence, which is in contradistinction to the view held here—benevolence being a key part of 
the argument. 
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from its Creator” (116) while the second half—the new redeemed creation—is 
brought into freedom through its intimate relationship with the ‘life of God’—in 
and through the work of Christ. 
 
In philosophy much is spoken of regarding the existence of a ‘Best Possible 
World’—that in order to offer a defence for the existence of evil in the world this 
world is to be defined as ‘the best possible world’. In referring to the supreme 
wisdom  of the God of Scripture, Leibniz states that, “…supreme wisdom—united 
to a goodness that is no less infinite cannot but have chosen the best…” 
(Theodicy, 197) In other words, the God of the Bible would have had to create 
the best possible world. Ergo, this world is the best [of] possible states of affairs. 
But is that the case? Moreover, need it be so? Southgate (2008) says that he fully 
accepts that, “…we can never be sure that this was God’s only way to give rise to 
creatures such as stem from the 3.8-billion-year-long evolution of the Earth’s 
biosphere.” (30) However, Southgate goes on to say that, “…given what we know 
about creatures, especially what we know about the role of evolution, in refining 
their characteristics, and the sheer length of time the process has required to 
give rise to sophisticated sentience, it is eminently plausible and coherent to 
conclude that this was the only way open to God.” (2008, 30)  
 
It might be suggested that Southgate is sacrificing the omnipotence of God in 
order to retain God’s benevolence. However, there are several things that can be 
said in answer to this. Firstly, in the light of our comprehension of the 
evolutionary process so far, we can ascertain certain fundamentals of the 
evolutionary process—fundamentals that Southgate mentions above: a) the role 
of evolution in the refining of creature’s characteristics, b) the amount of time 
taken. Given the nature of God’s omnipotence we can presume that the time and 
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procedure had nothing to do with God’s ability but all to do with God’s planned 
intentions to produce intelligent carbon-based-life on this planet. Given God’s 
benevolence we can further assume that there was no ‘better’ way for God to 
bring about/to actualise particular outcomes.41 Critics demand to know why it is 
that, in spite of God’s ‘alleged’ attributes, this world appears to fall far short of 
being the ‘best possible world’. Michael Murray (2008) considers two sorts of 
criticism: i. that the natural laws could have been better and ii. that there could 
have been more ‘evil-preventing interventions’.  Murray suggest that, “To show 
that such a world is possible the critic would need to describe a nomically 
regular world which (a) contains goodness of the sorts (either the same sorts or 
equivalent or better sorts) and amounts found in the actual world and which (b) 
contains substantially less natural evil than the actual world.” (147) Murray’s 
conclusion is that the task seems hopeless—that it would be necessary to 
identity a reasonably complete list of the goods that this actual world contains in 
order to offer a ‘best possible world’ potentiality. Murray suggests that it would 
be hard to know whether or not the acquisition of such a comprehensive list was 
at all possible. “Not only must the critic confront the fact that describing such an 
alternative world is seemingly beyond our capacities, she must also confront the 
claims of numerous scientists that there are many respects in which the physical 
parameters governing our world could not, after all, be significantly different 
from what they are in fact.” (2008, 147) Murray’s points are crucial to the 
question of whether or not God could have presented a better option. The 
argument presented here is that Murray is correct—as from our present 
                                                          
41
 The particular outcome  being the ‘birth’ and development of the species that have the freedom 
to choose or not to choose—Imago Dei. It is this perspective of evolution, id est the freedom of 
the Imago Dei to respond to the love of God that is ‘P’ here. Moreover, it has been the ascent of 
man that has provided a ‘highway for our God’—Immanuel with us. 
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understanding of the physical world—we cannot know whether or not there 
could have been a better option; this world being de facto the world we inhabit 
and of which we have reasonably comprehensive knowledge. Most importantly, 
it is because of the character of the God of Scripture, that we can assume that 
this world is the best of possible worlds. Liebniz  indeed argues (197) that it is in 
this sense that this world is the best possible world, as we know of no other, and 
assume that God would not have created this world without it being an absolute 
necessary state of affairs; this is, as is suggested above, an assumption rather 
than an argument—is though a reasonable assumption. Alvin Plantinga (1974, 
44), quite rightfully, points out that Leibniz’ view (his lapse) that an omnipotent 
God could have created/actualised just any world God pleased is false; this is 
taken to mean that, according to this reasoning, God could have created a world 
in which there was neither natural or moral evil. This world, as is painfully 
obvious, contains states of affairs that are considered to be rather bad states of 
affairs—affairs that, it can be concluded are brought about by both ‘natural’ and 
‘moral’ evil. However, this world is the best possible world, in that it is in this 
kind of environment in which the freedom of the action of carbon-based life 
expresses itself and in which the actions of both men and angels have both good 
and bad outcomes. If God were to create a world in which there existed only 
good outcomes, it would not be a world in which freedom could, in real terms, 
express itself  because neither an action or an outcome would have moral 
veracity as both would be neutral—neither good or bad. It is in this, the best of 
possible worlds, that the first part of Polkinghorne’s (2002) two-stage act of 
God’s creation plan can be actualised: The first-stage being the present 
scenario—subject to the effects of entropy, and the second-stage following on 
from the eschaton—‘new heavens and earth’. Polkinghorne’s scenario though 
does not offer a defence for God’s use of the evolutionary process but rather 
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brings a focus on a future (eschatological) finality where all may be considered 
‘well’. 
 
Listed in what he refers to as the core of his approach Christopher Southgate 
states that there is a strong likelihood that, “…an evolving creation was the only 
way in which God could give rise to the sort of beauty, diversity, sentience, and 
sophistication of creatures that the biosphere now contains.” (2008, 16)  
Southgate qualifies this by stating that this is, indeed, an ‘(unprovable) 
assumption’. Given that the overwhelming consensus of both science and 
philosophy is that evolution is the most likely means through which all carbon-
based-life came into existence then it is extremely likely that Southgate is correct 
in his assessment. However, it is not ‘just’ that an evolutionary ‘creative’ process 
has been the only way through which such a rich tapestry of life could have 
developed; it is also the case that, because of the biospheric potentiality, the 
evolution of creatures with the potential for higher-order-thought—the 
emergence of the Imago Dei would have been a most likely outcome. 
 
From a theistic-evolutionary perspective, it can be said that it [Evolution] has 
been the means through which God has brought about the best possible 
outcomes—for His [good] purposes. Of course, that the [Darwinian] 
evolutionary process can be described as either directed or good is hotly 
disputed—especially by those who deny either the existence of God or of any 
such ‘good outcomes’ that God might [bring] about through the evolutionary 
process. The perspective taken in this thesis is that of ‘Evolutionary 
Creationism’—described by Denis O. Lamoureux as “a purpose-driven natural 
process (2013, 43)”. It is assumed, therefore, that God does bring about his 
created objectives—even through what appears to be random processes.  
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Dennis Alexander (2008) posed the question of how a good God could choose to 
bring about all of the biological diversity, including us—‘by such a long and 
wasteful process—a process that involves so much death and suffering?’ (277). 
Alexander goes on to say that the positive side of this is that we are living in an 
incredibly dynamic world in which there is what Alexander refers to as ‘a huge 
amount of daily coming and going—the dead of all kinds are constantly making 
room for the living; all of life is Interdependent’ (279-280). Alexander holds that 
the God of all creation is also the great naturalist who enjoys all the richness and 
diversity of the natural world that he has brought into being—including its 
‘impressive carnivores’ (281).  However, Alexander’s picture of the ‘great 
naturalist’ enjoying the sight of one section of his handiwork tearing apart the 
other is not one that speaks of benevolence, rather of a sort of divine 
utilitarianism. But, the question is: Is the process simply a means to an end—and 
what end might that be?   
 
The theological problem with which this thesis wrestles is that of suffering within 
evolution. Southgate (2008, 7) notes that this problem has several aspects. One is 
that if God created this system, which is full of suffering, then the goodness of 
God seems to be in question. But another is the question just raised in respect of 
Alexander’s work: Did God use suffering within evolution as a means to the 
divine ends?  Alister McGrath (2011) brings the issue into focus by noting that 
Darwin’s model of evolution envisages the emergence of the animal kingdom as 
taking place over a vastly extended period of time, involving suffering and 
apparent wastage that go far beyond the concerns of traditional theodicy. (202). 
McGrath notes that Darwinism intensifies existing concerns with the problem of 
suffering. With evolution comes suffering and death—they are a part of the same 
 GOD, evolution and the problem of evil: 
Towards A Solution 
Derek J. White 
 
 
90 
package. If God is able to create all the necessary material and has the 
wherewithal to envisage and bring into being the best possible world—and yet 
has, seemingly, failed to accomplish his objectives without huge concomitant 
suffering then there are bona fide reasons for seeking answers as to why this 
seems not to be the case. As has been stated previously, the prevailing view is 
that a (system of biological evolutionary development) is the only way through 
which all the ‘values’ of all the creatures that have ever existed could obtain. Ergo: 
predation, pain, parasitism, plague and (obviously) death are all instrumental in 
the processes that produce the values to which Southgate refers. Southgate 
argues that the sort of universe we witness, “…in which complexity emerges in a 
process governed by thermodynamic necessity and Darwinian natural selection, 
and therefore by pain, predation, and self-assertion, is the only sort of universe 
that could give rise to the range, beauty, complexity, and diversity of creatures 
the Earth has produced.” (2008, 29) As has been said previously, Southgate fully 
accepts that it is not possible to know whether or not the evolution of the Earth’s 
biosphere was God’s only way. Nevertheless it is as, Southgate suggests, plausible 
to suppose that the evolutionary process was God’s only way.42 However, that 
God had the ‘one option’  (that of biological evolution) does not preclude the 
likelihood of God’s omnipotence or that God might be an ‘under achiever’ but 
rather that God’s desire was to bring about a state of affairs that allowed for the 
evolution of carbon based life forms—a creation with independent characteristics 
allowing for the ‘arrival’ of free-will—especially (in the case of mankind) the 
interaction of ‘mind’ and body.   Daniel Dennett says the following regarding the 
notion of the ‘evolution of free-will’:  
                                                          
42
 It is the case that absolute knowledge of distant past events has to be seen through a less than 
absolute lens and that there is much we presume to have comprehensive knowledge of today that 
might be proven inaccurate in the future. 
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Since I am conscious and you are conscious, we must have conscious 
selves…How can this be? To see how such an extraordinary composition 
job could be accomplished we need to look at the history of the design 
processes that did all the work—the evolution of human consciousness. 
We also need to see how these souls made of cellular robots actually do 
endow us with the important powers and resultant obligations that 
traditional material souls were supposed to endow us with (by unspecified 
magic). (Dennett 2003, 3) 
 
‘Magic’ apart: it is the question of the notion of ‘evolving’ freedom that, naturally, 
divides opinion in evolutionary interpretation. However from a theistic 
perspective there need be no such tension—as John Turl points out, “Whether or 
not we can postulate a reasonable method of interaction, for Christians the basic 
datum is that pure spirit can interact with matter…” (2010, 75)  Turl offers the 
following examples: “ God, who is spirit, created the universe, which is matter 
(Jn. 4:24;1:3). Angels have communicated with humans (Heb.1:14; Luke 1:13,28). 
The Holy Spirit affects human minds (Jn. 14:26; 16:8)” (Turl, 75)43  From a theistic 
perspective, Turl’s conclusion is entirely reasonable—and indeed plausible. This 
may seem somewhat of a paradoxical state of affairs as we appear to be referring 
to both a process of evolution that is unguided and a Deity that is able, in ways 
indiscernible to any sophisticated microscope, to somehow, within the 
                                                          
43
 In his conclusion Turl points out the following: 
o It seems difficult if not impossible to construct a non-reductive monism; reductive 
monism seems unacceptable philosophically and theologically. 
o Scripture does not favour monism in preference to a dualistic account of man. 
It is not necessary to assume that physics is hostile to the existence of an ontological soul. (Turl 
2010, 79)  
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evolutionary process, bring about changes in line with His teleological 
objectives44. The point here is that there are outcomes that may be predicted and 
outcomes that may not. The argument in this thesis is that such a world as this 
can only arise via an evolutionary process, which also necessitates suffering and 
apparent waste. However, it is also the case that Scripture suggests a better 
outcome—an outcome that God has purposed from before the creation of the 
world—the Telos of God. 
 
                                                          
44
 Should God so work within the cosmos it has to be admitted that there is little evidence of God 
‘actively’ pursuing paths that ease the suffering of the ‘products’ of such a state of affairs. 
However, should the evolutionary process have been left completely to its ‘own devices’, there 
would be no guarantee of a good outcome—especially regarding the emergence of the imago Dei, 
the incarnation, the victory of the Son of God over the principalities and powers… 
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Step 3. Only such a world is capable of being transformed 
into the ‘new creation’, in which there need be no more 
suffering: 
Having discussed various insights into the redemptive possibilities offered by 
some scientists/theologians engaging in what may be described as 
‘eschatological conjecture’, Christopher Southgate (2008, 85-90) underlines his 
view that, since this world is the world the God of ‘all creativity and all 
compassion’ chose for the creation of carbon-based-life-forms, we must presume 
that there was no other option—that, “…though heaven can eternally preserve 
those selves, subsisting in suffering-free relationship, it could not give rise to 
them in the first place.” (90) Southgate’s point is clear. If God could have, 
initially, created heaven, why did God not so do? 45 Southgate offers a clear 
explanation as mentioned previously—that though heaven can eternally preserve 
the ‘selves’ (in ‘a new, heaven and new earth’, environment) it cannot give rise to 
the carbon-based-life-forms that evolution has produced. Ergo, the 4 billion 
years or so of evolutionary development has been a necessary state of affairs.  
 
The argument in this thesis is that for God’s [good] outcomes to realise, there 
had to be the emergence of mankind (Imago Dei) as the ‘vessel made of clay’—fit 
for the Spirit of God (Swinburne 1997). For the possibility of the incarnation of 
                                                          
45
 However, as Southgate would agree—and as the likes of Michael Lloyd (Are Animals Fallen? 
1998) have made clear; it is not sufficient to offer a solely eschatological defence—as such 
defences, in their desire for scientific/philosophical acceptance, tend to be ‘anti-Christian’. In 
other words (my words not Lloyd’s)—the defence/theodicy that does not have Scripture as its 
prime source (its raison d'être). 
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the second person of the Trinity (ultimately for the Victory of God’ over Evil to 
obtain), it necessitated the protracted process of biological evolution. For the 
sake of our argument here, the necessary constituents for God’s planned 
intentions can be listed under the following brief headings: 
 
i. The existence of the Second Law of Thermodynamics—allowing for 
the effects of entropy—for its necessary consequences: life, death and 
evolutionary selection . 
ii. The evolution of Free-Will as expressed in the lives and experience of 
the imago Dei—the ‘Telos’ of [God] through evolution. 
iii. The arrival of the species that Scripture describes as being made in the 
image of God (imago Dei).  
iv. The physical appearance (incarnation), life, suffering, death  and 
resurrection of the second person of the Trinity: Jesus Christ. 
 
Regarding the 4 billion-year- biological-evolutionary-state-of-affairs, Adrian 
Hough (2010) offers some interesting and useful insights—perceptions that are 
germane to the argument in this thesis. Hough states that in more scientific 
terms we are able to say that the increase in entropy or disorder (which is a 
fundamental characteristic of the universe) is the cause of suffering and of death. 
(106) This is, most would agree, a de facto, state of affairs. Hough adds to this by 
asking whether the cross can also be seen as God accepting the consequences of 
the Second Law?  Though God, we believe, would not shrink from taking 
whatever responsibility is God’s, we do not accept the argument that offers the 
cross of Christ as some kind of ‘self-punishment’ for God’s own failure to 
produce a better outcome—in particular for the billions of years of suffering 
‘meted out’ by Natural Selection— though we do take seriously the notion that 
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this ‘silent’ universe somehow echoes the cry of the ‘Crucified [Son] of God’. It is 
in this sense that the universe is cruciform, for how could the sacrifice of God the 
Son not reverberate throughout the universe? God, we maintain, is not guilty of 
producing a world that could have been otherwise created; this world is the only 
possible world; it is also the world that God intended to create, and it is in this 
world, and no other, that the Problem of Evil has been dealt its death blow. This 
world is the best possible world—in which the consequences that Hough refers 
to can also obtain. Yet it is also the world in which Christ can take on himself the 
sins of the world—of the flesh and of the devil. It is in this world that God allows 
the results of free-will to have, seemingly, free-reign; yet it is a world out of 
which can arise a different state of affairs—a world wherein the Second Law has 
a different functionality.  Hough says that what is clear from the present 
consideration is that, “… the Second Law of Thermodynamics leads us to a 
grander vision of God if our vision of God begins with the assumption that Jesus 
Christ rose from the dead and that God wills the renewal of His creation.” (2010, 
133) 46 
 
Key to the argument in this thesis is that this world order (since its genesis) can 
be described in terms of its being the only possible world that could precede the 
advents of the incarnation and  (at the eschaton) a ‘new heaven and a new earth’. 
It is this world, with both its values and disvalues, that allows for a world of 
absolute values to obtain. It is this world that is subject to the effects of 
particular laws that, humans at least, have no means of controlling or of 
changing. This is not to say that mankind can effect no change whatsoever but 
                                                          
46
 Against the notion of a lesser deity—a ‘ground of being’ version of ‘God’ Hough suggests that,  
“If we consider the way in which the universe works, then it is clear that God has in some sense to 
be beyond the universe.” (Hough 2010, 133) 
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that it would not be possible for mankind, per se, to create a heaven on earth or 
to change the prevailing cosmological state of affairs. It is the Triune God that 
promises a better state of affairs—an eschatological fulfilment of God’s ultimate 
purposes for his creation—a creation that bears the scars of the ‘Crucified God’ 
(Moltmann 1993)47. Sam Storms (2013) writes that, “…the unfolding fulfilment of 
God’s promises may be seen in terms of what Geerhardus Vos called a ‘binary 
configuration’. That is to say, human history reflects a tension between what was 
accomplished at the first advent of Christ and what awaits consummation at the 
second.” (28) Southgate (2008) refers to the insights of R.J.Russell who sees the 
resurrection of Jesus Christ as, “…the beginning of a final act that will transform 
the character of creation…” (80) Moreover Southgate and Russell along with 
Wolfhart Pannenberg (2008, 16, 163) advocate that, “ The long sweep of evolution 
may not only suggest an unfinished and continuing divine creation but even 
more radically a creation whose theological status as ‘good’ may be fully realised 
only in the eschatological future.” (80) Whilst having sympathy with the 
opinions of Southgate and Russell, that creation’s good status may be ‘identified’ 
as being good only at the eschaton, we do not think it necessary to deny the 
creation its ‘good’ status presently; for the creation has been good from its 
genesis and it shall remain good throughout eternity.   
 
It is the quest for a Theory of Everything (Wilkinson 2001)—the ‘Big Picture’ that 
fuels the desire for knowledge; and it is the ‘Big Picture’ that is the driving force 
of scientific enquiry. However, as has been said elsewhere, it is the theology that 
drives the quest for a defence for the goodness of God.  
                                                          
47
 “The knowledge of the cross brings a conflict of interest between God who has become man and 
man who wishes to become God.” (Moltmann 1993) 
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Step 4. But also, there is evidence that angels exist: 
Firstly, it should be noted that there is no need to assume that the ‘time’ and 
location of the creation of the devil and the other angels should be accounted for 
in the Genesis story of creation. Moreover it is important to maintain the notion 
of these extra-terrestrial beings as having the will to choose ‘wrong’ from ‘right’: 
to bring about a state of affairs that might not be the preferred will of God but 
that of the outworking of minds opposed to the good. There can be no reason 
why angels could not be endowed with the kind of abilities that, even scientists, 
have no present/ personal acquaintance with. Indeed, even though God is 
incorporeal—God, nevertheless, cannot be restricted to any particular ‘reality’ 
designated by either science or philosophy—as if God, who is spirit, could not 
possess, within God’s life, such things as personality, will, intellect and ‘personal 
existence’. Angels (both holy and unholy), though usually without form 
(incorporeal), may, as Scripture makes clear, inhabit the ‘physicality’ of carbon-
based life forms. Moreover, as with God, who is Spirit, angels have personal 
qualities that are far superior to that of mankind’s. These creatures were, 
according to Scripture, privileged beings with powers that far surpass those of 
human agents.48 Hebrews 2:7-9  (also Psalm 8:5) refers to the ‘position’ of the 
incarnate ‘son of man’ who was, ‘...for a little while lower than the angels.’ 49 
N.T.Wright (1992) refers to the Shema (“Hear, O Israel: YHWH is one.”)—that it 
is the most famous Jewish prayer, “…burned into the consciousness of Judaism in 
                                                          
48
 These references pertain to the ‘position & power’ of angels: Psalm 34:7; Psalm 82:1 ; 1 
Chronicles 21:15; Isaiah 37:36, 63:9; Ezekiel chapters 1 & 10. Ezekiel 28. The book of Revelation is 
replete with examples of such creatures as angels. Genesis 6 also makes mention of their being 
creatures other than humans ‘on earth’; this it can be assumed was a reference to pre-history.  
49
 As Christ was made in the form of a man and had subjected himself to this position 
(Philippians 2:7,8); he, temporarily, had made himself ‘lower than the angels’.  
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the first century and that it was the battle cry of the nation that believed its god 
to be the only god, supreme in heaven and on earth…”However, as we shall argue 
in this section, God’s so being in no way precludes the existence of created 
agents—agents  that may be referred to as: ‘god’s, ‘angels’ or ‘spiritual beings’—
the existence of  such created beings is, unlike some forms of Dualism, not a 
challenge or denial of the sovereignty of the God of Scripture. 
 
Ulrich Mauser (1991) argued that the supremacy  of Israel’s God over all other 
gods—though everywhere asserted—is not a denial the existence of such ‘gods’. 
Boyd argues that, whilst strongly advocating the sovereignty of Yahweh, the Old 
Testament does include the understanding that, “…Yahweh [must] contend with 
a sometimes disobedient and incompetent council of spiritual beings (usually 
called ‘gods’), and must in fact contend with one particularly malicious god 
entitled ‘the adversary’.” (Boyd 1997, 115) Boyd points out that any reality 
regarding the struggle with other ‘gods’ is never taken to compromise the 
supremacy and sovereignty of Yahweh but rather it is taken to express the way  
in which Yahweh is supreme and sovereign.  Boyd makes clear however that the 
Israelites did not deny the existence of angelic or spiritual beings but rather that 
these beings (angelic or spiritual) were referred to as ‘gods’—moreover Boyd also 
makes clear that these creatures possessed a great deal of autonomous power. 
 
Christopher Southgate says that, “…whatever processes science is able to 
understand as contributing to the evolution of complexity, life, richness of ability 
and diversity in life, and the growth of self-consciousness and freedom of choice, 
must be presumed to be the gift of God in creation.” (2008, 33) It is the case that 
such creativity must emanate in the mind of God, and so it is not at all 
implausible that this should be the case with extra-terrestrial beings. The 
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existence of angelic beings need not be considered a threat to either science or, 
indeed, to God’s sovereignty. Angels are as much a part of God’s creative will as 
anything else God may have created. Richard Swinburne’s (1996) view is that 
“God has no obligation to create”. (97) God creates in freedom—to offer the 
freedom of choice that the creation of conscious/sentient beings allows for —
even when this freedom entails an element of risk in terms of the outcomes of 
any choice. The Sovereignty of the God of Scripture does not entail submission 
of all of creation to a defined pathway. God is free to choose to create or not to 
create extraterrestrial and terrestrial beings and any and every biological, or 
unknown, expression of his creativity. Creation, through the evolutionary 
process or any other means, is God’s prerogative alone—though Scripture 
suggests that God may delegate that responsibility to lesser beings as  James 
J.Grenshaw points out (2005, 50).  
 
Job 1:6 informs us that ‘the sons of God’ presented themselves before God and 
that Satan ‘came among them’50 .We are not told exactly where the place of 
meeting (Council of God) was located. It is however reasonable to assume that it 
was to be found somewhere outside of the physical universe—at least the ‘known 
cosmos’51 .Grenshaw states that, “Allusions to this heavenly court can be found in 
texts of various genres, beginning in Genesis and continuing through much of the 
Bible.” (2005, 50) Moreover, Grenshaw argues that the peoples of the ancient 
                                                          
50
 Robert Sutherland says that, “As a member of the heavenly host and not yet an outside 
challenger, he seems to have unlimited access to God and the divine council.” (Sutherland 2004, 
33)  
51
 There are numerous scriptures that evidence a ‘heavenly council e.g. ‘…let us go down…’ 
(Genesis 11:7); Isaiah’s vision of God (Isaiah 6); ‘Ascribe to the Lord O heavenly beings,…’ (Psalm 
29:1); ‘From heaven your stars fought, from their courses they fought against Sisera.’ (Judges 5:20); 
’…Bring down your warriors, O Lord…’ (Joel 3:11) 
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Near East conceived of the gods—and of these ‘gods’ as forming a heavenly 
assembly, “…a kind of divine council...” (2005) Psalm 82:1 says that, “’God’ has 
taken his place in the divine council; in the midst of the gods he holds 
judgement.” Grenshaw refers to both these texts (Job 1:6 and psalm 82:1)— 
particularly regarding the use of the word ‘elohim’—as , “…a telling sign that the 
polytheistic world of the Bible was understood to be more than simply a literary 
construct.” (50)The point here is that the notion of other ‘gods’ relates to extra-
terrestrial-created-agents—agents also described in Scripture as angelic. 
 
Regarding the existence of the angelic hosts John Lennox (2011) refers to the 
‘unannounced arrival’ of the serpent in Genesis 3—a creature that was clearly 
opposed to God; a creature that could be described as an ‘alien’—not a biological 
entity but something extra-terrestrial in origin. Unlike biological entities, angels 
do not appear to have a ‘shelf-life’—they seem to be much more durable than the 
normal created entities, such as humankind, and may, as they are incorporeal 
(unless ‘inhabiting some other life-form),not subject to the effects of entropy as 
experienced by carbon based creatures. They don’t ‘rust or decay’—they just exist 
in another realm in the cosmos or—even in a ‘dimension’ as yet undetectable by 
man or machine. Somehow these ‘creatures’ are given access to this space/time 
continuum and seem able to do both good and evil—to produce ‘good outcomes’ 
and ‘harmful outcomes’. The point here is that such creatures are unlike, 
anything else in all creation, capable of powerful influence within the physical 
universe—especially here on earth. Ergo, they are formidable adversaries— 
opposing any good outcomes and encouraging or devising outcomes to the 
contrary. 
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Richard Middleton (2005) observes that, although the plurals: ‘Let us make man 
in our image, in our likeness,’ (Genesis 1:26-28) have been interpreted as ‘a 
remnant of a polytheistic mythology [referring to the gods of the Canaanite or 
Mesopotamian pantheon], and adumbration of the Trinity—or at least of a 
plurality within the Godhead or several other alternatives, a careful intertextual 
reading of the plurals in Genesis 1:26 suggests that God here addresses the 
heavenly court or divine council of angels, a reading first suggested in rabbinic 
commentary on Genesis 1, going back to the ‘Targum Pseudo-Jonathan’ (55)52. 
Middleton also states that in many biblical texts53, God’s throne room is 
associated with a heavenly court of angelic beings, who are royal messengers of 
the cosmic king and who function as God’s attendants or counselors. (56) 
Moreover, Middleton points out that ‘the main action’ no longer occurs in the 
heavens: 
 
Rather, the dramatic movement of the text is from the heavens (days 1 
and 4) to the waters (days 2 and 5) to the earth (days 3 and 6), which is 
the focus for four of God’s eight creative acts. This may explain why on 
day 6, which foregrounds the earth, there is no explicit vision (or 
mention) of heavenly beings. Yet their presence is alluded to by the shift 
from third-person jussives in God’s first seven creative acts to the other 
cryptic cohortative (‘let us make’) in the eighth act. (Middleton, 56) 54 
 
                                                          
52
 ‘Targum Pseudo-Jonathan rests on a tradition going back to pre-Christian times, though its final 
form is probably sixth century C,E.’ (Middleton 2005, p.55fn) 
53
 Job 1:6;2:1;5:1;15:8;38:7;Psalm 29:1;82:1;89:5-7;97:7;Exodus 15:11;2 Samuel 5:22-25:1 Kings 22:19; 
Isaiah 6: 2-8;Jeremiah 23:18, 21-22;Ezekiel 1:312-13;10;Daniel 4:17  etc. 
54
 Isaiah 6:8 is another example of a similar first-person plural—‘Whom shall I send, and who will 
go for us?’ (ESV) 
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Middleton’s point is that angelic beings55 are not foreign to the author of Genesis 
1 ‘as is indicated by the occurrence of similar first-person plurals in 3:22 and 11:7 
(both of which are usually regarded unproblematically as referring to the 
heavenly court).’ (57) In other words, it can be assumed that there was some kind 
of plural communication—if not co-operation—in the act of creation’s genesis at 
least. Besides the Spirit of God—some of the ‘hosts of heaven’ were present on 
the earth at the very dawn of the birth of life on earth. The witness of certain New 
Testament passages is that he whom the Church came to confess as the second 
person of the Trinity was present (Colossians 1:15-20 & Hebrews 1:1-3;10-13). 
 
Simon Gathercole (2006, 114) refers to what he terms an ‘I have come + purpose 
formula’—as in the pronouncements of Angels. The use of this formula is, 
Gathercole states, ‘not to be understood idiomatically’—as an intrusion into the 
earthly realm but as a ‘coming with prior intent…Gathercole offers a helpful 
summary:  
Angels announce their advents with the ‘I have come’ + purpose formula. 
They can do this: a) because they are summarizing not their whole 
existence (they visit on numerous occasions) but the purpose of a 
particular visit; b) because they have a pre-existence in heaven. Similarly, 
Jesus announces his advent with the ‘I have come’ + purpose formula 
because he is summarizing the purpose of his whole earthly life and 
ministry. As with the angels, Jesus is not summarizing his whole existence 
(he will come again, with different purposes). However, he does 
summarize his life’s work with the ‘I have come’ + purpose formula… 
(Gathercole 2006, 117)   
                                                          
55
 Contrary to some objections—objections that Middleton considers implausible. e.g. 
Westermann, Genesis,1.pp.144-45 
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Peter S. Williams offers, what he describes as, a set of proposed ‘explananda’: 
1. The majority of humanity believes in angels. 
2. The majority of philosophers believe in angels. 
3. There are various paranormal phenomena that would be coherently and 
economically explained if demons exist. 
4. There are multiple historical and contemporary reports by evidently 
honest and intelligent eyewitnesses (including psychologists, psychiatrists 
and clergy) to the reality of Angels and demonic possession (including 
Satanic possession). 
5. The Bible teaches that Angels and demons (including Gabriel, Michael 
and Satan) exist (and we have good reason to trust what the Bible 
teaches). 
6. Christian tradition teaches that Angels and demons (including Satan) 
exist. 
7. Jesus teaches that Angels and demons (including Satan) exists (and we 
have good reason to trust what Jesus teaches. 
8. The hypothesis that demons exist provides a partial explanation of how it 
is that God and evil are compatible realities. 
9. Given the existence of God, there is a continuous pattern of hierarchy in 
creation that seems to come to a unique, aesthetically abrupt and 
unexpected end, unless angels exist.  (P. Williams 2002, 142-143)  
It is therefore reasonable to suppose that it is the case that Angels exist and that 
they have a continual influence over both good and bad outcomes. It is also the 
case that God allows such creatures the freedom to choose either good or bad— 
to love and serve God or to deny God any allegiance whatsoever. 
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Given the above detail, we can more than assume that the intelligence, 
knowledge etc. of angels does not ‘emanate’ from any primordial source, 
Moreover,  it can be supposed that these creatures are personal beings rather 
than vague concepts—oppressive systems, power oriented ideals [mores] etc. We 
can further assume that they are not restricted to act in the way ‘material’ objects 
may be considered/constrained so to act. 
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Step 5. That Angels may have existed before the creation of 
this universe: 
The likelihood that Angels pre-existed the advent of the evolution of the 13.7 
billion year-old physical creation is both plausible and coherent. Regarding the 
question of whether or not angels began when matter began Peter Kreeft (1995) 
suggests that ‘angel time’ is not the time of the material universe and that angels 
are no more in physical time than they are in ‘physical space’—as matter is.  
Kreeft’s argument (and ours) is that angels have to enter into this world from 
without: “We cannot use the standards of time from this universe—either the 
revolutions of the ‘heavenly’ bodies or the constant speed of light to measure how 
old angels are. Material time is a function of matter, is relative to matter. It does 
not exist before matter exists. It is between eternity and time.” 
(Kreeft, 92-93)  As angels are incorporeal they are not material. Ergo, they were 
not created through a process of biological evolution and are not, apart from 
when possessing materiality (possessing the physical) in any way subject to 
physical laws. There are however contrary opinions regarding creatures such as 
angels. Christopher Southgate (2008, 38) refers to the work of Andrew 
Elphinstone who regarded the demonic as something evolving out of the 
‘necessities of creative process’—not as ‘a pre-existent being or beings’. The 
argument here though is that there is no need whatsoever to suppose that angels 
were the products of ‘the impersonal, plus time plus chance’. Angels were meant 
to be, and existed prior to the beginnings we read of in the Genesis creation 
account. There can be no reason why an omnipotent God could not have, in 
another ‘reality’, other than space/time, created beings that pre-existed the 
creation of this [our] universe. Indeed, if there were/are in existence other 
created but non-carbon-based-life-forms, it is reasonable to suppose that they 
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would have been created/existed prior to the creation of the biosphere. As angels 
are incorporeal creatures and as they were ’there’ (Job 38:756) at the dawn of 
creation—they would not have been a part of the evolutionary process—for if 
they had they surely could not have ‘emerged’ until some point in the future 
rather than the distant, pre-historical, past. God, when putting Job in his place, 
asks Job where he was when the morning stars sang together and all the sons of 
God shouted for Joy?’ (Job 38:4-7). Angels pre-exist the creation of the cosmos— 
as has been said—there no actual record of their creation in Scripture.57 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
56
 “…when the morning stars sang together and all the sons of God shouted for joy?” 
57
 An argument might be that these creatures were created when ‘the heavens were created’ 
(Genesis 1:1)—that the angels were created during the creation of the heavens (shamayim). 
However, this view is highly speculative at the least as the actual ‘time’ of their creation is not 
given in the Genesis text.   
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Step 6. That it is a good thing that God gave angels freedom: 
 
(Irenaeus) held that, In the beginning God formed Adam, not as if He stood in 
need of man, but that God might have someone on which to confer his benefits. 
God’s conferring of his benefits though does not exclude creatures other than 
mankind; this could apply to other sentient beings—and it could also apply to 
non-carbon-based-life-forms such as angels. The question here is whether God’s 
use of angels is purely utilitarian—are they merely automatons—messengers, 
servants, aids?  The argument here is that angels were not created for purely 
utilitarian reasons; moreover angels are not automatons. Angels are created, 
among other things, to worship God—something, in which, Scripture implies 
(e.g. Isaiah 6 Revelation 4), is found absolute fulfilment. Angels are able to 
benefit from the most worthwhile/worthy of all activities because they are 
conscious creatures with mental states such as: sensation, thought, belief, desire 
and act of will (active volition power). (P. Williams 2002, 80 - 86) 
 
Swinburne (1998) says that if freedom and responsibility are good things, it is 
good that there be angels who have it as well as humans. The point is that: If any 
or all actions performed by the created order (whether angels or humans) were 
entirely the ‘programmed’ results of a divine puppet master—this could not 
possibly be a good state of affairs—not even for God. Swinburne argues that,“…if 
it is good that God should give us the ultimate choice over the period of our lives 
on Earth of being able to fix our characters beyond further change, it would seem 
to be similarly good that God should give to angels also the ultimate choice of 
being able to fix their characters. (108) 
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Regarding the likelihood of free-will and the existence of an omnipotent, 
omniscient, benevolent God, Eleonore Stump (2012) refers to the argument that 
states that any notion of a human tendency to moral wrongdoing is incomparable 
with the existence of the God who is omnipotent, omniscient and benevolent. 
Stump’s argument can equally be applied to free-will in angels. The argument is 
as follows:  
 
1. Humans also angels (our inclusion) have a propensity to moral 
wrongdoing.  
2. A propensity to moral wrongdoing is itself an evil.  
3. If there is a perfectly good, omnipotent, omniscient God, he would prevent 
or eliminate any evil in the world unless he had a morally sufficient reason 
to allow it.  
4. There is no morally sufficient reason for God to allow the human (angelic) 
propensity to moral wrongdoing. 
5. Therefore, there is no perfectly good, omnipotent, omniscient God. (153) 
  
Stump’s conclusion on the matter is that, “…to suggest that [allowing] any 
propensity to moral wrongdoing is itself evil is mistaken.” (153)  Stump is surely 
correct. Why should a perfectly good God disallow the sentient creature (man or 
angel) such potentiality—whether for good or evil?  A world in which there were 
no meaningful actions—actions with consequences—could not, in our opinion, 
be considered the best possible ‘outcome’ for God’s creativity. For such a world, 
though full of diversity, complexity and beauty, would be a rather ‘grey’ state of 
affairs—lacking both meaning and opportunity. A world in which God prevented 
any ‘bad’ outcomes by, either intervening before any such morally reprehensible 
action could issue forth, or by rescuing the victims from their harmful effects, 
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would be a world in which free-will was impossible or a world in which God acted 
as  a kind of ‘superman’. Should the above state of affairs obtain, Free-Will would, 
de facto, be an illusion—for actions would have no [authentic] consequences— 
either good or bad.  
 
The argument in this thesis is that God’s allowing his created agents (Angels and 
Men) free will as opposed to putting constraints on their potentiality is a good 
thing—as opposed to a bad thing. There is, from the perspective of this 
argument, no neutral position: it is good or it is bad. It is the case, however, that 
the freedom to choose allows for bad outcomes. Regarding the free-will choice of 
angels, P.S. Williams (2002), quoting an Aristotelian assay, offers the following 
view: 
 
Just as there are good houses and bad houses, so there are good and bad 
angels. However, while the house has no say in its value, the character of 
an angel is the character it has freely chosen. That an angel has the 
freedom to make this choice is a good thing, because it is a pre-condition 
of the value of freely choosing to love God and fulfil its telos. However, the 
exercise of angelic free will to reject God is a bad thing, a frustration of the 
angelic telos that results in the corruption of the intended angelic nature 
that is called ‘demonic’;… (P. Williams 2002, 110-111) 
 
6.1  Free Will, Angels and Sovereignty 
God’s allowing angels free will raises the question of Sovereignty. How can God 
retain sovereignty while allowing the potential for what could be described as, 
unrestrained freedom? Indeed, what [exactly] is meant by the expression, ‘The 
Sovereignty of God?’ A.W. Pink’s answer is unequivocal.  
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Pink states that, “We mean the supremacy of God, the kingship of God, the 
Godhead of God. To say that God is sovereign is to say that God is God. To say 
that God is sovereign is to declare that He is the Most High...To say that God is 
sovereign is to declare that He is the Almighty, the Possessor of all power in 
heaven and earth, so that none can defeat His counsels, thwart His purposes, or 
resist His will.” (Pink 1980, 20) Pink’s view allows for the kind of sovereignty that 
is not ‘all controlling’ but a sovereignty that depicts all the aforementioned 
characteristics of the Triune God. However, the term ‘resist His will’ may not give 
the best of impressions—as if God’s desire is to ‘control’ rather than allow 
genuine expressions of freedom. Christian theism, Alvin Plantinga (2011, 172) 
argues, involves the idea that God governs the world; that what happens does not 
come about by chance, but by virtue of God’s ‘providential governance’. In other 
words, God is sovereign over his creation. This does not, in our opinion, mean 
that God controls every single event within every single minute of every single 
hour; or that God pre-ordains the thoughts and actions of men and of angels. 
There are numerous outcomes in the world that come about by either the free-
will actions of agents or by the ‘happenstances’ of natural events. It is as David 
Johnstone makes clear when he refers to the weather as an example of exactly 
this. 
 
Consider the weather. The Bible is quite clear that God is in control of the 
weather (Psalm 42:7; Psalm 135:6-7; Psalm 148:8; Jeremiah 10:13). But we 
also know that the weather is a natural process. We know about the 
hydrological cycle and meteorologists are able to predict the weather with 
some success (the atmosphere being a chaotic system which makes it very 
hard to predict, but that is beside the point). (Johnstone 2009)  
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The point here is that the weather is a natural process, but this does not mean 
that God is not in control of it or not able to control it—or, in other words ‘able 
to act sovereignly over it’. In his article entitled ‘The Necessity of Chance’ Paul 
Ewart (2009) provides good reason why perceived random events do not 
eradicate the notion of sovereignty, id est God’s ability to bring about his 
purposes: “The necessity of chance is seen to be not just an accidental outcome 
of the laws of nature but an intentional aspect of God’s creating process that 
preserves both our freedom and his freedom to act.” (Ewart, 129) Of course, 
theological libraries are replete with books arguing for or against the sovereignty 
of God. The question is, however: What exactly can we infer from such a belief 
when contemplating the state of the world we inhabit and, indeed, the very 
existence of natural evil within the evolutionary paradigm?  
 
It could be said that, if God is to be sovereign over all his creation, it must mean 
that God has access to it all, whether it is the known universe or otherwise. God 
could not, logically, be sovereign over any entity that is outside of his ‘reach’.  
However, God’s sovereignty does not necessitate a strong measure of control on 
God’s part; rather, sovereignty means that God is sufficiently confident in his 
purposes immanent or eschatological for his universe—that the best of possible 
outcomes will obtain.  Indeed this applies to the outcome of the choices of 
created agents. Greg Boyd refers to a common objection regarding, what he 
denotes as ‘God’s risk taking’. Boyd says that if God must risk the fate of 
individuals, it seems that he must also risk his overall goal of acquiring a bride. 
In other words, it is likely that God’s entire plans for world history could 
ultimately fail. (2001, 146) According to this view, God could lose the fight. Boyd’s 
is a possible conclusion from reflection on God’s desire to be in loving 
relationship with freely-choosing creatures. However, it is difficult to imagine 
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that the sovereign God of the universe would allow any adversary the final 
‘victory’. It can be argued that free-will choices have unpredictable outcomes but 
it is not implausible to suggest that God cannot bring about the best of possible 
outcomes for his creation—whether or not God has foreknowledge of those 
outcomes58. It was C.S.Lewis (2001) who stated that what is ‘praiseworthy’ about 
God’s sovereignty is not that he exercises a power he obviously has but that out 
of his character he does not exercise all the power he could. Ergo: God is not a 
controlling ‘god’ but a God who allows ‘freedom to choose’ yet will, somehow, 
enable his plans and purposes to obtain. It may be a present mystery but it is, 
nevertheless, a possibility that God can so act.  
 
Christopher Tiegreen (2006, 42) says that, somehow, God’s sovereignty is woven 
into free will and that free will is woven into God’s sovereignty. Tiegreen is 
referring to humanity but it can also be applied to the action of angelic ‘free 
agents’ who have the capability to bring the utmost good or to unleash the most 
horrendous evil. It is the case that the free-will choices of agents (angels and 
men) can bring about satisfactory states of affairs, i.e. states of affairs that may be 
considered good states of affairs and not bad states of affairs, but it also the case 
that such choices may bring about bad states of affairs. Nevertheless God’s 
allowing for creatures with free will is, indeed, a good thing. Indeed it is as 
Richard Swinburne points out that, “ We value the spontaneous pursuit of the 
                                                          
58
 Regarding the free will choices of humans, Henri Blocher raises a concern when he says: “Either 
God does not interfere and no longer has control over anything much; or else God contrives to 
limit the consequences of human choice, and so is not really playing the game and is reducing the 
drama of freedom to a superficial effect of no importance.” (1994, 59). Blocher has a point—but 
not a significant one. The problem is in the notion that ‘control’ and ‘sovereignty’ are somehow 
synonymous. Can we not conceive of a God who is so great that he dares to create agents who 
can, to some extent, make autonomous decisions? 
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good, the pursuit of the good which the agent (angels in this case) fully desires to 
follow. We value the willingly generous action, the naturally honest, 
spontaneously loving action. But we value even more that the pursuit of the good 
should result from a free choice of the agent between equally good actions, that 
is, one resulting from the exercise of (libertarian) free will. It is good for any 
agent to have such free choice; for that makes him an ultimate source of the way 
things happen in the Universe.” (Swinburne 1998, 84). Swinburne further argues 
that it is likely that the actions of angels may well intervene ‘in an already 
created order’ (108). 59 The possibility of such intervention is indeed plausible — 
though not a part of this argument. The argument in this thesis being that 
Angels possess free will and that this is a good state of affairs as opposed to a bad 
state of affairs.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
59
 We take Swinburne to mean the present order rather than any pre-existing order of creation 
that may or may not have been carbon based. 
 GOD, evolution and the problem of evil: 
Towards A Solution 
Derek J. White 
 
 
114 
Part 7.That angels rebelled and continued to oppose God’s 
will for humans and the rest of creation: 
 
The devil’s sin consisted of his having desired his happiness in a  
disordered way. But he could have understood the nature of his happiness 
at the first moment of his creation. Therefore, he could also have willed 
his happiness in a disordered way at the first moment of his creation. Any 
efficient cause not acting out of natural necessity can avoid what it causes. 
(Aquinas) 
Anselm of Canterbury, (T. Williams 2013) posed the following question, which we 
quote in full:  
If free choice is the power to hold on to what is fitting and expedient, and 
it is not the power to sin, does it make any sense to say that the first 
human beings and the rebel angels sinned through free choice?” Anselm's 
reply to this question is both subtle and plausible. In order to be able to 
preserve rectitude of will for its own sake, an agent must be able to 
perform an action that has its ultimate origin in the agent him—or herself 
rather than in some external source…Any being that has freedom of 
choice, therefore, will thereby have the power for self-initiated 
action…Nonetheless, free choice does not entail the power to sin…In On 
the Fall of the Devil (De casu diaboli) Anselm extends his account of 
freedom and sin by discussing the first sin of the angels. In order for the 
angels to have the power to preserve rectitude of will for its own sake, 
they had to have both a will for justice and a will for happiness. If God had 
given them only a will for happiness, they would have been necessitated 
to will whatever they thought would make them happy. Their willing of 
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happiness would have had its ultimate origin in God and not in the angels 
themselves. So they would not have had the power for self-initiated 
action, which means that they would not have had free choice. The same 
thing would have been true, mutatis mutandis, if God had given them 
only the will for justice. (T. Williams, 4.2) 
 
As Williams suggests, Anslem’s reply is both subtle and plausible. Free-Will does 
not necessitate ‘rebellion against authority [God] or a predilection to err’—as if 
either were written in the DNA of the agent, but it does allow for the potentiality 
of such a state of affairs. According to Scripture there is an existent state of 
affairs.60 
7.1  Fallen Angels 
How you are fallen from heaven, O Day Star, son of Dawn! 
How you are cut down to the ground, you who laid the nations low! 
                                                          
60
 Of course this raises the question of ‘Holy Angels’ and their proclivity ‘not to sin’. On this 
matter Anselm offers the following: “Since God gave them both wills, however, they had the 
power for self-initiated action. Whether they chose to subject their wills for happiness to the 
demands of justice or to ignore the demands of justice in the interest of happiness, that choice 
had its ultimate origin in the angels; it was not received from God. The rebel angels chose to 
abandon justice in an attempt to gain happiness for themselves, whereas the good angels chose to 
persevere in justice even if it meant less happiness. God punished the rebel angels by taking away 
their happiness; he rewarded the good angels by granting them all the happiness they could 
possibly want. For this reason, the good angels are no longer able to sin. Since there is no further 
happiness left for them to will, their will for happiness can no longer entice them to overstep the 
bounds of justice. Thus Anselm finally explains what it is that perfects free choice so that it 
becomes unable to sin.” (T. Williams 2013, 4.2) 
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You said in your heart, “I will ascend to heaven; 
above the stars of God; I will set my throne on high; 
I will sit on the mount of assembly in the far reaches of the north; 
I will ascend above the heights of the clouds; I will make myself like the 
Most High.” But you are brought down to Sheol, to the far reaches of the 
pit. (Isaiah 14:12-15) 
 
Peter Kreeft (1995) refers to Lucifer as, ‘the Light-bearer’—the greatest of all 
creatures, highest angel, Top Guy next to God—and he rebelled and invented 
evil—many of the angels rebelling with him. 
 
Their war was a real war. It is not symbolic language. It was not a physical 
war, because angels don’t have physical bodies, but it was a real war, a war 
of wills, of minds, like a war between paralysed telepaths. The military 
symbols we use for it are not too strong but too weak….The war was more 
passionate, intense, and terrifying than any physical war or any physical 
symbol can convey. (Kreeft, 118) 
 
Fallen Angels have continued not only to oppose God and to denigrate his 
character but to war against God . The apostle John refers to the arch-angel 
Lucifer (Satan) as a ‘murderer’ and ‘the father of lies’ (John 8:44) 
John G. Stackhouse (1998) points out that Judaism and Christianity teach 
explicitly that a variety of angels (led by the archangel) conspire against the rule 
of God—and the ‘good’ of the world:  
 
Islam speaks of the jinn, some of whom are evil and serve Satan, or iblis. 
As in Judaism and Christianity these powerful and malignant creatures 
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once were good….Jews and Christians see the evil beings as ‘fallen angels’, 
or former spiritual servants of God. These angels or demons, rebelled 
against God’s sovereignty at some point in the remote past and have since 
been engaged in an unrelenting campaign to frustrate, if not’ destroy,  
God’s work of blessing the world. (Stackhouse 1998, 38,39)  
 
7.2  Rationale for The Fall 
Given Anselm’s rationale for the fall of angels it would appear that their 
happiness would have been conterminous with their status; therefore it is likely 
that their unhappiness would have precipitated their fall from grace. Williams 
reports Anselm’s logic, which is that,  “…the rebel angels chose to abandon 
justice in an attempt to gain happiness for themselves, whereas the good angels 
chose to persevere in justice even if it meant less happiness.” (T. Williams 2013, 
4.2) Ergo the happiness of the unholy angels was more important to them than 
any cause of an omnipotent and benevolent God, such as God’s will for humans 
and for the rest of creation. Regarding the angelic rebellion Peter Vardy (1992) 
suggests that, “What the Fall does express, however, is the conviction that God 
created only good and this good then fell from its perfect state in rebellion 
against God.  Indeed later writers (starting with Origen and later Aquinas) were 
to see the chief feature of Satan and the Devils as being pride. ‘They refused to 
submit to God, they wished to be autonomous…’” (Vardy, 175)  We agree with 
Vardy: that God creates that which is good, and that ‘the presence of God’ would 
not be an environment in which rebellion of any sort should take place. Pride 
would be a good enough reason for a refusal to love and serve God. According to 
the Oxford dictionary pride can be described as ‘the quality of having an 
excessively high opinion of oneself or one’s importance.’ 
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Regarding the ‘catastrophe of the angel rebellion’ Greg Boyd makes the following 
assertion, “The greater an angel’s potential to soar, the greater its potential to 
fall: corruptio optimi pessima.” (2001, 171). However, the rebellion of the angels is 
not indicative of some kind of ‘battle of the titans’ but rather, it is indicative of 
God’s concern to allow authentic freedom to creatures—freedom that may have 
allowed for undesired states of affairs.  It is most likely that these creatures were 
capable of behaving with a freedom that far surpasses that of ‘natural man’61 and 
that this will have allowed angels the self-determination to contend for 
autonomy—a  drive to achieve absolute self-sufficiency/self-supremacy. Isaiah 
describes the ‘heart’ of the matter:  
 
You said in your heart: ‘I will ascend to heaven; above the stars of God. I 
will sit on the mount of assembly in the far reaches of the north; I will 
ascend above the heights of the clouds, I will make myself like the Most 
High” (Isaiah 14:13–14). 
 
Viktor Frankl’s (1988) 62 comparison of ‘Freedom’ and ‘Responsibility’ speaks 
volumes:  
Freedom, however, is not the last word. Freedom is only part of the story 
and half of the truth. Freedom is but the negative aspect of the whole 
phenomenon whose positive aspect is responsibleness.  
                                                          
61
 By ‘natural man’ we are referring to the state of our species that would have allowed them but 
one choice in the Garden (Genesis 3)—that of desiring some kind of self-satisfaction, i.e. that they 
desired the fruit without comprehending the consequences—preferring this option to that of 
partaking of the tree of life (Genesis 3:24). 
62
 Dr Frankl (1905-1997) lost all of his family in the concentration camps of Hitler’s Germany but 
held on to the belief that there was a God in spite of all his observations suggesting the contrary. 
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In fact, freedom is in danger of degenerating into mere arbitrariness 
unless it is lived in terms of responsibleness… (Frankl 1988)  
 
As has been stated elsewhere, the existence of angelic creatures (including the 
fallen variety) need not be contentious. Scripture gives abundant significance to 
their existence. In spite of there being no account of their actual creation in 
Scripture angels are described as ‘created beings’ (Revelation 4:11)—they are not 
gods. As has been suggested above, the creation of these creatures —including 
the archangel known as Lucifer (Satan)—does not need to bear any relation to 
the evolutionary process whatsoever. However, there would, in the long term, be 
consequences for these particular agents (2 Peter 3:5-13; Jude 12-16).63 
 
Though Satan’s presence in heaven is referred to in Scripture (Job 1:6, 2:1; 
Revelation 12:7-9), these examples of Satan’s presence (whether literal or literary) 
are ‘past-tense’ events. It is not necessarily the case, that Satan still occupies the 
exact same place of authority to which he was initially appointed—though Satan, 
                                                          
63
 D.E. Johnson (2001, 164) suggests that the war in heaven that the apostle John sees in symbol 
was fought, when Jesus suffered and died on the cross outside of Jerusalem and cites Revelation 
12:7-9. Johnson’s opinion regarding the ‘actual’ time of the above event is interesting but not 
significant—in terms of the space-time outworking of God’s plan for the creation... However, it is 
an interesting possibility and it does resonate with the actual declaration of Christ when he 
declared: ‘It is finished’ (consummatum est) (John 19:30) These were not the words of one 
acquiescing to his fate but the words of the victorious Son of God who had defeated the works of 
Satan and had rescued the creation that groans. The crucifixion was the ultimate sacrifice—the 
resurrection the herald of Creation’s release from its bondage to decay and corruption; but, for 
the fallen variety there became ‘new’—hitherto unexperienced constraints—constraints that 
would eventually see their demise—the eclipse of evil and the realisation of the eschaton. 
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along with the other fallen angels continues to exercise/abuse certain of the 
prerogatives of power that were given by God from the onset of their creation64.  
 
As counterintuitive as the existence of such creatures may seem, particularly 
regarding the evolutionary process, it is the case that the existence of (angelic) 
extra-terrestrial life is supported by Scripture and may therefore form part of a 
biblically-based theodicy. N.T. Wright (2006) reminds us that when C.S. Lewis 
wrote the Screw Tape Letters, Lewis referred to the equal and opposite errors 
into which people could fall when thinking about the devil; they might take the 
idea of such a being or concept too seriously—imagining, “…the satan as a being 
equal and opposite to God or to Jesus…” or, conversely, they might ridicule the 
very idea of the existence of such entities. 
 
The satan, as portrayed in scripture and as experienced and taught about 
by many spiritual guides, is flatly opposed to God, supremely to God 
incarnate in the crucified and risen Jesus Christ. The claim made by the 
satan in Matthew 28:18, that to him has now been given all authority in 
heaven and earth. (N. Wright 2006, 71) 
 
                                                          
64
 According to Frederick Tatford (1970, 80) Satan is still numbered among ‘the sons of God’ and 
until this privilege is (finally) taken from him in ‘the future’ Satan still has access into the 
presence of God. We’re not sure how anyone could ‘affirm’ that the fallen angels are, somehow, as 
Tatford  puts it, ‘still numbered among the sons of God’. Fallen angels are, we suggest, though— 
post the incarnation—constrained to the confines of the known universe and possibly susceptible 
to the effects of its physical laws. Scripture is clear as to their demise as they shall either cease to 
exist or be cast out in ‘darkness’ (Jude 12,13).Wherever they may or may not have their existence it 
will, we can assume, not be in the New Heavens or Earth — dwelling in the very presence of God. 
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Wright holds the view that it is quite wrong to think of ‘the satan’ as ‘personal’— 
in the same way that God and Christ are personal but rather that, ‘the satan is 
sub-personal’. However, Wright does not suggest that the satan is a ‘vague or 
nebulous force—quite the reverse’ (N. Wright, 71) We, however, fail to see the 
problem—and prefer to consider Satan as (very) personal—so personal in fact 
that this creature is desirous of the elimination of the ‘vessel made of clay’ 
(Jeremiah 18:4 & Romans 9:21). Moreover, a ‘vague or nebulous’ concept could 
not, conceivably, have ‘personal’ objectives. 
 
7.3 Biospheric Consequences: 
The question arises as to how the [continued] rebellion of such creatures actually 
affects the physical realm. How does it manifest itself?   
 
Though not specifically addressing the influence of incorporeal agents, Marilyn 
McCord Adams (1999) suggests that, when evil  (unspecified origin) threatens we 
can take measures by assessing the risk factors, “…be it by taking care not to drop 
matches in dry forests, by boarding up windows against hurricanes, by sending 
peace-keeping forces…by working long hours in scientific laboratories to 
discover cures for crippling diseases…” (Adams-McCord 1999, 181) McCord 
Adams is not suggesting that the above are inherently evil (though the effects of 
war produces untold suffering) but that there needs to be an awareness that 
these eventualities may bring about harms. These harms—often considered as 
‘natural evil’ are harms that may, though, be brought about by the influence or 
unseen actions of extra-terrestrials—fallen angels. To suggest that such ‘august’ 
creatures as angels can have no influence on the physical world would be to deny 
Scripture. Moreover, these creatures, though incorporeal, are able—as is the 
creator God—to affect change to the physical order.  
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To suggest that fallen angels do not have the ability to bring about: forest fires, 
hurricanes, war and disease would be to ignore what Scripture affirms—that the 
immaterial can bring about changes to the ‘material’. If this were not so then 
Scripture would not be replete with examples of how it does exactly that. 
Moreover, it is the case that the Creator God, though incorporeal, is able to 
influence/persuade the creation into being. Referring to Quantum Theory 
Richard Swinburne (1998) makes that point that Quantum theory indicates the 
most fundamental laws of nature, “…the laws governing the behaviour of very 
small-scale particles, are probabilistic, i.e.  indeterministic; but that, in general, 
small-scale indeterminacies cancel out on the large scale, leading to virtually 
deterministic behaviour of the medium size objects with which we interact—
tables and chairs, trees and persons.” (Swinburne 1998, 116) It is not that ways 
have to be found to justify the unseen interaction between the ‘material’ and the 
‘immaterial’ but that modern advances in theoretical physics have brought to 
light ideas that had been considered most unlikely.  
 
John Hick (2010) refers to,  “the idea of a fall of angelic beings preceding and 
accounting for both the fall of man and the disordered and dysteleological 
features of the natural world.” (331) He admits that such a speculation has its 
attractions but views it with some disdain—comparing it with that of the ‘old 
Greek pantheon’. Hick adds, that the above idea was, in the first century, “… a 
contemporary Jewish understanding of disease which seems also to have been 
shared by Jesus himself.” (332). Hick’s concern here seems to be that such an idea 
would be a denial of creation’s ‘natural goodness’. In contradistinction to Hick’s 
view, the argument here is that the intrusion of angels into the material world 
does not deny the existence of an evolutionary pathway; neither does such an 
intrusion militate against the notion of a ‘good’ creation. However, our 
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understanding of ‘good’ is not that the creation was ever ‘perfectly morally good’, 
so it has to mean something else. Stephen T. Davis’ view is that, “God judged his 
creation to be very good in that it was a harmonious, beautiful, smoothly 
working cosmos rather than an ugly, churning chaos over which the Holy Spirit 
had moved (Genesis. 1:2).” (S. Davis 2001, 73) The Creation was as God intended.  
 
R. J. Russell (2008) points out that, “the Second Law of Thermodynamics 
provides an example at the level of physics of what is needed if the consequences 
of sinful acts are to be expressed physically, including dissipation and disruption, 
as well as the consequences of virtuous acts of beauty and goodness.” (258) This 
potentially, we maintain, would had been allowed for prior to the genesis of 
creation. If the Second Law is the necessary component—the one constant that 
produces the bountiful array of life that emanates through the biological 
processes as well as producing the entropic consequences that bring about 
predation, parasitism, plague and even ‘natural disasters’—then its inclusion 
would have been either an intentional act of the Creator of the universe or 
otherwise. We advocate the former, i.e. that it was both a necessary and 
intentional act—taken by God before the creation of the physical universe.      
 
In Genesis 2:17 the author refers not only to the tree of life but also to the ‘tree of 
the knowledge of good and evil’65. The linguistic use of the term ‘good and evil’ in 
Scripture is defined as an actual state or potentiality. In other words ‘good and 
evil’ had prior linguistic and experiential reality with regards to the actions of 
created agents.   
                                                          
65
 C. John Collins (2011, 65) refers to the symbolic references ( e.g. Proverbs 3:18;11:30;13:12;15:4) and 
suggests that the use of such language warrants us in finding the this tree to be some kind 
‘sacrament’ that (somehow) sustains or confirms someone in his moral condition—this being the 
reason for God’s banishment of the couple from ‘the garden’. 
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For any such ‘actions’ to have real effects there needs to be the ‘physical’ 
potential, i.e. the potentiality for incorporeal agents to bring about less than 
positive outcomes within the biosphere: to interfere with the creation.  
 
7.4 Post Fall Subjugation 
God’s necessary plans and intentionality are not to be confused with Paul’s words 
in Romans 8:20-21 where the apostle states that, “…the creation was [subjected]66 
to futility, not willingly, but because of him who subjected it, in hope that the 
creation itself will be set free from its bondage to corruption and obtain the 
freedom of the glory of the children of God.” In this passage, as elsewhere in the 
letter (Hendriksen 1980), Paul is referring to a ‘post Adamic Fall’ subjugation and 
not to any plans or actions taken by the creator before the creation of the 
physical universe. NB: It was God who (post Adamic fall) subjected the creation—
not: angels, demons or mankind. The subjugation that the apostle refers to, 
moreover, is not related to the creation of the universe but, specifically, to the 
Adamic Fall as recorded in Genesis 3. Leon Morris states that Scripture never 
assigns (either to ‘Adam’ or ‘Satan’) the power to bring about such far-reaching 
change, and that there is no reason to think of Adam or of Satan acting in hope 
for the future. “…hope is characteristic of God, who may indeed be called ‘the God 
of hope’ (Romans 15:13) The Adamic fall is not the last word; the last word is with 
hope.” (Morris 1988, 321-322) When would this subjugation of nature have taken 
place? We suggest that, as far as Paul was concerned, it would have been after the 
event in the garden (Genesis 3:15); here the writer specifically refers to the 
condemnation of the ‘serpent’. Paul, most likely, would not have presumed that 
God had pre-ordained the present (created) evolutionary biosphere in order to 
deal with the rebellion of either ‘Adam’ or angels.  
                                                          
66
 Greek Hupotassὅ meaning to rank under—denoting subjugation. (Vine, 1109) 
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John Bimson (2006) refers to the work of Andrew Linzey (2000) who suggests 
that Paul’s use of  ‘bondage to decay’ refers to ‘predation and parasitism—all the 
apparent violence and cruelty inherent in the structures of nature’. Regarding 
Paul’s reference to Genesis 3 James Dunn (2003, 96-97) suggests that the allusion 
is clear—and that the theme is familiar. Dunn states that the apostle draws the 
obvious implication from the function of the tree of life in Genesis 2-3, that death 
was not a part of the original divine intention in creation. However, despite some 
ambiguity, Dunn offers what he thinks Paul might be saying: 
 
What Paul seems to be saying is something like this: (1) All humanity 
shares a common subserviency to sin and death. This is not merely a 
natural fleshness, a created mortality. Sin is bound up with it, a falling 
short of God’s intended best. Death is the outcome of a breakdown within 
creation. (2) there is a two-sidedness to this state of affairs, involving both 
sin as an accountable action of individual responsibility…(3)…this state is 
the consequence of humanity’s refusal to acknowledge God, of the 
creature’s attempt to dispense with the creator. When humankind 
declared its independence from God, it abandoned the only power which 
can overcome the sin which uses the weakness of the flesh, the only 
power which can overcome death… (Dunn 2003, 97) 
 
Dunn’s summary offers a reasonable account of the ‘life potential’ offered to the 
imago Dei—in contradistinction to mankind’s  adherence to acquiesce to 
another’s choice—that of Satan.  Indeed, Genesis 3:22 informs us that the man 
had not eaten of the tree of life, 3:24,  and that there were cherubim guarding the 
way to the tree of life so that they could not partake of its fruit.  
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The occupants of the garden had ‘eaten’ from the tree of the knowledge of good 
and evil (Genesis 3:6). This was not at all surprising as the quest for knowledge is 
empowering.  It would have been, we suggest, the quest for knowledge, 
independent of God, where the problem lay—the quest for power and personal 
sovereignty—perhaps the same quest sought by Satan and the fallen angels. God 
had made provision for the sustaining of the life of the first Adam .The tree of life 
had not, previously, been out of bounds. Physical death was however the ‘order’. 
Without the direct intervention of the source of life (God the creator) it was the 
necessary consequence of one of the fundamental laws of physics: the second law 
of thermodynamics—what William R. Stoeger (2007)  describes as, “…the 
underlying physical reason for the transience and fragility of any physically or 
chemically based system—any material entity…” (96).  
 
Death was natural yet the possibility of eternal (physical) life seemed to be ‘on 
offer’. If eternal (physical) existence was possible, why should God have included 
such a defining set of rules? There are two reasons that we wish to consider as 
‘reasons’ for God’s inclusion of the Second Law within the laws that govern 
physical reality: 
 
1. That, in order to produce ‘conscious physicality’ in carbon-based creatures, 
the process of biological evolution was the only way God could have brought 
about his ultimate (good) objectives—the production of  all ‘creaturely 
value’—ultimately the Imago Dei. 
2. To dispose of the ‘present problem of evil’—the problem that had 
manifested itself within the physical cosmology—that is the present universe. 
Moreover, we maintain that it is within the physical/material reality that evil 
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presently pervades and that it will not obtain at the eschaton as God will have 
completely eradicated it. 
 
Belief in the sovereignty and integrity of God leads us to the conclusion that God 
is working his purposes out and that belief in God’s benevolence can be upheld. 
However, the world ‘has been’, ’is being’ and ‘will be’ subjected to degradation of 
all kinds until the eschaton. Scripture tells us (Ps. 24:1-2) that this world and all 
that is in it belongs to God and yet Scripture also states that, ‘the whole world lies 
in the power of the evil one.’ (1 Jn. 5:19) and that, ‘...an enemy has brought 
corruption to the earth...’ (Matt. 13:28). There is, we maintain, no contradiction 
here as ‘ownership’ or ‘authorship’ does not preclude either intrusion or the out-
workings of the decisions of ‘minds’ other than God’s.  Gregory Boyd argues that, 
“If the cosmos is not something of a democracy67, it has to be something of a 
tyrannical monarchy.” (1997, 118-119) We do not hold that the cosmos is anything 
like a democracy neither do we believe that ‘sovereignty’ necessitates tyrannical 
monarchy—at least not where the God of the Bible is concerned—‘gods’ are 
another matter. What is clear from both observation and from Scripture is that 
the earth is not anything like ‘heaven’ but that it is a place full of all that might be 
expected if an enemy of God ‘wished to’ usurp God’s authority and to tarnish 
God’s reputation.  This ‘present’ state—as recorded in Scripture and as observed 
by the discerning eye—is not an example of chaos ruling over sovereignty or any 
other kind of alleged (dualistic) cosmic conflict. It is not at all what it seems; it is, 
in spite of what seems to be ‘evidence’ to the contrary, “God’s future, and this is 
more than the future time. It is the future of time itself—time past, time present, 
                                                          
67
 Whilst not sharing all of Boyd’s particular views of the openness of God we appreciate his 
sentiments here, i.e. that there has to be activity in the creation that is not under the control of a 
cosmic puppeteer; this applies to the actions (causes and effects) of both humans and angels. 
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and time to come. In his future, God comes to his creation and through the 
power of his righteousness and justice, frees it for his kingdom, and makes it the 
dwelling place of his glory.” (Bauckham 1999) 
 
Summary: 
1. Considering the pre-existence of Angels it can be concluded that, though 
created by God, they were not created along with the rest of the creative 
order within the evolutionary system. In other words, they were created 
outside of the known space/time continuum. 
2. The event that precipitated the rebellion of some of these angelic agents 
would have been ‘known’ by God prior to the ‘beginnings’ of the universe. 
Ergo, this would have been a major factor regarding God’s planned 
intentions for the material universe.  
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Part 8. That only such a world as this could make possible 
the incarnation of the divine Son and thereby the defeat of 
the angels and the implantation of justice through the power 
of the Cross: 
 
8.1 Only such a world 
Simon Conway Morris (2003) refers to the significance of the evolution of 
humans, or something very closely related. He states that, “We may be unique, 
but paradoxically those properties that define our uniqueness can still be 
inherent in the evolutionary process. In other words, if we humans had not 
evolved then something more or less identical would have emerged sooner or 
later.” (2003, 198) Whatever the actuality of the evolutionary process mankind’s 
place in the evolutionary scale of events has been inevitable and is exceptional 
within the created order. Evolution was given, seemingly, a clear direction—there 
was, what may be considered a ‘blueprint’ for the process. William Carroll 
(quoting various sources) succinctly outlines the theistic implications within the 
biological process:  
 
Although chance events are frequent and important in biological 
evolution, rendering its actual course indeterminate or unpredictable in 
exact outcome from any particular stage, these events and their short and 
long-term effects—whether they be of point mutations at the level of 
molecular DNA, or the impact of a meteorite—are always within a context 
of regularities, constraints, and possibilities. Thus, to refer to such events 
as ‘pure chance’ or to assert blithely that evolution proceeds by purely 
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chance events is much less than a precise description of this source of 
unpredictability in biological evolution… Furthermore, even though the 
contemporary natural sciences often seek to discover efficient causes 
without reference to purposes (final causes), any ordering of efficient 
causes and their effects implicitly acknowledges and presupposes that the 
efficient causes and the processes which embody them are directed 
towards the realization of certain specific types of ends. Efficient causes 
always have certain specifiable effects. (Carroll 2000) 
 
The point being made here is that an omnipotent God can bring order out of 
chaos or order out of what may appear to be undirected evolutionary processes. 
However one discerns the means through which the God of the Judeo/Christian 
Scriptures ‘directs’ creative processes, Earth is the ‘blue sphere’ that God had 
prepared for the arrival of homo sapiens68 and for such an event as the 
incarnation of Christ and the annunciation of ‘release for the captives‘(Isaiah 
42:7). As has been previously argued this world is the only possible world, in 
which there could have arisen intelligent carbon-based life forms. Indeed, as 
Michael Murray (2008)  points out, we have no knowledge of any other such 
worlds in which biological evolution as we know it could succeed.  
 
Regarding the creation of this world the Genesis text states: “God saw everything 
he had made and it was very good”. (1:31). God sustains the world as well as the 
                                                          
68
 William Stone (2014, 53-81) suggests that Adam could be placed at the route of the Homo 
erectus/ergaster to Homo sapiens lineage around 1.8 million years ago.  Stone qualifies this by  
adding (p80) that his conclusion was somewhat contingent on the acceptance of a number of 
presuppositions that were “bound up with current paleoanthropological models.” Stone 
commented that he had not addressed the wider issues of relating the ‘human’ fossil record to the 
biblical narrative, which is something of particular importance.  
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universe within the boundaries69 He has set for it. According to the Genesis text, 
the creative results were not only good but they were ‘very good’; ‘everything had 
gone to plan’; the result being that it was ‘very good’. There followed, what 
appeared to be, a ‘dark side’ to the process70—that of the negative side of the 
Second Law of Thermodynamics—the increase of entropy that ensured the 
likelihood of the evolutionary process. However, what may appear to some 
observers to be the dark side of the laws of physics need be nothing of the sort. 
Rather, the laws, as ordained by the creator, were a necessary ingredient for the 
creation and development of carbon-based life—culminating in the ‘late’ arrival 
of the image bearers of God. It is by the laws of physics that the triune God is 
able to bring about ultimate justice; God, in Christ, is able to give of himself on 
the cross so that there could be resolution and reconciliation71.  
                                                          
69
 What is meant by ‘boundaries’ is the limits that God may have preordained for the development 
of his creation both cosmological [in terms of the expansion of the universe] and biological [in 
terms of God’s restrictions on the limits of evolutionary development as well as God’s prohibitions 
on any undesired interference to that development—by any created beings—humans or 
otherwise.]  
70
 “..the Second Law taken in isolation leads us to predict a future which is one of disorder and 
ultimate decay…” (Hough 2010, 143) 
71
 With reference to the efficacy of the Cross of Christ the apostle Paul states that, “…while we 
were enemies we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son, much more, now that we are 
reconciled, shall we be saved by his life. More than that, we also rejoice in God through our Lord 
Jesus Christ, through whom we have now received reconciliation.” (Romans 5:10) .Christ has dealt 
with the problem of evil through his death on the cross. The cross is the ultimate act of justice 
through which God deals with the sin of the world. Paul states that , “…if righteousness were 
through the law, then Christ died for no purpose.” (Galatians 2:21) The acceptance of God’s offer 
of unconditional forgiveness is a matter of grace but it is also a matter of the heart as is made 
clear in Romans 10:9: “If you confess with your mouth that Jesus is Lord and believe in your heart 
that God raised him from the dead, you will be saved.”. However it is that reconciliation and grace 
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The argument in this thesis is that any kinds of harms—whether the results of 
predation, parasitism and plague or the consequence of plate tectonic movement 
etc.—should be regarded  as consequences of, mostly, a necessary-natural-state-
of-affairs.  However, the ‘evil’ that does manifest itself within the world is far 
from natural, rather it is the result of deviancy within the minds and wills of 
both terrestrial and extra-terrestrial beings—ergo it is ‘moral’ rather than 
natural, and it manifests itself in every hideous shape and form.  
 
It is this ‘angelic moral deviancy’ and resultant rebellion that the Creator God 
had to consider prior to the initiation of the creation ex nihilo; ‘omniscience’ 
would have been key to the knowledge required by God to outmanoeuvre the 
powerful enemies of God. Our argument here is that it was the mind of God 
alone that contained the wherewithal to bring about a biosphere that, on the 
surface, would have appeared random yet beneath the veneer of chance and 
necessity there lay a deeper reality over time—an unfurling of the telos of God.  
Perhaps it was the ‘unfurling’ of God’s plans for creation that enabled/allowed 
the angels’ insight into the (perceived) plans and purposes of God. Whatever the 
truth, the fallen angels could not have understood the actual plans of God— 
plans that were to bring about the redemption of a cosmos tainted by the actions 
and interventions of deviants. It was the incarnation—the death— the 
resurrection into ‘new life’ of the second person of the Trinity  that they would 
have been ignorant of—for if they had not been ignorant of God’s plans and 
intentions, they would not have allowed such a state of affairs to obtain—for it 
was to, eventually, bring about their demise. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
work together, the important point is that this momentous act of sacrifice and of reconciliation is, 
according to  Scripture, found in Christ alone (Acts 4:12). 
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 8.2 The Goal of Creation 
Scripture attests to the incarnational objectives of the second person of the 
Trinity. Andrew and Trotter (1997) refer to the importance of eschatology as 
recorded in the letter to the Hebrews—pointing out that the prologue catalogues 
what had happened in Christ, “… in a historical progression of events moving 
from his role as Creator to Redeemer to heavenly intermediary for his people.” 
(208).  
 
…to which of the angels has he (God) ever said, ‘Sit at my right hand until 
I make your enemies a footstool for your feet.’(Christ) …for a little while 
made a little lower than the angels…..crowned with glory and honour 
because of the suffering of death, so that by the grace of God he might 
taste death for everyone…that through death he might destroy the one 
who has the power of death, that is, the devil. (Hebrews 1:13; 2:7,14).  
 
The irony is that God, by allowing for the physical laws that bring about what 
may be considered the worst possible state of affairs, actually allows for the best 
possible state of affairs to obtain—victory over sin and death. Colin Dye (2013) 
refers to Genesis 3:15 as being the first glimpse of the gospel, the first 
foreshadowing of the cross, and it points specifically to the victory of God: 
 
This first prediction of triumph identified the woman’s seed, or offspring, 
as the one who would be completely victorious. It was later revealed to 
the prophets that this ‘seed’ would be the Messiah, the Christos or 
‘Anointed Man’, who would establish God’s righteous rule and eradicate 
evil.” (Dye 2013) 
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Regarding the incarnation Adrio König (1989) points out that when the apostle 
Paul states that ‘all things are created for Christ’ (Colossians 1:16), “…here we have 
the goal of creation. Creation is aimed toward Christ as its target; it moves 
toward him, and in him it will reach its goal.72” (1989, 26)   
Ivor Davidson refers to God’s ‘end designs’ when he says that, “The God who 
saves is the God who is creator, sustainer, redeemer and perfecter of all things, 
the one who elects to enter into irrevocable union with materiality, whose Spirit 
animates all life, and who surely has purposes for all that he has made. While 
there is much that we cannot say about the details of what this entails 
eschatologically, God, it seems, intends that not just humans but creatures of all 
kinds should attain the glory of freedom and fulfilment in relation to their 
creator.” (2011, 11)  
 
Jonathan R. Wilson (2013) states that it is when Christians progress a Trinitarian 
doctrine of creation (in what Wilson refers to as “being in dialectic with 
redemption”) it is ‘then’ that they have good news for their interlocutors— 
indeed for society: “Given our convictions about creation…we may know that the 
refusal to believe in Christ as the telos of the universe will lead to despair even as 
society develops strategies, practices and products to ameliorate deny and 
manage the despair.” (Wilson 2013, 20-29) 
 
He is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of all creation. For 
by him all things were created, in heaven and on earth, visible and 
                                                          
72
 König points out that there is no contradiction between this and such statements as Romans 
11:36 and Hebrews 2:10 where it we read that God (the Father) is the purpose of creation—for 
there is no disunity between Father and Son. The same applies to Hebrews 2:10 and also to 
Colossians 1:16. 
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invisible, whether thrones or dominions or rulers or authorities—all 
things were created through him and for him. And he is before all things, 
and in him all things hold together. And he is the head of the body, the 
church. He is the beginning, the firstborn from the dead, that in 
everything he might be preeminent. For in him all the fullness of God was 
pleased to dwell, and through him to reconcile to himself all things, 
whether on earth or in heaven, making peace by the blood of his cross. 
(Colossians 1:15-20) 
 
N.T.Wright (2003) refers to the above passage from Paul’s letter to the 
Colossians as, “…a spectacular early Christian poem [which] places Jesus’ 
resurrection (1:18) in parallel with the creation of the world (1:15), seeing it as the 
ground and origin of what the creator has now accomplished and is now 
implementing, namely the reconciliation of all things to him.” (239) Wright’s 
conviction, that the very shape of the poem insists that Jesus’ resurrection, as a 
one-off event, is an act not of the elimination of the original creation but of its 
fulfilment (239),  fits in with our argument. Moreover, Wright’s conclusion that, 
“…the one through whom all things were made in the first place, the one through 
whom all things cohere, the one in and through all things are now brought into a 
new relationship with the creator God and with one another..” coheres with the 
argument here—that, the eternal Son of God—through his life, death and 
resurrection reconciled all things to himself—“ He [God] disarmed the rulers and 
authorities and put them to open shame, by triumphing over them in him 
[Christ].” (Colossians 2:15) 
 
8.3 The Justice of God  
 GOD, evolution and the problem of evil: 
Towards A Solution 
Derek J. White 
 
 
136 
Without penalty any notion of law is meaningless. Any action by agents with the 
Peter capacity to will to choose brings with it the consequences of that action. 
Lowman (2002) says, “… to the biblical worldview, the world as a whole was 
condemned to purposelessness by the first humans' assertion of independence 
from God that we call the Fall. The results were meaninglessness—futility.” (53) 
This ‘one act of rebellion’ (as reported in Genesis 3) was, de facto, the precursor 
to both condemnation and intervention—God’s intervention being particularly 
delineated in Genesis 2 and 3 where the text refers to: ‘a loss of life potential’ 
(2:17); ‘increased pain awareness’  (3:16); ‘a radical change in the environs’ (3:17-
19), and the loss of access to the ‘tree’, which is, in some way analogous of ‘the  
source of the sustenance of life’ (3:23,24) . But, this ‘one’ act of rebellion by the 
‘Adamic’ pair was not the source of the Problem of Evil, it was rather the 
outworking of the rebellion of angels that had taken place ‘prior’ to the creation 
of the physical universe73. But it was within this physical universe (within the 
constraints allowed by the physical laws that God had ordained) that the effects 
of these laws (outside of the garden) had already been made manifest. It was to 
the outside of this ‘Eden’—‘sacred place’ (Walton 2009, 82)—that the first pair 
would have been expelled. As with the angels who were cast out of heaven, so 
the man and woman were cast out of Eden not because they had the will to 
choose but that they chose to oppose God—to abjure from loving and serving 
and enjoying the presence of their creator God. Both the ‘casting out’ of the 
Adamic pair (Genesis 3:22,23) and the casting down of Satan and his angels 
(Revelation 12:7-12; Luke 10:18) entailed banishment and exile—Imago Dei from 
                                                          
73
 ‘Events’ prior to the beginning of the space/time continuum are not events that can be measured 
as such; however, the need for intelligible communication dictates the use of time words and of 
tenses; consequently, when we refer to an authentic occurrence before the creation of the 
Universe we have little option but to use such language. 
 GOD, evolution and the problem of evil: 
Towards A Solution 
Derek J. White 
 
 
137 
the paradise—from the potential for life in all its fullness ; the angels  from the 
presence of God—into an environment from which there would be no exit (Jude 
13; Revelation 20). 74 
   
 
8.4  Beyond Shadowlands 
It stands to reason that if God were ‘able’ (due to God’s omnipotence) to create a 
world without the deleterious effects of entropy, then it is reasonable to ask why 
it is God may not have taken this direction when working out his grand plan for 
the creation of the universe. Could God have not produced a better environment 
than planet earth so that there was less likelihood of—at least natural disasters? 
The answer is, unequivocally in the negative; and it is for this reason: This 
universal system is not merely the best of all possible systems conducive to the 
formation of biological life—life in all its vulnerability.It is more crucially, the 
only system that would have allowed for God to deal with the ‘Universal’ Problem 
of Evil: to prepare a biological pathway for the arrival of mankind—and therefor 
the possibility of the incarnation of the second person of the Trinity, and 
henceforth the redemption of creation through the Cross of Christ, so that the 
redeemed creation could dwell with the Godhead on the new earth.   
 
That the ascension of Christ is significant is beyond doubt. However, what may 
not be so readily observable (unless seen through the lens of theoretical physics 
—into the ‘world’ of parallel universes) is the possibility that the new world order 
                                                          
74
 Could it be the case that these creatures, having been cast out of heaven, infecting both the 
biosphere and their own self[s]—were, as fallen angels, lesser creatures with diminished powers 
—in some way subject to the laws of physics? We can but speculate. They, however, have 
continued to war against the creation that God had declared good. 
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(new heavens and new earth) may already exist—having been developing  in 
tandem with the known world—that this is possibly where Christ dwells at 
present—is somehow synonymous with that which will appear from ‘heaven’—as 
the vision of John records: “And I saw the holy city, new Jerusalem, coming down 
out of heaven from God, prepared as a bride adorned for her husband.” 
(Revelation 21:2)   
 
J.J. Wilson describes the ‘new heavens and new earth’ as, “…not a second creation 
or a simple restoration of the first heaven and earth; it is the redemption of 
creation for its telos [that] takes place in Jesus Christ. The blessedness of the 
‘beatitudes’ is now fulfilled in the new creation.” (2013, 136)   
 
C. S. Lewis said that Christianity does not teach us to desire ‘a total release’—as if 
we were to be emancipated from the physical: “We desire, like St Paul, not to be 
un-clothed but to be re-clothed; to find not the formless Everywhere-and-
Nowhere but the promised land, that Nature which will be always and perfectly– 
as presently Nature is partially and intermittently–the instrument for that music 
which will then arise between Christ and us.” (1998, 171,172) Moreover, Lewis 
considers that entering heaven is to become more human than ever possible on 
this planet. In one of his ‘children’s stories Lewis paints a picture of a bleak world 
in which there is no summer only winter. The ‘coming world’ may be the world 
beyond our present experience but  Scripture assures us that life in this, as yet 
unknown world, is beyond the tainted reach of ‘Shadowlands’. It can be further 
supposed that the paradise of God may somehow co-exist with the known 
cosmos. In other words, The evolution of the best of all possible worlds (in which 
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entropy has no effects75) may have been being created at the same ‘time’ as this 
(the best of all possible worlds in which the problem of evil is dealt a fatal blow). 
The possibility of such a parallel new world order is not, considering the nature 
and character of the God of Scripture, an unreasonable or implausible 
assumption. Moreover, it is not a less reasonable projection than the novel ideas 
regarding the happenstance of parallel universes. 
 
We are of the firm opinion that it is because of the inexhaustible benevolence of 
God that the ‘old order’ has been allowed to continue thus far. Moreover, it is 
because of the gracious mercy of God that every possible opportunity is given for 
mankind to respond to ‘kindness of God’ as the apostle Paul refers to in his letter 
to the Romans. (2:4)  
 
As much as it is possible to offer a theodicy or defence; it is quite another thing 
to satisfy all the challenges proffered against the possibility of, not only the 
existence of the God of the Bible, but of this same God’s goodness. In the Eight-
Step argument offered here we have, what is, as close to an evolutionary theodicy 
as is possible. There is, however, one area of thought that we need to consider— 
that of ‘Free-Will’. The notion of free-will may be considered a flaw in the 
argument because, it might be argued that God will have taken a step too far in 
that any cause and effect from free-will choices would be, ultimately, God’s 
                                                          
75
 Projecting forward to the actualization of the Grace of God in a ‘new world order’, R.J. Russell 
states insightfully that, “in its most simple form it might mean that the New Creation will not 
include thermodynamics since it contributes to natural evil. In a slightly more complex form it 
might mean that the New Creation will not include thermodynamics to the extent that it 
produces natural evils, though it might include it to the extent that it produces natural goods.” 
(Russell 2008).   
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responsibility. In response to this sentiment, we would argue that the free-will 
expressed in both angelic and human actions were, for the Creator, a price worth 
paying—and for the creation—a glorious expression of ontological  creative 
genius. The alternative is not a consideration—indeed there would be no need of 
any notion of defence should free-will be either an illusion or a state of affairs 
that is beyond the creative ability of an omnipotent God. 
 
Let the reader decide which of the two would have produced a better state of 
affairs: a sterile, mechanistic world void of personality and free-will, in which there 
existed only the pretence of  personality or a world in which God’s personality is 
reflected in the Imago Dei—the fallen and the redeemed? 
 
Conclusion  
Throughout the duration of this research project we have sought to establish 
whether or not it was possible to successfully argue that the God of  biblical 
theism—being identified as the master craftsman of the creation of the physical 
universe—could possibly be the architect, creator/ sustainer of life throughout 
the [evolutionary] history of the biosphere—and have concluded that it is 
entirely plausible to conclude that the God of Christian Scriptures,who is both 
omnipotent and benevolent, ordained the known physical laws so as to bring 
about the best of possible outcomes. 
 
We reasoned that the creation should be considered ‘good’ as opposed to 
‘perfect’—and that there is sufficient reason to refute the notion of the creation 
being perfect at its inception and therefore—as the result of either an Angelic or 
Adamic Fall—that creation suffered a catastrophic failure to the extent that there 
 GOD, evolution and the problem of evil: 
Towards A Solution 
Derek J. White 
 
 
141 
was a change to the physical laws through which predation, parasitism, plague 
and death entered the experience of all carbon-based life forms.  
 
We have, furthermore, argued that in spite of the difficulty in advocating God’s 
goodness within an evolutionary framework the implications do not present an 
insurmountable hurdle to the work of evolutionary theodicy—as argued in part 
two of this thesis.  
 
We considered the ingenuity of philosophical theologians—in their attempt to 
offer an alternative for the God of Scripture, and argued that though their efforts 
are creative—at least in terms of an alternative view of the deity—they are not 
relevant to any defence that takes the traditional views of God’s character 
seriously. Moreover, we reasoned that the ‘Ground of Being’ alternative, and that 
of process theology, and other philosophical theologians are not at all 
convincing—and are an unnecessary deviancy from the traditional view God as a 
[Triune] personality: ‘A Determinate Entity’.  
 
We interacted with various defences/theodicies, that in the light of biological 
evolution, have offered differing perspectives—ranging from, what appears to be 
an obscure scenario involving retrospective Kairological—post ‘Adamic Fall’ 
judgement—to an up-to-date review of the theodicies of Irenaeus and Augustine. 
It was throughout our lengthy interaction with all of these defences/theodicies 
that the eight-part argument was devised and developed.  
 
In the second part of the thesis we introduced and discussed an ‘Eight Step 
Defence’ (we refer to it as a defence rather than a theodicy). In this eight-step-
defence we argued that it is good for God to create a world such as this—and that 
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such a world as this could only obtain via an evolutionary process—that it is only 
such a world as this that is capable of being transformed into the new creation—
as it is in this world, at the right time, that mankind ‘became’ . We made the case 
for the existence of angels, and for their existence prior to the ‘space/tie 
continuum—that it was a good thing that God had created angels with free-
will—even though these fallen angels continued to oppose God’s purposes, 
especially with regards to God’s purposes for mankind—both on this earth and 
on the new earth. We argued that, at a particular juncture in time, the second 
person of the Trinity became a man so that, in due course, He, and only He, 
could, through his death and resurrection, defeat the evil brought about by the 
rebellion of angels—making possible a way back from ‘Eden’ for mankind—from 
alienation into the presence of God on the New Earth.  
Derek John White  
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